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This thesis is situated at the intersection of feminist political theory, identity politics 
and moral philosophy. Its broader aim is to show the positive consequences of 
returning the self and its inner activity to the ethical domain for feminist identity 
politics. To this end, it brings feminist identity politics into dialogue with 
contemporary developments in virtue ethics, in particular Christine Swanton’s 
pluralistic virtue ethics. As its starting point, it takes issue with the tendency to 
reduce the complexity of identity to issues of category. The first part of the thesis 
problematises this tendency and argues for a reconsideration of the question of 
identity politics by shifting the focus away from identity per se and towards a more 
complex picture of the self that is reflective of the constitutive relation between the 
self and identifications, commitments and values. The work of the post-modern 
feminists Wendy Brown and Judith Butlers are read as proposing just such a shift 
away from the identitarian engagement of identity politics of ‘who am I?’ towards a 
more ethically imbued engagement that centres a complex self with inner depths. 
Part Two of the thesis extends this reconceptualisation of the problematic of identity 
politics and elaborates on what it could mean to undertake such a shift and how such 
a project could be conceived. Drawing on both Michael Sandel’s and Michel 
Foucault’s formulations of the self, identity and its relation to the good, the thesis 
develops the argument that the problematic of identity politics, articulated in ethical 
language, enables the formulation of an argument for giving an account of the good 
life and that this entails developing a subject imbued with a full inner life. Part Three 
of the thesis argues that contemporary work in virtue ethics offers the best way to 
take this project forward, suggesting that it represents a positive development in 
conceptions of the self and that a complex picture of the person emerges that 
provides the basis for a richer approach to the ethical concerns raised in identity 
politics. The thesis concludes by illustrating the potential value of taking those 
feminist insights into the constructed nature of identity into dialogue with a 




new opportunities for understanding and discussing the collective dimension of 
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The contemporary debate in Anglo-American feminist theory about identity politics 
has led to a critical impasse
1
 and mired feminism in what has been termed an 
‘identity crisis.’
2
 This debate is generally framed within the conflict of two 
seemingly irreconcilable ways of thinking about identity categories. On the one side, 
the identity of women is best understood as essentialist.
3
 Essentialists, along with 
strategic essentialists,
4
 argue that feminism has been at its most powerful when it is 
grounded in an understanding of the identity of women as sameness and unified. On 
the other side, deconstructionists
5
 argue that the notion of ‘woman’ as a unified 
identity should be rejected in favour of multiply shifting, open-ended processes of 
identification.
6
 Feminists, by and large, tend to align themselves with one of these 
                                                 
1
 See Linda Alcoff, ‘Cultural Feminism Versus Poststructuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist 
Theory,’ Signs: Journal of Women in Culture in Society, Volume 13, Number 3 (1988); Wendy 
Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(New York, London: Routledge, 1990); Jodi Dean, Solidarity of Strangers: feminism after identity 
politics (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1996); Susan Hekman, 
‘Beyond Identity: Feminism, Identity and Identity Politics,’ Feminist Theory, Volume 1, Number 3 
(December 2000); Susan J. Hekman, Private Selves, Public Identities: Reconsidering Identity Politics 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2004); Alison Stone, 
‘'Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy,’ Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 
1, Number 2 (2004); Allison Weir, Sacrificial Logics: feminist theory and the critique of identity 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995).  
2
 Alcoff coined this term to describe the crisis in feminism over the concept of the subject ‘woman.’ 
See Alcoff, ‘Cultural Feminism Versus Poststructuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory.’ 
Hekman picks up on this in subsequent work. See Susan Hekman, ‘Identity Crises: Identity, Identity 
Politics and Beyond,’ ed. Susan J. Hekman, Feminism, Identity and Difference (London: Franc Cass, 
1999). See also Fiona Webster, ‘The Politics of Sex and Gender: Benhabib and Butler Debate 
Subjectivity,’ Hypatia, Volume 15, Issue 1 (Winter 2000). 
3
 This is work that originated with Carole Gilligan, In a Different Voice: psychological theory and 
women’s development (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1982); Nancy 
Chodorow, The reproduction of mothering: psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender (Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 1978); Jean Bethke-Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: women in 
social and political thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993 [1981] 2
nd
 ed).  
4
 For instance see Gayatri Chakravoty Spivak, In other worlds: essays in cultural politics (New York, 
London: Routledge, 1988).  
5
 Under the heading of ‘deconstructionists,’ I place both postmodernism and poststructuralism – i.e. 
the work of theorists like Judith Butler and Wendy Brown.  
6
 See Vikki Bell, Feminist Imagination: genealogies in feminist theory (London: Sage, 1999). Bell 
argues for an understanding of feminism as ‘the exposition of a shared non-identity,’ (19). 
 




 More recently, some feminists have suggested that it is time to move 
‘beyond identity,’
8
 casting blame for the fragmentation of both activist and academic 
feminism here.
9
 Indeed, some feminists have withdrawn from advancing any notion 
of shared values as essential for collective politics, viewing such claims as invariably 
false and complicit in the normalisation of privileging some forms of femininity over 
others.
10
 Still others critique this sidestepping of the issue of identity, arguing that 
feminist theory thereby neglects the difficult question of collective feminist 
politics.
11
 What these critiques hold in common is that it is identity that gives shape 
to the ethical relation.  
 
This thesis builds the argument that it is the reverse that is true. It is the ethical 
relation in identity politics that shapes identity. It is the relation of the self to others, 
to commitments, to values, in short, to what moral philosophy refers to as the ‘good 
life,’ that shapes identity. This thesis challenges the claim that diversity and 
postmodernist feminism neglect the difficult question of political collective action. I 
argue that identity politics are ‘practical politics’ in the sense that diverse groups of 
differentially situated individuals attempt to form and maintain collectivities for the 
purpose of carrying out political projects that have to do with how old forms of 
oppression can be resisted and what new ways can be created. In coming together to 
work on shared projects though, differentially placed individuals are placed 
differentially in relation to each other. Women’s organisations in Northern Ireland 
that have attempted to work across the sectarian divide are illustrative of the sort of 
hard, on-going, as well as risky, work involved in forging shared political projects 
                                                 
7
 For recent exceptions to this trend, see for instance Dean Solidarity of Strangers: feminism after 
identity politics; Weir, Sacrificial Logics. 
8
 Dean, Solidarity of Strangers: feminism after identity politics; Hekman, ‘Beyond Identity: 
Feminism, Identity and Identity Politics.’ 
9
 See Dean, Solidarity of Strangers: feminism after identity politics; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth,  
Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange  (London: Verso, 2003); Hekman, 
‘Beyond Identity: Feminism, identity and identity politics,’ 289-308; Moya Lloyd, Beyond Identity 
Politics: Feminism, Power and Politics (London: Sage, 2005); Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and 
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Linda Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of 
Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005). 
10
 See for instance Stone, ‘Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy.’  
11
 Allison Weir, ‘Global feminism and transformative identity politics,’ Hypatia, Volume 23, Number 
4 (October-December, 2008): 110-133; Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Human/Women’s Rights and Feminist 
Transversal Politics,’ Global feminism : transnational women's activism, organizing, and human 
rights, edited by Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp (New York, London : New York University 
Press, 2006).  
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across difference. This ‘practical work,’ I argue, is best understood through the 
notion of praxis.  
Practical work as praxis  
Praxis is derived from the Greek verb meaning ‘to do’ or ‘to act’ and is concerned 
with intentional action or conscious achievement. Aristotle distinguishes praxis from 
poeisis; the latter term is concerned with making things, whereas the former includes 
activities such as theory. With Rousseau, the concept is employed to explain social 
and political transformation.
12
 In Marx, we find its contemporary form, where it is 
used to explain the processes of labour, but the emphasis remains on transformation: 
‘By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he (she) at the same time 
changes his (her) nature.’
13
 For Marx too, praxis is collective, not individual, action. 
It is an important term of use in feminist theory since the 1970’s and is loosely taken 
to indicate that point at which one moves from informed awareness to political 
action. Postmodern accounts like hooks’ argue though that a feminist understanding 
of praxis is often premised on an emphasis of identity. This can create the illusion 
that one is engaged in praxis. However, she argues that ‘any praxis within a political 
movement that aims to have a radical transformative impact on society cannot solely 
be focussed on creating spaces wherein would-be radicals experience safety and 
support.’
14
 Feminist movement, she insists, in order to end oppression, must actively 
engage participants in a struggle that is ‘rarely safe or pleasurable.’
15
 For hooks, 
praxis is about collective politics and requires of the individual a cultivation of an 
ethical concern for the oppression of others that she, herself, is complicit in.  
 
This is the ethical link between praxis and identity politics that both Brown and 
Butler, in different ways, are pointing towards and that this project aims to connect. 
It is in Foucault, I argue, that we find the workings of this connection clearly 
                                                 
12
 Jean Jaques Rousseau, The Discourses and other early political writings, Victor Gourevitch 
(ed/translator) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
13
 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach,’ D. McLellan (ed) Selected Writings: Karl Marx (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 28-30.  
14
 bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 30.  
15
 hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, 30. 
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specified. Foucault also can be read as positing praxis in reference to activism and 
consciousness. Key is the same integration of theoria and praxis that Aristotle wrote 
of, as well as the integration of reflection with action and collective work that aims at 
transformation. What is most important for Foucault, and an element that I develop, 
is that the term praxis is to be understood as an intentional ‘achievement’ that 
depends upon developing, not only knowledge of the self, but importantly, the self-
reflective capacities of the agent.  
 
Whereas, poeisis is about making and thus, completing some thing, praxis is doing 
as a mode of conduct that contains its meaning in itself. Therefore, completion is 
contained within its satisfactory accomplishment rather than in producing a product. 
Acting though is never completed in the sense that a product in poeisis is. Because 
each action entails some further action, in any given instant, the subject is never 
finished with her task and yet is at her goal, which is good action. This suggests the 
further Greek term telos and presses the further question of what motivates resistance 
to old forms of oppression and what motivates inventing new ways of life. In order 
to highlight that identity politics is a form of political activity that should be 
understood as praxis, I argue for reframing the debate within terms closer to those of 
the traditional discourse of ethics.  
 
I argue that what has become lost in the so-called ‘paradigm wars’
16
 of feminist 
identity politics, is not the unified subject, but a lack of attention to these important 
ethical issues that belong under the rubric of identity politics – namely issues to do 
with the relation of the self to others, the relation of the self to values and ideals, the 
relation of the self to self, both within the context of an individual life, as well as, 
within the context of a collectivity – in short, praxis. The ‘paradigm wars’ have 
focussed too much on identity as a category, with questions tightly revolving around 
defining the ‘woman’ question – is she constructed or is she essential? The focus on 
identity as category has led to a lack of focus on the ethical grounding that is 
necessary for connecting identity to politics, which is the liberatory dimension of 
identity politics.  
                                                 
16
 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Sexual Difference and Collective Identities: The New Global Constellation,’ 
Signs, Volume 24, Number 2 (Winter, 1999), 335-361. 
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Mutually exclusive prospects for contemporary feminism as 
a collective political movement? Reframing the debate 
The aim of this thesis is to develop this ethical rephrasing of the identity politics 
debate. Therefore, this project is not intended as a contribution to the assessment of 
the general worth or accomplishments of identity politics, nor as a critique of it as a 
form of oppositional politics. My intent is to think through the link between identity, 
politics and the self, not with the aim of developing a wholesale critique and 
repudiation of identity, but rather, in order to develop, in a constructive way, an 
account of identity that places the self and how to live at the centre of feminist 
politics and theory. I seek to look at how feminist theory might move the debate on 
identity politics and identity away from identity politics as a matter of category to 
identity politics as a matter of vision, commitment and value. This, I will argue, 
requires centring the notion of a complex self that is capable of taking on the very 
practical, ethical work that identity politics requires. 
 
The suggestion to move the debate in feminist identity politics away from definition 
and category and towards something more like ethics is not a new one. It is a turn 
that has been suggested increasingly, in the last years, by feminists normally thought 
of as poststructuralist or postmodernist. Wendy Brown is one such feminist theorist 
who argues that feminist politics has been mired in trying to answer the question of 
‘who am I?’ Posing the question of identity in this manner she views as having led to 
a stagnant moment for feminism, because it insists upon a fixity of position and a 
defensive closure of identity. Brown proposes instead to shift the question of ‘who 
am I?’ to that of ‘what do I want for us?’ Although she does not elaborate exactly 
what such a shift might look like, I argue that she is suggesting that the way for 
feminism to engage in a more explicitly political project is through an ethical turn – 
an engagement with the issue of conceiving of the good (life).  
 
Judith Butler is another important feminist who more and more explicitly argues for 
a similar shift. Although in her earlier work she has been sceptical of the role of 
ethics in politics and has expressed the worry ‘that the return to ethics has constituted 
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an escape from politics,’
17
 I argue that in her most recent work, similarly to Brown, 
Butler engages ever more explicitly in the development of an ethical project as the 
means by which to undo restrictively normative conceptions of life and thus, gives 
us pause to re-examine her earlier work on identity politics and the self in this light. 
 
The broader aim of this thesis is to show the positive consequences of returning the 
self and its inner activity to the ethical domain for feminist identity politics. How can 
this project be imagined? How can the question of the self in the context of how to 
live, that is, ethics, be placed at the centre of feminist political theory? And what 
would such a shift look like? What theoretical and philosophical resources are 
available to elaborate such a vision of the self? To this end, I bring the problematic 
of the self in feminist identity politics into dialogue with contemporary 
developments in moral philosophy, in particular virtue ethics. I seek to elaborate on 
what it could mean to undertake such a shift and how we could go about conceiving 
of such a project by proposing looking at resources out with feminist political theory. 
I ultimately suggest that reconceptualising identity politics in this manner, in which 
the ethical is brought to the fore, places feminist theory in dialogue with a particular 
kind of ethics – virtue ethics.  
Methodology 
This research is primarily problem driven and therefore, in the main, it is diagnostic. 
I look again at the debates in feminist identity politics and pose the following 
questions: What is it that is at issue here? Is it really a crisis about identity as 
category? If it is not, what is it? What happens when the very practical aspect of 
identity politics that has to do with the collective nature of politics is foregrounded? 
That is, what happens when emphasis is placed on the practical politics of working 
together with different others, in a context of alterity, towards concrete goals, rather 
than, articulating essential or ontological meanings? What then is at stake? Because 
what emerges is that identity politics concerns the self, in order to answer these 
                                                 
17
 Butler, Judith. ‘Ethical ambivalence,’ The Turn to Ethics, edited by Marjorie Garber, Beatrice 
Hanssen, Rebecca L. Walkowitz (New York, London: Routledge, 2000). 
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questions, I find it necessary to situate myself at the intersection of feminist political 
theory and moral philosophy. That is, I begin with the identity politics debates in 
feminist theory, but in recovering the practical aspect of the work that is required by 
individual agents who participate in identity politics projects, I find that I must turn 
to moral philosophy. Turning to moral philosophy for these purposes brings me into 
contact with a literature not normally used in the debates in feminist identity politics.  
 
Because when the practical aspect of identity politics is foregrounded, the 
problematic emerges as one to do with the self, I turn specifically to a tradition in 
moral philosophy that is agent-centred and that centres questions to do with what 
sort of self one should be. These are primarily questions to do with character and it is 
for this reason that I turn to virtue ethics. I spend some time distinguishing between 
different virtue ethical approaches in order to point out some of the advantages of the 
virtue ethical approach to thinking about identity politics as practical politics.  
 
I do not confine myself to any particular methodology, or school. The problematic of 
feminist identity politics is complex and crosses many boundaries – liberalism, 
postmodernism, political theory, moral philosophy. None of the theorists that I draw 
on confine themselves to any one particular school and in fact, all work to refuse 
this. Instead, what I offer are close readings of a few theorists – Brown, Butler, 
Sandel, Foucault and Swanton, and to a lesser extent Murdoch - and I attempt to read 
these philosophers on their own terms. This leads to alternative readings and allows 
me to draw out elements often overlooked by others who have approached these 
philosophers from a particular school of thought or methodological classification.  
 
In choosing the theorists that I focus on, I looked for approaches that met certain 
criteria to do with approaches to the self. I sought out approaches that take up the 
problematic of ethics and the self, not from the vantage point of an autonomous, 
independent chooser in the context of universal principles, but rather as an issue of 
grappling with those features of sensibility that a person must have in order to be 
receptive to the complex task at hand. In short, I looked for traditions of ethics that 
offer conceptions of a self with a complex inner life.  
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This project is intended as a contribution to the understanding and politics of identity 
and the self from a feminist and a philosophical perspective. The research begins 
with an exploration of the understandings of identity politics and the self and ends by 
advocating an approach that places the question of the self in the context of how to 
live, that is, ethics, at the centre of feminist political theory. This contextualisation 
brings poststructuralist/postmodernist accounts of identity into dialogue with non-
feminist accounts of ethics, in particular, virtue ethics. I draw mainly on the work of 
philosophers with interests in both traditions and interests in Ancient Greek 
philosophy, in particular Michel Foucault, Iris Murdoch and Christine Swanton. 
These philosophers, although not explicitly feminist, I believe offer resources that 
can be used to address feminist concerns.  
 
Within feminism and feminist theory, this project has been most influenced by North 
American feminism, though I also draw on work, and have been influenced by, 
British feminism. In particular, I engage with the work of Wendy Brown and Judith 
Butler.  I also draw on the work of a number of others, especially those doing work 
in political theory.  
 
It might be asked why I have not incorporated a consideration of the ethics of care 
literature into my research; after all, care ethics is often taken as a feminist version of 
virtue ethics. I have deliberately chosen not to enter these on-going debates in 
feminist theory.
18
 Part of the goal of this project is to draw on the strengths of a 
literature that appears to have resources for feminist theory and that, thus far, has not 
been extensively explored. To this end, I think that it is more fruitful at this point to 
assess this literature on its own terms and not in terms of care ethics.  
  
                                                 
18
 See for instance Raja Halwani, ‘Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics,’ Hypatia, Volume 18, Number 3 
(Fall 2003); Maureen Sander-Staudt, ‘The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics,’ 
Hypatia, Volume 21, Number 4 (November 2006). 
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Structure of the text and main arguments 
The thesis is organised into three parts: Part One is entitled, ‘Re-thinking feminist 
identity and identity politics’ and defines the theoretical and philosophical issues and 
sketches the framework suggested for the reconceptualisation of identity politics for 
which I argue.  Part Two, entitled ‘Reframing the identity politics debate: attending 
to the self,’ presents the resources that I argue can assist in the elaboration of this 
framework. Part Three, entitled ‘Virtue ethics and the self,’ offers a picture of the 
agent that a pluralistic conception of virtue ethics allows.  
  
Part One begins with Chapter Two, Identity politics in which I explore the terms of 
the debates in the feminist identity politics literature. I begin with an examination of 
its theoretical context within the terms of liberalism. I then look at four main 
approaches to the issue of identity and identity politics in feminist theory. I discuss 
how these four differing accounts approach the issue of the self and how this relates 
to the very practical politics of working together, which is a hallmark of identity 
politics. The chapter thus, sets the scene as well as the rationale for the thesis. 
Finally, I suggest that the normal terms of the debate in identity politics tend to 
reduce the complexity of the identity question to questions of category, thereby 
neglecting other important questions to do with praxis. I suggest that this alternative 
approach to identity politics, offers a fruitful reframing of the debates in terms closer 
to ethics, a position I pursue in subsequent chapters.  
 
In Chapter Three, Identity politics and the subject of ethics, I offer a non-standard 
reading of Wendy Brown and Judith Butler in order to begin formulating my main 
argument that, whilst disclosing the limits the liberal project of rationality and 
universalism, feminist identity politics must aim to do so without foreclosing a 
radical rethinking of ethics and therein identity. By introducing the notion of identity 
as ‘injury,’ Brown reconceptualises the subject by attending to the issue of sentiment, 
or what she terms the ‘psyche.’ Identity politics becomes not only a project of 
disrupting the category of the neutral, universal citizen, but also one of participating 
with different others in the defining of a 'common good,' or the 'good life.’ I conclude 
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that Brown can fruitfully be read as pushing for a re-framing of the primary 
problematic in feminist identity politics as an ethical one, which she importantly 
differentiates from a moral one.   
 
I then turn to the work of Judith Butler, whom I argue is making a turn to ethics 
similar to that of Brown. I argue, contrary to what have become the most familiar 
criticisms of Butler’s work, that she is not advocating a move beyond identity 
politics, but rather her early work, in particular, is diagnostic and should be read as 
pointing towards understanding the problematic of identity within an ethical 
framework. After setting out Butler’s views on the self in her early work, I argue that 
we can already see here resources for formulating an argument about the value of an 
ethical turn as an emancipatory political strategy, and that this becomes ever more 
apparent in her later work. Viewed as a whole, this body of work begins to articulate 
a rehabilitation of ethics as a move toward an energised political future for feminism 
as a necessarily political and coalitional project. I conclude that to substantiate an 
ethics as suggested by both Brown and Butler requires accessing some resources out 
with either feminist ethics or traditional ethics (equated with morality) and this I 
move to do in Part Two.  
 
Part Two begins with Chapter Four, The turn to ethics: the subject of ethics. The 
main aim of this chapter is to begin identifying the resources that can be accessed in 
order to develop the ethical turn I point to in Part One. I start by making a distinction 
between the terms morality and ethics. This distinction brings me into dialogue with 
a similar distinction made in mainstream critiques of liberalism, the starting point of 
which broadly parallels feminist identity politics. I use Michael Sandel’s critique of 
Rawls to develop the distinction between ethics and morality which paves the way 
for my reconceptualisation of identity politics. On the basis of the distinction I make 
between morality and ethics, and using Foucault’s later work, I elaborate a definition 
of ethics that points in the direction that I plan to move - towards an ethics that is 
more about becoming, but within the context of difference. This signals a shift that 
Brown made away from the negativity of resistance and the politics of ressentiment 
towards an aesthetics of existence that is a framework of praxis. A framework 
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derived within the notion of praxis moves beyond the delimiting factors of difference 
in identity politics. The self within this ethics as praxis is not reducible to the 
practices of the self in the private sphere. So, although I signal a turn inward, this 
turn inward is in order to turn outward. The turn inward is one that is transformative 
and is meant to emphasize a futural dimension. 
 
In Chapter Five, Ethics as praxis: the self, transformation, desire, vision and the 
good, I develop in more detail the notion of ethics as praxis. Whereas in the previous 
two chapters, I read Brown, Butler, Sandel and Foucault as pointing towards 
understanding ethics as praxis, in this chapter I argue that it is Foucault’s 
engagement with ancient Greek philosophy that really begins to develop this project. 
I raise here again the questions: what sort of self do we find in ethics understood as 
praxis? How does the self of an ethics of praxis account for difference? How does 
the self undertake collective projects? How is the issue of ressentiment approached? 
To this end, I discuss in detail how Foucault elaborates ethics as praxis of ‘care of 
the self’, drawing out those elements of Foucault’s understanding of ethics to do 
with transformation of the self. I show how Foucault’s ethics as praxis deals with the 
issue of alterity in a manner that is constructive within the problematics of identity 
politics. In this chapter I also move to address the unresolved issue of ressentiment. 
Although Foucault’s ‘care of the self’ does not entirely neglect the issue raised by 
Brown - of the presumption of the direction that telos takes - I argue that it could be 
strengthened. In order to do this, I draw on some of the work of Iris Murdoch to 
show how, within an ethics of transformation (praxis), this problem could be 
elaborated.  
 
Part Three opens with Chapter Six, Virtue ethics and feminism: Okin, Tessman and 
Nussbaum. In this chapter, before making my move to defending a pluralistic virtue 
ethical approach, I look at some feminist engagements with virtue ethics. I do this for 
two reasons: firstly, in order to address some of the key concerns that feminists have 
expressed about an engagement with virtue ethics; and, secondly, to distinguish the 
virtue ethical approach I am both defending and developing. I  look first at Susan 
Moller Okin’s influential critique of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Alasdair 
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MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics because it is illustrative of some of the 
main objections that feminists have raised about an engagement with virtue ethics. I 
then move to examine two directions feminism has attempted to take virtue ethics 
forward by looking at the recent work of Lisa Tessman and Martha Nussbaum. 
Although both Tessman and Nussbaum’s approaches have a number of strengths, I 
ultimately reject them as unsuitable for my purposes and argue in the following 
chapter that a pluralistic approach to virtue ethics provides a better way forward for 
my project.   
 
In Chapter Seven, Pluralistic virtue ethics and the self, I draw mainly on the recent 
work of Christine Swanton to argue that a pluralistic conception of virtue ethics 
successfully elaborates a self (identity) that is inextricably related to the good, where 
the notion of the good is not finally definable. I explore how a pluralistic virtue 
ethics, that is non-eudaimonistic, conceives of the self. Beginning from an 
understanding of virtue not as an end state of perfection, but as a ‘dynamic process-
notion,’
19
 a number of ethical concepts - such as love, respect, creativity and 
objectivity – contribute to a rich picture of the inner life of the self. The aim of this 
chapter is to show how a pluralistic virtue ethics addresses the central notion of 
‘desire’ as comprised of both ‘vision’ and ‘attention’ and yields a picture of the self 
with the full resources of an inner life. A complex picture of the person emerges that 
provides the basis for a rich approach to the ethical concerns raised in identity 
politics.  
 
In Chapter Eight, Practically speaking: applying pluralistic virtue ethics, I offer a 
rough and very tentative illustration of what a pluralistic virtue ethics (PVE) might 
look like when applied to a specific context. I look at the Northern Ireland Women’s 
Coalition (NIWC) and in particular, how they handled a particularly divisive case. I 
discuss: how the self I am arguing for can be expected to function when applied to 
the practical task of ethics; how this self might act when it comes to a real life 
situation in which problem-solving is involved; how this self derives virtue-
knowledge; what the aims of this self would be in problem-solving situations; and 
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finally, what the virtues of practice are that this agent might exercise. Although there 
are certain similarities between ‘transversalism’ and the pluralistic virtue ethics 
(PVE) approach I take, this chapter argues that the latter approach offers a richer and 
broader framework through which to understand the self in feminist identity politics 
and thus, may serve as a resource to enrich the transversal politics framework. By 
exploring the practical applications of PVE, this chapter is both a contribution to the 
debates in identity politics as well as to the growing developments in virtue ethics.  
 
In the final Chapter Nine, Conclusion – Reformulating feminist identity politics and 
the problematic of ethics as praxis, I draw together the main arguments of the thesis, 
namely that taking feminist insights of the constructed nature of identity into 
dialogue with a pluralistic virtue ethical account of the self provides new and 
illuminating opportunities for both understanding and discussing the imperative 
collective dimension of identity politics in situations of diversity and inequality.  
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Anglo-American feminist theory is said to have reached an impasse in the debates on 
identity politics. Some feminists have gone so far as to proclaim that feminist theory 
is in the throes of an ‘identity crisis.’
20
 The aim of this chapter is to explore the terms 
of this debate, so as to set the scene and provide the rationale for this thesis, which 
concerns shifting the debate on identity as category to a more ethically orientated 
understanding of identity.  
 
The first section begins by placing the issue of identity politics within the context of 
the limits of liberalism. Identity politics works within the framing terms of liberalism 
and seeks to transform oppressed identities. By politicising identity, identity politics 
is simultaneously a response to the limits of the self that is viewed to sit at the heart 
of liberalism and made possible through the terms of liberalism. The aim of this 
section is to draw out some of the main, very practical elements of identity politics. 
Namely, that identity politics entails a concrete and ethical understanding of the 
issue of community that requires responsiveness and action from the self. This 
concrete and ethical dimension must be recovered and focused on in order for 
identity politics to function as transformative. This very practical work, I argue, 
requires a certain sort of understanding of the person that is to undertake it and 
therefore, raises questions to do with what sort of person can undertake this work.  
  
The next section looks at identity politics within feminist theory. Here I take the 
position that feminism is an identity politics from both within and without. I do not 
offer a complete rehearsal of the extensive and on-going debates on identity politics 
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in the feminist literature. Rather, I offer a broad outline, concentrating on 
foregrounding the issue of the sort of self that each approach to identity takes.  
Identity politics  
The liberal self   
Liberalism can be defined as a theory of the principles which should govern politics. 
Contemporary accounts of liberalism, as found in the work of Dworkin, define it in 
terms of a neutrality of politics between differing conceptions of 'the good life': 
 
Political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any 
particular conception of the good life, of what gives value to life. Since 
the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does 




Larmore concurs that in liberalism: 
 
The ideal of neutrality can be best understood as a response to the variety 
of conceptions of the good life. In modern times we have come to 
recognise a multiplicity of ways in which a fulfilled life can be 
lived.....The state should not seek to promote any particular conception 
of the good life because of its presumed intrinsic superiority, that is 




Sandel summarises the liberal vision as: 
 
…...a just society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables 
its citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty for 
all; it therefore must govern by principles that do not presuppose any 




According to Sandel, in liberalism a just society is just on the basis of its refusal to 
choose in advance among competing purposes, rather than on the basis of a 
particular aim. Liberalism distinguishes emphatically between the political (public) 
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and personal (private) spheres, insisting that the one should not be reflected in the 
other. In the face of pluralism, liberalism demands that differences based on 
competing conceptions of the good life are set aside. Instead, neutral principles of 
cooperation should be pursued. That is, the liberal society aims, through its 
constitutions and laws, to provide simply a framework by which citizens can pursue 
their own, private telos. In liberalism the 'right' is positioned prior to the 'good' in the 
sense that, contrary to utilitarianism, individual rights are never cast to one side (or 
‘trumped’ to invoke Dworkin) for a greater good. Furthermore, contrary to a 
teleological approach, governing principles of justice, which specify these rights, 
cannot be based upon any particular conception of the good. 
 
Sandel goes on to examine the ‘vision of the person’ that lies at the heart of 
liberalism that ‘both inspires and undoes it.’
24
 This he traces through Kant's 
transcendental subject directly to Rawls' ‘unencumbered self.’
25
 What Sandel finds 
here is a relegation of all that is deemed personal to the private realm. 'Public man' 
embodies all those liberal qualities of rationality, autonomy, separation. Feelings, 
emotions and relations are relegated to the private, non-political realm. These latter 
emotional elements have no place in the public and political sphere. Any private 
differences between people are therefore to be considered irrelevant.  
 
Rawls’ ‘vision of the person’, according to Sandel, is a self stripped of the self-
knowledge of the identity markers of class, race, gender, etc.
26
 Equipped only with a 
general knowledge of economic systems and psychology, individuals are said to 
proceed with measured caution in the knowledge that once the ‘veil of ignorance’ is 
lifted, they could find themselves to be in the ‘worst off’ position in society.
27
 
Therefore, those principles chosen behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ would be directed 
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The aims of politics and morality are understood to be based on what all persons 
share in common. Since differences are considered contingent, they are either 
irrelevant or are obstructions to be overcome. In Rawls, neither moral judgments nor 
political institutions should appeal to ‘those contingencies (i.e. social identities) 
which set men at odds and allow them to be guided by their prejudices.’
29
 
Deontological liberalism, in its prioritisation of the ‘right’ over and independent of 
the ‘good,’ demands an understanding of the self as ‘prior to and independent of 
purposes or ends.’
30
 This configuration results in the placement of the self beyond 
the reach of experience. Therefore, identity is secured beyond the possibility of 
constitutive ends. This is liberalism's ‘generic human thesis’: society can and should 
be organised behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ where personal and contextual 
issues are put aside.
31
 In short, in liberalism, identity has no place in the 
public/political arena.  
Identity politics and liberalism 
Identity politics can be placed within the counter movement away from the 
‘unencumbered self’ of liberalism and its prioritisation of the ‘right’ before and 
independent of the ‘good.’
32
 Identity politics explodes the myth that identity is 
irrelevant to liberalism and to the self. Identity politics brings identity into the public 
sphere, thereby breaking the most central tenet of liberalism of a clear separation 
between the public and private spheres. In bringing the particularities of identity into 
the universal public, identity politics seeks to throw off Rawls' ‘veil’ protecting the 
abstract, neutral citizen sitting behind it and in so doing reveals his identity. Identity 
politics aims toward an embodied somebody, rather than a disembodied nobody.  By 
bringing excluded identities into the political arena, identity politics constitutes a 
radical challenge to the neutrality of liberalism by revealing that identity matters to 
the universal citizen.  
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The contemporary social movements, including feminism, of the post-1960’s period, 
were based on the premise that the very personal and contextual experiences of being 
black, being female, etc. functioned to marginalize some groups of individuals from 
the liberal ‘generic human thesis.’
33
 Therefore, such movements began to formulate 
and validate political claims on the basis of certain shared social identities and 
locations, as women, lesbians, black women and so on.
34
 The distinct character of 
identity-based politics thus is its politics of difference. As Sonia Kruks summarises 
it: 
 
What makes identity politics a significant departure from earlier, pre-
identitarian forms of the politics of recognition is its demand for 
recognition on the basis of the very grounds on which recognition has 
previously been denied: it is qua women, qua blacks, qua lesbians that 
groups demand recognition. The demand is not for inclusion within the 
fold of ‘universal humankind’ on the basis of shared human attributes; 
nor is it for respect ‘in spite of’ one's differences. Rather, what is 




Identity politics rest on the shared experience of the injustice of oppression and 
originate in the negative experience of oppression in which visible identity markers 
(the colour of skin, gender, race, etc.) are deemed inferior or subordinate and are on 
this basis subject to oppression. Political philosophers like Shklar remind us that the 
experience of injustice is a felt one and therefore, is personal.
36
 Although born 
through a primary hurt, identity politics does not stay here, taking up residence only 




The demands for respect and ‘recognition’ are practical ones in that they generally 
take the form of claims for certain kinds of legal recognition and state support. Those 
groups premised on shared, oppressed identities, approach the state for recognition 
of a characteristic, or attribute, and demand recognition on the basis of the very 
grounds upon which recognition has previously been denied: it is ‘qua women, qua 
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blacks, qua lesbians’ that groups demand recognition. Affirmative action programs 
and the securing of maternity rights for women count as such instances.  
 
Particularising the a priori self of universal liberalism pries that self out of its 
‘unencumbered’ position and contextualises it within its raced, sexed, sexualised, 
and so on position. Once positioned, the self seeks to reclaim, or to reconstitute, to 
transform those characteristics and markings that serve to oppress and subordinate 
the self. Slogans such as ‘Black is beautiful’ and ‘Sisterhood is beautiful’ are 
employed to express the transformative intent of identity politics. On the basis of 
similarity within the identity category, politics are formed, demands are worked out 
and pursued.  
 
The liberal self is now particularised, yet is left intact. Just as in liberalism, the self is 
still located prior to rights and constitutive ends. But if identity politics are ‘category 
politics,’
38
 where identity categories refer to terms associated with individuals’ 
identities, for example 'women,' 'blacks,' 'gays,' etc., then to label someone as, for 
instance, a 'woman' is to make the case that someone so labelled has certain 
discernible characteristics in common with others in the same category and hence, is 
categorisable as such. What this points towards is that identity politics have a 
constitutive component. That is, if identity politics are category politics, the 
individual does not only decide freely and strategically to categorise herself, but is 
categorised – becomes categoriseable – and therefore, the identity category has a 
constitutive function. What this implies is that in the liberal schemata, identity, once 
it is introduced, may have the impact of reversing the configuration of the self as 
‘prior to and independent of its ends.’ This raises the following questions: Do those 
ends become defined in advance of the self? Is it now possible that the ends become 
constitutive of the self? Does a strong concept of the autonomous individual become 
problematic, if not unsustainable? 
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Kenny points out that liberal democracy sits uncomfortably with any theory that 
lacks a strong concept of the individual.
39
 In liberalism, once a group has been 
recognised as a personage irreducible to the universal citizen, the difference becomes 
‘irremovable and constitutive’ of the identity and the associated politics.
40
 That is, 
the difference in respect of which makes members of the group unique, once 
recognised, comes to define the group and the individual (as member of the group). 
Those involuntary associations of the identities of race, gender, sexual preference, 
which identity politics seek to politicise become, upon recognition by the state, 
‘markings that stick.’
41
 Identity is what Lloyd terms ‘constative’ in the sense that it is 
pre-given and represents in a qualitative manner ‘what we are.’ 
42
 Identity therefore, 
becomes a site of closure; it is simultaneously the ‘necessary truth’ and an 
‘expressive condition.’
43
 What the individual is, finds its basis in a supposedly pre-
given set of attributes particular to the identity marking. The individual’s life 
becomes describable by experiences that are taken to determine a particular kind of 
life. Thus, in the moment that the individual identifies, or is identified, with the 
group identity, the individual is marked by and through the identity. The group is 
‘envisaged as a social personage, a plural subject driven by a singular collective will 
and coherent value set.’ 
44
 The individualism upon which democracy is founded is 
transferred from the person to the group identity.  
 
In summary, identity politics are politics premised on the ‘felt’ experience of 
oppression and as such, can be viewed as having an affective element. Identity 
politics are relational in the sense that oppression is experienced always in relation to 
some other social position – i.e. women vis-à-vis men, Black vis-à-vis White, and so 
on. The oppressed identity, situated in its position of inequality vis-à-vis some other 
position does not languish in its pain. Rather, it is ‘actional’ in that it works to 
uncover, discover, and demand recognition and amelioration for its oppressed 
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positioning. On the basis of this positioning, individuals are grouped and form 
groups with the intention to transform the hurt of the oppressed identity.  
Identity politics as practical politics 
Identity politics are practical politics in a sense that comes close to the notion of 
praxis. That is, identity politics, as activist politics, can be understood to depend 
upon a group of individuals acting in concert, as a collectivity. In identifying with 
each other, individuals identify with an identity category, as well as, with concrete 
other individuals in that identity category as ‘others.’  That is, I actively place myself 
in the identity category of ‘woman’ and recognise others in this same category. On 
the basis of this shared identity category the group forms and then creates a (shared) 
vision of what action it would like to undertake in order to transform the oppressed 
shared identity. Finally, once the group has a vision, it becomes necessary to 
formulate a plan of action. 
 
In her research on women organising across differences in the Women’s Support 
Network in Belfast, Cockburn provides an illustration of the practicalities of identity 
politics.
45
  The Network represents women’s community centres from Catholic and 
Protestant districts. Cockburn notes how the Network formed as an intentional 
women’s-only project, based on gender as a central organising principle in women’s 
subordinate status. The members are therefore, all committed to working under the 
conviction that there is something important at stake for women as women. 
Secondly, the ethnic, racial, religious and national diversity in the projects is 
intentional. There is a commitment to not only maintaining the small, nuclear 
collectivity, but also to forging and maintaining a wider and more inclusive 
collectivity. Thirdly, what the individual in the group is (i.e. Protestant or Catholic, 
for instance), should not pose a limit on what she is able to say and do in the 
collective. Cockburn argues that this is reflective of a commitment to an ethos that 
gives the participant responsibility for what she says and at the same time does not 
limit her by who she ‘is’. Although some political values and goals may be shared, 
                                                 
45
 Cynthia Cockburn, The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 1998).  
 
 23 Chapter Two 
 
there is also an open acceptance that divergences can emerge. The real possibility of 
divergences is what makes negotiation a necessity. Lastly, as a political collectivity, 
the democratic process is taken as paramount. Finding ways that all can have an 
equal say and allowing differing, opposing sides to be made salient is of particular 
importance. Crucially, what underlies all of the foregoing is the relation of the self as 
an individual to the collective. 
 
Cockburn’s research on the Network highlights the practical aspects of identity 
politics – the action of identification of the self within the identity category, to the 
group as well as to the vision of the work. All of this works within and moves 
beyond, the questions raised by identity as category, which most generally take the 
form of: Who am I? Who is like me? Whom can I trust? Where do I belong? 
Understanding the self as in a situation of praxis requires raising the two further 
questions: how to thematise the self in relation to the other in difference, and how, in 
difference, to achieve a shared vision. These questions are underpinned ultimately by 
what sort of self the self in praxis is. I will in due course argue that to formulate the 
problematic of identity politics as the ‘I’ being capable of articulating itself, and its 
desire, in relation to a ‘for us,’ points towards placing identity within the ethical, but 
before approaching this I turn to a discussion of identity politics and feminism.   
Identity politics and feminism 
Identity politics form the basis of the women’s movement.
46
 It is within the context 
of liberalism that feminists have been compelled to address the identity of the 
‘subject,’ introducing on the scene the concrete identity of the subject of feminism – 
‘woman.’ There is much disagreement among feminists though over whether or not a 
unified conception of identity is imperative for an effective feminist politics. 
Braidotti and Fraser both discuss three competing assumptions at work in feminism 
with regards to the issue of the subject.
47
 The first assumption, often referred to as 
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the ‘equality approach,’ is that feminism should seek to adopt an approach to the 
subject that advocates equality with men. This is the work associated with 
Wollstonecraft and later de Beauvoir.
48
 The subject is constructed in such a manner 
as to place emphasis on the sameness between men and women. Equality feminism 
does not introduce the specificity of the subject (as woman), but rather relies on 
identity politics, insofar as it relies on a politics in which the subject is united under a 
category of universality. Identity politics serves as the basis for mobilization and 
organisation – i.e. sisterhood.
49
 Identity is taken up as an organising basis vis-à-vis 




The second approach is based on a notion of the subject that reflects difference. 
Difference though takes two directions here. The first direction focuses on the 
difference between men and women. This strand is largely associated with the work 
of Carol Gilligan
51
 and Nancy Chodorow
52
 and is referred to as difference feminism, 
or cultural feminism. In this approach, difference tends towards a homogenisation of 
the identity of ‘woman,’ posed as it is contra men. It does not address the potential 
(and real) differences between women and has been robustly criticised for valorising 
differences between men and women whilst ignoring differences internal to women 
and the category of ‘woman.’ This second strand of difference feminism, sometimes 
termed ‘diversity feminism,’
53
 or, ‘intersectional feminism,’
54
 argues that theories 
that rely on a homogeneous identity category for women serve to exclude many 
women. Here the issue of identity is raised within the category of woman. Yet, both 
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difference and diversity feminism rely on mobilising women around unified 
similarities – around a shared identity.  
 
The third approach to the issue of identity is a deconstructionist one. This approach 
contends that feminism must maintain a strong scepticism in regards to the fixing or 
predetermination of subjectivity. Whereas difference feminists assume a subject that 
has an identity that is similar across all women and is modelled on the liberal 
subject, the deconstructionist model insists that feminism does not need the subject. 
Not only does feminism not need the subject, but in adopting the subject, feminists 
adopt with it all the flaws and exclusionary premises upon which it is based.  
 
Finally, to the above three models, I add the post-identity strategy of coalitional 
politics which is an approach that attempts not to take issue with defining 
subjectivity. It does not engage with the problem of identity, but rather attempts to 
sidestep the issue. Identity is presumed and not deemed something that needs to be 
defined or transformed.  
 
Although I have presented differing approaches to the issue of the feminist subject in 
a way that makes them look as if one follows upon the next in some sort of 
developmental trajectory, this is only partially accurate. Certainly much of the 
feminist debate about the subject and identity engages with these four models as 
discrete and completely separate ways of thinking about the subject. But as Kemp 
and Squires point out, there is a productive tension between understandings of 
subjectivity.
55
 Furthermore, although Hekman identifies the issues of ‘the 
potentialities of resistance’ and ‘the question of agency,’
56
 as central to all feminist 
attempts to either reformulate or reconstitute the liberal subject, I argue that there is 
prior work that is missed by such a focus. I shift the focus on to the collective 
dimension of identity politics and the hard work required to forge and maintain 
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political bonds. What becomes central, I argue, is the individual effort and attitude 
involved in this practical task.  
 
In what follows, I outline what I take to be some of the representative arguments in 
each of these approaches to feminist subjectivity. I do not intend to offer a detailed 
account of each, but offer rather a broad outline, concentrating on foregrounding the 
issue of the self in relation to the practical work of identity politics – what I have 
termed praxis. Specifically I look at how the self is conceived in relation to the 
‘other,’ both within the identity category as well as vis-à-vis the liberal subject. I also 
consider the self in relation to the ‘vision’ of the approach and in relation to values. I 
do so in order to reconsider what each approach takes as paramount in forging and 
maintaining political bonds.  
 
Although within the feminist theory literature on the topic of identity politics there 
are feminists who confine the term to the description of ‘diversity’ feminism,
57
 there 
are many others who employ the term more generally.
58
 Lloyd, for instance, uses the 
term in this general sense,
59
 noting that insofar as feminism is defined by the three 
concepts: ‘woman, experience, and personal politics,’ it is to be understood as an 
identity politics.
60
 Together these factors determine the questions that feminism 
raises: What is a woman? Who and what might be responsible for women’s 
oppression and what are the solutions to the problems?
61
 Organising around, and 
making demands for, a particular identity (‘woman’), counts feminism as an identity 
politics.
62
 In what follows, I adopt this more general definition of identity politics, 
recognizing as well that identity politics is both an explanatory as well as a 
theoretical term. It is also a retroactive descriptor insofar as feminist theorists now 
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associated with the term may not have, at the time of their writing, named 
themselves or their theories as such.  
Identity politics and equality feminism 
Insofar as identity politics is based on a notion of a shared identity of women, 
women are deemed to share certain universal characteristics. On the basis of these 
universal characteristics, women as a group can speak, or are spoken on behalf of. 
This understanding of identity politics forms the basis for a variety of liberal 
feminists to challenge and critique mainstream philosophical and political culture.
63
 
For these feminists, it is the ‘liberal language of individual rights and freedoms that 
had tremendous resonances.’
64
 As such, feminism and liberalism are historically 
closely related and indeed, early feminism did not question the premises of 
liberalism itself.
65
 Instead, equality feminists used the liberal notions of universal 
reason and natural law to fight for the full participation of women in social and 
political life.
66
 Early feminists like Catherine Maculay, upheld the liberal view of the 
irrelevance of differences between individuals, writing that: ‘those vices and 
imperfections which have generally been regarded as inseparable from the female 
character, do not in any manner proceed from sexual causes, but are entirely the 




First wave equality feminists fought to transform the oppressed position of women 
on the basis that differences between men and women were contingent and therefore, 
inconsequential. Women ultimately shared with men the same capabilities and 
capacities and the differences between them were simply a result of social 
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convention. It was on this basis that feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft
68
 demanded 
equal access to education for girls and women. The main objective for early equality 
feminists was the issue of women’s suffrage. The issue of equal rights to education 
and property were of secondary interest insofar as education was deemed a critical 
issue as it would enable women to develop the rationality that would serve as the 
basis for autonomy. Once women had secured their place as rational, autonomous 
subjects they would be equal to men and therefore, could not then be denied 
suffrage.  
 
De Beauvoir encapsulates the goals of these feminists when, in The second sex,
69
 she 
endeavours to demonstrate that the concept of woman is fabricated by a society that 
benefits from the subordination of women. Woman’s inferior place, argues de 
Beauvoir, is not a result of her inferiority in some essential sense to man, but rather it 
is that the concepts associated with woman are fabricated by a society that benefits 
from woman’s subordinated place in relation to man. De Beauvoir argues that given 
the same opportunities, woman could equal man. She also challenges the 
philosophical constructions of woman, but does so by working from within the 
system she is critiquing. Therefore, she does not suggest that the ideologies are 




De Beauvoir’s quest for equality between men and women is subsequently taken up 
by the radical feminist Shulamith Firestone
71
 and in many senses taken to its logical 
conclusion.
72
 Following de Beauvoir having located women within nature, Firestone 
identifies the oppression of women as located in their ‘child-bearing and child-
rearing role.’
73
 Therefore, according to Firestone, the goal of feminism must be to 
free women of their biology. Once free of the responsibility of child-bearing and 
child-rearing, women would be free to participate fully and unhindered in society.  
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There are positive gains in identity politics to be understood here, namely to do with 
the issues of solidarity and empowerment. Solidarity allows for the possibility to 
work together as a unified force towards a shared goal. Up to this point, women had 
been both isolated and divided in both the public and the private sphere. The 
possibility of empowering women was seen as a desirable goal. As Papedelos points 
out, the political goals of equality feminism could also be fairly quickly and very 
visibly achieved.
74
 For instance, a liberal (equality) feminist position that pursues 
women’s equality in education has seen significant achievements very rapidly, in 




Looking at the identity category, or subject, of ‘woman’ that is pursued largely by 
equality feminism, we see that it is predicated on a liberal conception of the subject 
definable as ‘human’ rather than male or female – masculine or feminine. Clearly, 
the subject of equality feminists is the liberal subject – the rational, modernist 
subject, the rights-bearing individual, in which differences between subjects are 
minimised. Yet, even early first wave feminists grappled with this subject as gender-
biased. Mary Wollstonecraft was already troubled by the dilemma of difference - 
what Pateman has coined ‘Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma.’
76
 That is, in the pursuit of full 
citizenship, the very early feminists grappled with the dilemma of whether or not 
women should take the course of fighting for the extension of existing citizenship 
rights enjoyed by men to them, or if they should fight for a specific and 
differentiated set of citizenship rights that would take account of women’s specific 
needs, talents, etc.  Are women persons just like men? Or are they different?  
 
The subject that is invoked in an equality approach is one that is ‘human’ rather than 
masculine or feminine. The self maintains the a priori position just as in liberalism. 
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The experience of being a self is not taken as the starting point for either an 
understanding of the self or of what sort of life the self might live. Pateman points 
out that the subject is marked by a patriarchal system in such a way that serves to 
limit and exclude women.
77
 Unexamined, this ‘human’ subject is a masculine subject 
that both denies and excludes gender, racial and sexual differences. This is not to say 
that the pursuit of egalitarian demands to ameliorate economic and political 
injustices is not important to feminism. It is in the pursuit of this that questions arise 
to do with: What sort of subject is it that is being pursued? On what basis, and how is 
it possible, to mobilise women as a political group? And can this be achieved 
without devaluing and excluding women’s particularity? These are the issues 
pursued by difference feminists to which I now turn.  
Identity politics and difference feminism 
Difference feminism, as the term itself implies, is complex and the task of 
representing it a difficult one.
78
 Therefore, my aim here is to simply present some of 
its representative arguments. Difference feminism generally can be seen as an 
attempt to rethink the meaning of gender difference, that is, the difference between 
men and women. Dietz summarises this task as inhering in two related questions: Is 
there a coherent notion of woman that exists a priori to women’s interests and 




Difference feminists can be loosely characterised by the critical stance they hold in 
regards to the desirability and possibility for an equality agenda to address the issue 
of the oppression of women. Whereas up until what is referred to as the ‘post-1968’ 
period, feminism had largely concentrated on the issues of female suffrage, birth 
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control and women’s emancipation more generally, ‘post-1968’ a number of 
feminists began to challenge the marginalisation of women’s perspectives as mothers 
and carers.
80
 Where first wave feminists embraced liberalism’s universality by and 
large unquestioningly, many second wave feminists began to focus on the possibility 
that liberalism’s universality functions in a way that actually requires the exclusion 
of particularity of a certain kind.  Feminists like Pateman note that liberalism 
overlooks that the ‘unencumbered self’ of liberalism results in women and children 
being cast either as deviant (different) cases, or their interdependence simply 
ignored.
81
 Liberalism’s failure to reflect women’s particularity gives rise to the 
notion that what constitutes a person in the proper sense (i.e. in who matters and can 
act morally) is actually a representation of men’s lives. Thus, the individual at the 
heart of liberalism rather than being human, is the male head of house.
82
 Therefore, 
leaving the self of liberalism untouched by matters of identity becomes a matter of 
urgent contestation for difference feminism.  
 
Despite a multiplicity of approaches that seek to explain the failure of equality, what 
all difference feminists hold in common is a conviction that the modern notion of the 
liberal subject is masculine rather than universally human. It is on this basis that 
Young contends that the liberal subject is ‘marked’ by a patriarchal society in which 
what is feminine or female is excluded.
 83
 The liberal conception of the individual, 
excluding as it does the perspective of all but the dominant group, has politically 
significant consequences for women. According to Young, societies are made up of 
different groups that are based on and around differing experiences, histories and 
perspectives and no one group can stand in and speak for, or represent, adequately 
any other group. In the face of such diversity, Young argues, the seemingly neutral 
standards of liberalism are merely a reflection of the experiences of white middle 
class males. Women and other marginalised groups are prevented from defining 
liberal standards: 
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A general perspective does not exist which all persons can adopt and 
from which all experiences and perspectives can be understood and 
taken into account. The existence of social groups implies different, 
though not necessarily exclusive, histories, experiences and 
perspectives on social life that people have, and it implies that they do 
not entirely understand the experience of other groups. No one can 





By way of attacking this ‘general perspective’ and the subject, as well as the 
oppressive forms of social arrangements that accompany it, difference feminists look 
to women’s experience. This is the approach pursued by Carol Gilligan.
85
 Critiquing 
Kohlberg’s scale of moral development, Gilligan argues that women tend more than 
men to define themselves in terms of relationships and therefore, they experience an 
identity that is marked by connection and empathy. Furthermore, men are only able 
to sustain their own identity of separation and independence due, in part, to women 
taking on the responsibility for sociality. It is because of this that the strategies 
women bring to bear on moral problems focus on the conflict of multiple 
responsibilities, rather than the strategies men bring to bear, which have to do with 
the weighing up of competing rights.  
 
Gilligan’s project, in relation to the revaluation of women’s identity and 
particularity, can be seen as having a twofold aim. Firstly, it is Gilligan’s intention to 
rescue women’s way of knowing and doing from the devaluation to which it is 
subjected when measured from the male point of view (Kohlberg’s model of moral 
development). Secondly, Gilligan aims to revise the male point of view by offering a 
picture of moral maturity that is a combination of male concerns for rights and 
female concerns for attention to other’s needs. What Gilligan does not do is actually 
abandon Kohlberg’s model, which she never specifies as wrong, but rather as 
incomplete.  
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Hartsock makes a similar critique, albeit one that situates Gilligan’s different voice 
in the political economy of the gendered division of labour.
86
 Whereas Gilligan 
leaves the elaboration of the collective dimension of her shift in moral judgment 
unelaborated, Hartsock focuses on the relation between forms of power and 
community. Hartsock’s main point is to reveal the underlying identity of the subject 
of capitalism as male and masculine. This male subject is premised on autonomy, 
isolation and competing interests. Any association between subjects is strictly 
voluntary and instrumental. The vision of community, such as it is, is one that is 





In counterpoint to the male subject, Hartsock posits a feminist standpoint that puts 
forward a particularised female identity grounded in connection and relational 
knowledge rather than separation and abstract reason. The ‘double aspect’ of 
‘women’s lives makes a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy’ 
possible.
88
 The main task of feminism, according to Hartsock, is to revalue the 
female experience and to search for ‘common threads which connect the diverse 
experiences of women’ and to articulate a feminist standpoint that ‘offers the 





In constructing her feminist standpoint, Hartsock takes up the analysis of power, 
eros and community from the epistemic perspective of women’s experience. 
Hartsock reformulates sexuality under the broader term of eros, in which she also 
includes: union with another, bodily pleasure, creativity and purposeful activity.
90
 
She distinguishes the death-oriented masculine form of eros from the life-affirming 
eros that is achievable through a feminist standpoint. It is in the life-affirming eros, 
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made possible by a feminist standpoint, that Hartsock develops an alternative 
tradition that can be tied to life-affirming connections between individuals who are 
able to act together towards shared, rather than conflicting ends. Rather than a model 
of power as coercion, Hartsock develops a model of power as empowerment and as a 
task of working together towards common goals. In this way Hartsock locates 
women’s experiences in what they do rather than in what they are.
 91
 Hartsock, thus, 
accounts for the collective dimension of difference feminism, something Gilligan 
neglects, by putting forward the liberated perspective as one that women as a group 
must struggle for. 
  
Yet, where Gilligan and Hartsock differ, Ferguson notes that there is still a shared 
epistemological manoeuvre.
 92
 Both Gilligan and Hartsock present a configuration in 
which men and women as respective groups exist within those groups as unified and 
universal categories – as men, or as women. Representation of men as a unified 
group, and women as a unified group, carries an implicit epistemology, the aim of 
which is to access a nature, or social reality, that is true for all women and, as Dietz 
notes, ‘raises the question of exclusion, and ignites the identity crisis within feminist 
theory.’
93
 Therefore, while accounts of difference feminism, like those of Gilligan 
and Hartsock, succeed in exposing the pervasive liberal model of the ‘universal 
human’ as modelled after the white male, they, at the same time, reify the very 
essentialist tendencies of liberalism that they aim to critique by arguing that there 
exists a universal female self that must be uncovered, rediscovered, nurtured and 
embraced. It is only on this basis that women are able to act as a group for political 
purposes. 
 
This is exemplified in the approach taken by the Northern Irish feminist movement 
in the 1970’s and the dilemmas they subsequently faced. Attempts were made in 
Northern Ireland, beginning in the 1970’s, to form a unified women’s movement, 
which would focus its priorities on gender over any other aspects of identity. It was 
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on this basis that the Northern Ireland Women’s Rights Movement (NIWRM) was 
founded in 1975 by women from civil rights, trade unions, and broad left 
backgrounds. Its main concern was the considerable levels of disadvantage faced by 
women as women and thus, it campaigned for equal pay and an end to sex 
discrimination.
94
 In its fight to extend Britain’s Sex Discrimination Act, it was 
successful. In 1976 the Act was introduced in Northern Ireland and an Equal 
Opportunities Commission was established.   
The Northern Irish Women’s Rights Movement (NIWRM) 
Although the NIWRM cannot be assigned to the purely difference feminist axis, it 
did focus very clearly on gender as a universal category that mattered to women’s 
subordinate position in society. In its campaigns, the NIWRM stressed that attaining 
equality for women vis-à-vis men worked best by de-emphasising differences 
between women. In order to overturn the oppression of a universally shared gender 
category (women), the NIWRM’s view was that it was necessary for women to 
abstract themselves from other oppressions, which were best addressed in other 
contexts. Taking the same approach that the trade unions had, the NIWRM asked its 
members to leave their commitment to nationalism or unionism or whatever ‘at the 




Asking members to leave their unionist and nationalist convictions ‘at the door’ 
though did not completely rid the awareness that these ‘other identities’ related to 
privilege and disadvantage among women.
96
 Efforts to minimize differences in order 
to create a feminist solidarity based on sameness resulted in a denial of differences 
which ultimately led to numerous splits and fragmentations. The Socialist Women’s 
Group (SWG) for instance, criticized the NIWRM’s approach to forming a unified 
movement as achieving little more than a false unity because it failed to challenge 
prejudices and sectarianism. Indeed, efforts to forge a united front on feminist 
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activity by remaining neutral on the national question were fraught and were pushed 
to the fore when Armagh women Republican prisoners joined the male prison protest 
for prisoner political status by refusing to work and finally, joining the ‘no wash’ 
campaign.
97
 The campaign placed pressure on the NIWRM to support the Armagh 
women prisoners. Nell McCafferty captured the dilemma facing feminist 
organisations when she wrote in graphic detail in the Irish Times: ‘the smell of 





Women Against Imperialism (WAI) broke away from the NIWRM and was formed 
in 1977, led by the prominent feminist Republican activist Bernadette Devlin (later 
McAliskey), in order to protest the mistreatment of Republican prisoners at Armagh 
as well as to publicise the link between British occupation and the oppression of 
women. The NIWRM, however, took the view that they would not support the 
women prisoners because Armagh was not a feminist issue. NIWRM’s position was 
in keeping with their strategy of seeking to unite women across the sectarian divide. 
As one member is quoted as saying: 
 
By calling a demonstration outside Armagh prison on International 
Women’s Day, [Women Against Imperialism]
99
 linked it [the 
demonstration] with feminism and women’s rights…..We could have 
called a meeting where…..it would have caused a major split in the 
organization and for what purpose? ….We could still have come out in 
our own organisations on the policies which we wanted to, rather than 





The NIWRM avoided a schism by avoiding the Nationalist question. On the basis 
that the Armagh women prisoners were Republicans, imprisoned for ‘terrorist’ 
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offences, the NIWRM maintained that Armagh was a sectarian and not a feminist 
issue and thus one that would only divide women. Unity turned out to be 
disingenuous as many of its members argued elsewhere that the Armagh women 
‘were aping tactics of their male counterparts in Long Kesh.’
101
 And, because 
Republican women prisoners refused to associate with other prisoners, it was 
asserted that ‘so much for pioneering prison reform. Armagh like Kesh is all about 




Armagh served to further entrench the conviction of feminist collectivities like the 
NIWRM that ignoring the National Question for the goal of achieving some shred of 
women’s unity was a realistic and necessary strategy. This idea was tested in so-
called ‘unity’ meetings to see what issues could be agreed upon – action on debt, 
rape and cuts to social services. These ‘unity’ meetings were initially attended by all 
feminists. Very quickly though, conflict and disagreement over the National 
Question resurfaced, and those feminists most closely identified with the Armagh 
campaigns ceased attending. Indeed, this is what led to the formation of new groups 




What the case of Armagh makes clear is that the largest stumbling block to a politics 
based on identity as sameness (women uniformly different from men), is that in its 
focus on a fairer distribution rather than a politics of transformation and change, 
identities that are secured in direct opposition to one another (i.e. 
Republican/Nationalist, Protestant/Catholic) are accepted as inevitable hostilities 
between such groups. I am agreeing with Phillips who argues that competing groups 
end up securing their equality ‘behind ever higher barriers of mutual distrust.’
104
 
Equality in both power and resources can only ever be part of the answer. This must 
be combined with a more engaged approach to politics that works at enhancing 
communication between differing groups. If this latterly work is not undertaken, or is 
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‘left at the door,’ individuals end up entrenching themselves behind barriers of 
mutual resentment.  The NIWRM, by barring members their different identities, 
could not undertake the transformative work that is necessary in order to work 
together. 
 
Young’s discussion of communicative democracy is helpful here. She notes that it is 
the task of communicative democracy to move beyond ‘difference’ and to ‘locate or 
create common interests that all can share,’ which is exactly what the NIWRM’s aim 
was.
105
 However, Young cautions that: 
 
[w]hen discussion participants aim at unity, in the appeal to a common 
ground in which they are all supposed to leave behind their particular 
experience and interests, the perspectives of the privileged are likely to 
dominate the definition of that common good. The less privileged are 
asked to put aside the expression of their experience, which may require 
a different idiom, or their claims of entitlement or interest must be put 





In Northern Ireland, feminists like those in the NIWRM, seeking to mobilise women 
on the basis of a shared gender identity, faced the same problems that other second 
wave feminists did. On closer inspection, the ‘unencumbered,’ universal subject of 
liberal democracy, turned out to be full of concealed masculinities as well as the 
situated privileges of class, race, etc. In the process of trying to embody this neutral 
subject with femininities, along came the situated experiences of Protestant, unionist, 
loyalist, Catholic, etc.  
 
In summary, identity politics, as it is expressed in difference feminism, holds that 
group membership is predicated on some feature, or experience, that members share 
in common. This shared feature, or experience, is what is held to constitute identity. 
Identitarian logic construes this as follows: the feature of sex gives fundamental 
shape to my experience and shapes the experience of others who have this feature in 
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similar ways. For instance, in a sexist society, all women are at risk of sex 
discrimination. Therefore, the shared feature of sex leads to the shared (oppressive) 
experience of sexism which results in a shared identity. The self here discovers an 
identity category to which she belongs. So, although Hartsock helpfully raises the 
issue of the collective work that must be undertaken to achieve common political 
goals in feminism, she does so on the basis of a universally shared gender identity. 
The universality of a shared identity must first be discovered by a woman and then 
women can work together. 
 
In seeking to politicise identity, identity politics as gender difference operates 
according to identitarian logic in which the ‘differently similar’ is reduced to the 
‘same.’
107
 That is, beneath differences, unity is uncovered, or discovered. It is in this 
sameness that a shared politics is found: ‘we have an identity and therefore a 
politics’ (my italics).
108
 Identity is prior to, and therefore, is the ground of politics. 
To quote Fraser: ‘All therefore were sisters under the skin.’
109
 By locating identity 
prior to politics, the liberal positioning of the subject as prior to the right and the 
good is left intact. Identification is made by the self to a universal category, as well 
as to the other on the basis of similarity. On the basis of this similarity, political 
projects are undertaken. But what if, as the NIWRM example emphasizes, we are not 
all ‘sisters under the skin’? What if other identities ‘under the skin’ are suffered as a 
relation to other identities? What if we do not all identify with the same universal 
category? What if we identify differentially to the same universal category? As the 
NIWRM case in relation to Omargh points towards, there is no escaping differences 
between women. On what basis and how then are we to undertake the hard work that 
is necessary to maintain political bonds in these circumstances? These were the 
questions raised by diversity feminists to which I now turn.  
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Identity politics and diversity feminism 
By the 1980's ‘gender difference’ feminism had given way to a focus on the 
differences between women. This shift in focus came largely from the work of 
feminists of colour and feminist lesbians who argued that feminism did not reflect 
their lives and therefore, failed to address their problems. For these feminists, the 
‘gender difference’ approach merely served to replicate the essentialist fixing of the 
concept of identity it sought to destabilise and created a hierarchy within the 
category of women. Not only did difference feminism essentialise women’s 
characteristics, it also ignored or erased differences between women.  
 
Feminists critiquing mainstream difference approaches on the basis of a neglect of 
the race issue, like bell hooks,
110
 pointed to the failure of conceptions of ‘woman’s’ 
identity premised on gender difference, to deal with issues like race, class and sexual 
orientation. Such approaches were viewed as essentialising white middle-class 
women’s traits. For instance, hooks criticises Betty Friedan for ignoring ‘the 
existence of all non-white women and poor white women.’
111
 The Combahee River 
Collective similarly took issue with the second wave idea that women were ‘all 
sisters under the skin.’
112
 The Combahee River Collective identifies itself as ‘Black 
feminists,’
113
 signalling from the start its difference from mainstream essentialist 
feminism as being at the level of the skin: ‘As Black women we see Black feminism 
as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous 
oppressions that all women of color face [sic]’.
114
 Second wave white feminists, by 
locating the problematic and solution to women’s oppression as lurking ‘under the 
skin,’ neglected the oppression suffered by non-white women at the level of the skin.  
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In the United States, Latina, Jewish and Native-American, and Asian-American 
feminists were also critiquing the implicit reference to white Anglo women that 
mainstream feminist texts like Friedan’s were making.
115
 Lesbian feminists as well 
were contributing to the realisation that the classic feminist accounts of those like 





What all of these critiques of the mainstream difference feminism hold in common is 
an insistence that the feminism on offer was not one that gave an account of all 
women. Instead, it offered an account that privileged the standpoint of the white, 
Anglo, heterosexual, middle class women who dominated the movement and 
extrapolated from this. In this way, the mainstream women’s movement, that 
claimed to liberate women, merely ended up replicating, from within, racism and 
heterosexism, classism and ethnic hierarchies. hooks summarises this critique 
succinctly: 
 
White women who dominate feminist discourse, who for the most part 
make and articulate feminist theory, have little or no understanding of 
white supremacy as a racial politic, of the psychological impact of 





Both equality feminism and difference feminism are guilty of overlooking the 
significant differences between women. hooks marks a significant shift in the 
feminist debate from a focus on ‘gender differences’ to  a focus on ‘differences 
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 With diversity feminism, identity politics in feminism then 
becomes a matter of asserting and inserting the differences, not only between men 
and women, but between women. Diversity feminists press demands on the 





Collins’ ‘Afrocentric feminist epistemology’ and ‘Black women’s standpoint’ 
exemplifies a systematic attempt to attend to the implicit racial bias of mainstream 
second wave feminism.
120
 Collins’ project is worth looking at more closely since it 
exemplifies many of the main issues attendant to the diversity approach of identity.  
Collin’s ‘Black women’s standpoint’ 
In her 1989 Signs article, Collins develops a ‘Black women’s standpoint’
121
 which is 
to serve as the basis for ‘Black feminist thought.’
122
 Collins argues that ‘Black 
women’ have a self-defined standpoint on their own oppression and that this 
standpoint is distinctive from ‘those who are not Black and female.’
123
 This 
distinctive standpoint intersects with an Afrocentric epistemology as well as feminist 
standpoint theory, both of which emerge out of the concrete experience of 
oppression. Collins puts it this way: 
 
…as a result of colonialism, imperialism, slavery, apartheid, and other 
systems of racial domination, Blacks share a common experience of 
oppression. These similarities in material conditions have fostered 
shared Afrocentric values that permeate the family structure, religious 
institutions, culture, and community life of Blacks in various parts of 
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According to Collins, feminist scholars advance a similar argument, viewing women 
as sharing a history of ‘patriarchal oppression through the political economy of the 
material conditions of sexuality and reproduction.’
125
 These shared material 
conditions serve to unify women, transcending as they do any differences between 
women (race, class, religion, etc.). These same conditions also form the basis for a 
feminist epistemology. 
 
Black women though straddle both the Afrocentric and the feminist standpoints and 
it is from this straddled position that Black women articulate their own unique, 
alternative standpoint. Since Black women have access to both Afrocentric and 
feminist standpoints, their own standpoint reflects elements from both traditions. Yet 
Collins resists the implication that a ‘Black women’s standpoint’ is merely a 
combination of Afrocentric and female values. Instead, she insists that whilst a Black 
women’s epistemology will be reflective of both Blacks as a group and women as a 
group, there are features that are unique to Black women as a group. 
 
Having established a ‘Black women’s standpoint’ as a corrective to mainstream 
feminism’s latent essentialism, Collins herself soon falters on similar grounds. 
Although she acknowledges the importance of the intersecting divisions of class, 
Collins is only unevenly able to keep class as a variable in her standpoint theory. She 
sometimes presents all white women as middle class and all black women as 
working class. This is apparent in her account of working class black women 
commenting on the lives of white women:  
 
Since I have to work, I don’t really have to worry about most of the 
things that most of the white women I have worked for are worrying 
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Collins omits from this account and others like it, the positions of middle class black 
women and working class white women.
127
 Collins positions all white women as 
having class privilege, although she recognises that some black women have 
achieved middle class status. She even admits that black women cannot therefore 
share a uniform Black feminist epistemology, yet in the end she still insists that a 




Collins is successful in critiquing the racial bias of the identity of the subject in 
mainstream feminist theory. Her aim though is not to expand the unified category of 
mainstream difference feminism, rather it is to create a new and separate category for 
‘Black women’ because the universal category of ‘woman,’ she maintains, is 
actually ‘white.’ Just as difference feminists had found that the universal liberal 
subject was male and masculine, Collins is arguing that the universal category of 
woman advanced by difference feminists is ‘white’ female and feminine. It is this 
point that is often overlooked in the identity politics debate in feminism. That is, the 
debate is one that is posited as having reached a crisis point in the matter of the 
identity of woman as a matter of category.  
 
Diversity feminism has been blamed for diversifying the identity of woman to the 
extent that there is no universal category of woman to be shared by all women, and 
therefore, there is no basis for unification and political action. But what we see in 
Collins is not a project that aims at diversification of the universal identity category 
of ‘woman,’ but rather the creation of a new and separate category for ‘Black 
women.’ Collins is not arguing that difference feminism needs to add in the race of 
’Black women’ (and stir), but that ‘Black women’ have their own identity category 
that is separate from other identity categories - for example, a universal identity 
category of ‘woman,’ which is ‘white.’ The crisis here, I want to suggest, is not one 
that can be rearticulated as a crisis of identity per se, but of how Collins’ ‘Black 
women’ might work together collectively with other mainstream, or other 
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differentiated feminists. That is, how can feminists work across and from positions 
of difference without erasing those differences?  
Diversity and the ‘SlutWalk’ 
Movements like ‘the SlutWalk’ exemplify this on-going, real and visceral issue 
around diversity in feminism.  SlutWalk originated in Toronto, Canada on April 13, 
2011 as a protest march in response to the statement made by a Toronto police 
officer at a sexual assault prevention lecture. The officer advised women that if they 
wanted to be safe from rape, they should ‘avoid dressing like sluts in order not to be 
victimised.’
 129
 The initial protest march soon expanded into a global movement that 
is against any explanation of rape in reference to how a woman dresses. The main 
aim of the movement is to change the existing rape culture, which blames women for 
rape.   
 
Organised as a movement within which diverse women speak with one, unified 
voice though has not been accepted by all women’s groups as is exemplified in this 




What becomes an issue is those white women and liberal feminist 
women of colour who argue that ‘slut’ is a universal category of female 
experience, irrespective of race. I recognize that there are many women 
of color who are participating in the SW movement, and I support those 
sisters who do, particularly women who are doing it in solidarity and 
coalition. But rather than forcing white women to get on the diversity 
train with regard to the inclusivity of SlutWalk, perhaps we need to 
redirect our racial vigilance. By that I mean, I’d prefer that white 
women acknowledge that they are in fact organizing around a 





The Crunk Feminist Collective is taking exception to the word ‘slut.’ They argue 
that the term holds different associations for Black women than it does for white 
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women, ones that are situated in a history of slavery, immigration and racist 
representations. For Black American women, the term ‘slut’ cannot be rescued from 
the particular history within which it is embedded. The Black Women’s Blueprint 
similarly expressed these sentiments in their ‘Open Letter from Black Women to 
Slutwalk’
132
 in 2011:  
 
As Black women, we do not have the privilege or the space to call 
ourselves ‘slut’ without validating the already historically entrenched 
ideology and recurring messages about what and who the Black woman 
is.  We don’t have the privilege to play on destructive representations 





In a manner similar to Collins, groups like the Crunk Feminist Collective and the 
Black Women’s Blueprint argue that it is not only not productive to diversify a 
mainstream category of woman to simply include the issue of race, but it is 
destructive to ‘Black women.’ Rather, ‘Black women’ occupy a different and 
separate category than the one occupied by ‘white women.’
134
 Therefore, ‘Black 
women’ and ‘white women’ cannot work together on the basis of a shared essential 
identity – ‘woman.’ As it was for Collins, the problem of collective political 
undertakings, according to the Crunk Collective, is not exclusion from the ‘universal 
category of woman,’ rather it is that the universal category is not appropriate for 
‘Black women.’ 
 
The Crunk Feminist Collective does not completely rule out the possibility that 
‘Black women’ might work together with ‘white women.’ The two groups might be 
able to work together across difference on a coalitional basis though not as a unified 
group since ‘different histories necessitate different strategies.’
135
 The Crunk 
Feminist Collective sees such work as possible only ‘if white women could 
recognize SlutWalk as being rooted in white female experience, it would provide an 
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opportunity for them to participate in coalition and solidarity with similar 
movements that are inclusive and reflective of the experiences of women of 
color.’
136
 That is, by invoking the term ‘slut’ as the universal identity term around 
which to organise, the movement Slutwalk fails to capture the complexity and 
difference of the identity of ‘Black women’ thus failing ultimately to address the 
specific issues ‘Black women’ suffer around ‘rape culture.’ It is necessary to 
recognize that there is no single, unified feminist standpoint that is shared between 
‘Black’ and ‘white’ women. In order for the two groups to be able to work together, 
the painful history of relations between them must be recognized and worked on.  
 
Haraway moves in this direction and offers some elaboration on how this sort of 
work might be undertaken. Although she takes a somewhat different approach to 
Collins in her rejection of any notion of a single, unified feminist standpoint, she 
comes to a very similar conclusion.
137
 Haraway begins by critiquing theories like 
Mackinnon’s that purport to espouse a radical theory of a universal feminine 
experience. According to Haraway such a standpoint brings about the ‘unintended 
erasure of polyvocal, inassimilable, radical differences.’
138
 Yet, Haraway does not 
dispose of the category of women’s experience. Instead, she reconsiders it as a way 
of redefining the exclusive boundaries between nature and culture. Through the 
notion of a consciously constructed ‘political kinship,’
 139
 Haraway redefines 
women’s experience within a global context that is able to account for the 
differences of race, gender and class in a way that is not essentialist or oppressive.
140
 
Feminists, she writes, need to: 
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…self-consciously construct a space that cannot affirm the capacity to 
act on the basis of natural identification, but only on the basis of 




Haraway is clearly privileging coalitions based on alliance, rather than a natural, 
essential identity.  Her ‘cyborg’ feminist politics is based on ‘affinity’ and not a pure, 
unified, originary identity.
142
 Groups come together, not because of some pre-
existing or ‘natural’ wholeness that is shared, but because they are ‘imperfectly 
stitched together’ as incomplete, differently situated selves.
143
 ‘Affinity groups’ will 





Haraway defines ‘affinities’ in the language of choice, as ‘related not by blood, but 
by choice.’
145
  Whilst Marsden reads this as implying the adoption of decisionist 
vocabulary and a transcendental notion of agency,
146
 Gedalof argues against this 
conclusion.
147
 Gedalof points out that Haraway clearly rejects any definition of 
choice as framed within the terms of a ‘liberal epistemology and politics that posits 
an autonomous human agency outside of its social location.’
148
 Instead, Gedalof 
views Haraway as making the distinction between ‘by blood’ and ‘by choice’ 
because the latter is trying to emphasise the point that feminist unity is an often very 
difficult achievement which involves choices that have consequences. Unity is not 
available as a resource in the sense that it could be chosen. Rather, unity is 
something that has to be worked for and can only be understood as an achievement, 
which is what the Crunk Feminist Collective is suggesting as the only way possible 
for ‘Black women’ to work together with ‘white women.’ 
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In summary, although there are a plurality of approaches to diversity feminism, there 
are some key features that all share. Firstly, all approaches emphasise the differences 
between women, thus rejecting any notion of a universal group and singular identity 
category for women as women. Secondly, all place emphasis on an ethnically, 
racially, sexualised, classed, etc. situated female subjectivity. And finally, all view 
the main task of feminist politics to be that of bringing into focus and politicising all 
those identities that are dismissed or oppressed – not only the identity of woman vis-
à-vis man. What accounts like those of Collins and Haraway point towards is that the 
crisis for feminism is not that race, sexuality or ethnicity need to be added in to a 
universally presumed category of woman, but that, in having raised the issue of 
diversity, attention needs to be shifted to how it is that women of diverse standpoints 
might come together to work towards common goals. Can it be on the basis of a 
universally shared identity as women? This would not seem to be possible. How 
might, for instance, ‘white women’ working on the issue of women’s safety in the 
Slutwalk movement work together with the ‘Black women’ of the Crunk Feminist 
Collective? What begins to emerge here is the strong suggestion that there is hard 
work that needs to be undertaken if feminists occupying differing identity positions 
are to work together on collective projects. And that this hard work has to do with 
how individuals are positioned unequally in relation to each other.  
 
Whilst the intent is to diversify the range of possible articulations of women’s 
identity, it also casts doubt on the very notion of a common female identity. 
Complicating the notion of a universal woman highlights the complexity of its 
constituents. Each of the complicating categories of black, lesbian, immigrant are 
themselves further complicated (think of Collins’ class issue), each no more unified 
than the category of ‘woman.’ This debate aims to alter the liberal subject so that 
sexual and racial differences are illuminated. It seeks to rework or reconstruct the 
subject, but not to abandon it. The subject still stands, but now reflective of gender, 
racial and sexual differences. The subject of difference and diversity feminism is still 
premised on what is universal in identity. The universal of identity that serves to 
unite the group is based on what one is born into – be it a set of (constructed) social, 
racial or gendered categories. It is these categories that equip the subject with the 
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By the 1990’s a new intellectual articulation of feminism was emerging, which 
profoundly reflected the doubt of the viability of a unified concept of women: 
postmodernism. The issues raised by diversity feminists are central to postmodern 
feminists. Both difference feminism and diversity feminism successfully unprise the 
liberal self from its supposed identity-free status. This, in turn, brings about a crisis 
within feminism not only as to what concept of the self might replace it, but in the 
light of differences between woman, on what basis it is that women will be able to 
act (together), if not from the foundation of a unified subject. Although feminists by 
and large can be seen to be in agreement that the modernist subject of the 
Enlightenment was complicit in the inferior status of women, just what conception 
would replace the universal modern subject is still fiercely under debate.   
 
Postmodernism enters and challenges the foundational idea in the women’s 
movement that the notion of ‘woman’ refers to a shared essence or common identity 
and that it is this unified identity category that serves as the basis of feminist 
knowledge and politics. Where equality, difference and diversity approaches to 
identity politics take an approach that posits a settled notion of identity as prior to 
politics and thus, view politics as premised on a notion of identity as settled, the 
postmodern approach to identity politics critiques this view for being both inaccurate 
and damaging. This is captured in Butler’s observation that: 
 
The theorists of feminist identity that elaborate predicates of color, 
sexuality, ethnicity, class and able-bodiedness invariably close with an 
embarrassed ‘etc.’ at the end of the list. Through this horizontal 
trajectory of adjectives, these positions strive to encompass a situated 
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Identity politics and postmodern feminism  
Postmodern feminism is most generally understood as politicizing the very notion of 
identity. That is, postmodern feminism seeks to disrupt and deconstruct the unity of 
any notion of pre-constituted identity categories that equality, difference and 




 challenge to the feminist identity category of 
woman has an extensive literature behind it, what all of these approaches share in 
common is an approach to the identity category of ‘woman’ that is deconstructive.
152
 
For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on certain aspects of the work of both 
Wendy Brown and Judith Butler. I first look briefly at Brown’s Nietzschean critique 
of identity politics
153
 which foregrounds the experience of the oppression of identity 
and the inaugural scene of pain. I then trace Butler’s Foucaultian path of identity 
deconstruction, which is generally taken to be the definitive feminist deconstructive 
attack on feminism as an identity politics.  
Identity as ‘injury’ 
One influential postmodern account of identity politics is that identity politics creates 
and perpetuates an understanding of identity in terms of ‘injury’ or ‘the suffering 
self.’
154
 The Nietzschean concept of ressentiment is most often employed in 
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formulating this argument and prompts a focus on victimhood, powerlessness, and 
fixation on recognition.
155
 Brown’s work is generally taken as a paradigmatic 
example of this sort of critique of identity politics. In her States of Injury: Power and 
Freedom in Late Modernity, Brown’s central concern is with the ‘exclusionary and 
reactionary function’ of contemporary feminism, standpoint theory and identity 
politics, which she views as having the aim of theorising the conditions of ‘political 
conversation among a complex and diverse ‘we.’’
156
 Her main question is how to go 
about understanding the impulse to politics at work in feminist identity politics. In 
particular, she explores the way in which feminism, as a form of identity politics, can 
be understood as based in and driven by a Nietzschean form of ressentiment: 
‘[g]iven what produced it, given what shapes and suffuses it, what does politicised 
identity want?’
157
 According to Brown, the answer to this question is located within 




Brown argues that ‘politicised identity’ exhibits many of the attributes of 
ressentiment, which is a critique of the source of domination on the part of the 
‘injured’ and is based on moral reproach. Brown describes it as so: 
 
Developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the 
injured, it delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting 
sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the ‘injury’ of social 
subordination. It fixes identities of the injured and the injuring as social 
positions, and codifies as well the meanings of their actions against all 





Identity politics is rooted in the pursuit of recognition through its own history of 
subjection – a subjection that is predicated on ‘injury.’ Group identities are therefore, 
according to Brown, premised on their own marginalisation and this marginalization 
is akin to a primary ‘injury.’ Therefore, politicised identity is ontologically invested 
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in its own subjection (‘injury’) and because of this can only continually reiterate its 
own injuries of marginalisation, exclusion and oppressed subjugation.
160
 The 
problem then is that any identity position cannot see itself outside of its positionality 
and cannot envision any futurity outside of this. This implies that paradoxically, in 
its attempt to empower, politicized identity actually functions only to entrench 
marginalization. Brown summarises this as follows: 
 
In its emergence as a protest against marginalisation or subordination, 
politicised identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion both 
because it is premised on this exclusion for its very existence as identity 
and because the formation of identity at the site of the exclusion, as 
exclusion, augments or “alters the direction of the suffering” entailed in 
subordination or marginalisation by finding a site of blame for it. But in 
so doing, it installs its pain over its unredeemed history in the very 
foundation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as 
identity…..Politicised identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for 
itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatising, and inscribing its pain 





Positing the subject as victim, results in the subject as capable of nothing more than 
wielding ‘moral reproach’ against power: ‘Truth is always on the side of the damned 
or the excluded; hence Truth is always clean of power, but therefore always 
positioned to reproach power.’
162
 Consequently, according to Brown, one of the 
most debilitating implications of identity politics, cast in light of the logics of 
ressentiment, is that the subject is posited as morally pure, but powerless. This 
eliminates the possibility for democratic contestation and therefore, also the 
possibility of meaningful transformation. The possibility of political disagreement is 
precluded because the reality that all subjects are implicated in power structures is 
obscured, hidden from view. Furthermore, the capacity for making political 
judgments and the practice of dialogue across difference are both diminished.  
 
The self is rendered powerless and incapable of interacting in the manner that would 
be required to transform the ‘injured identity.’ That is, within a framework of 
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ressentiment transformation becomes impossible and indeed is no longer even a goal. 
The telos of the ‘injured’ is not towards increased freedom, but rather aims only at 
repeating the ‘injury.’ How then does Brown propose injured identity transform? 
How in a context of inequality and oppression (‘injury’) are differentially placed 
‘we’s’ to undertake collective political projects? How will it be possible for the self 
to participate in democratic communication with differentially placed others?  
 
Brown moves to explore the possibility of Nietzsche’s ‘virtues of forgetting’ as one 
possible solution that would transform the painful investments that form and deform 
politicized identity.
163
 Very quickly though she abandons Nietzsche, noting that it is 
‘erased histories and historical invisibilities’ that are themselves elements positioned 
at the heart of the pain of subjugated identities.
164
 Instead, in order for ‘the 
transformative possibilities of collective political invention’ to flourish, Brown 
proposes that the problematic of pain, embedded at the heart of politicized identity, 
must be given scope to be acknowledged.
165
 The only way to do this is to configure a 
‘radically democratic political culture’ that must include a space for acknowledging 
the pain at work in identities yet being careful not to allow this space to slide away 
from political discourse into therapeutic discourse. Part of this reconfiguration is 
premised upon ‘desire.’
166
 This is a notion of ‘desire’ that is expressed in 
transforming the character and claims of politicized identity away from ‘I am’ to ‘I 
want this for us’: ‘This is an I want that distinguishes itself from a liberal expression 
of self-interest by virtue of its figuring of a political or collective good as its 
desire.’
167
 This, according to Brown, is how it is possible to rescue politicised 
identity and establish as its telos a (collective) freedom. In order to actualise freedom 
what is required is on-going work, and this work will be a ‘frustratingly 
indeterminate matter of ethos…of the style of political practices.’ (9) 
 
In summary, accounts like Brown’s that explore identity politics through the lens of 
ressentiment, argue that attachment to a political identity as the basis for motivation 
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for political argument is best understood as a ‘wounded attachment.’ If the identity of 
feminism is born in and through ‘injury,’ then the telos of its politics are likewise 
dominated by ‘suffering,’ a ‘suffering’ that, as Bell notes, is ‘owned.’
168
 Thus, 
feminism cannot afford to cast aside the ressentiment that is at work in politicized 
identity, but must engage with its challenges. By articulating politicized identities as 
‘injured states,’ Brown re-frames the debate of feminist identity politics in terms of 
psychic states. In so doing, she pushes feminism to pay attention to the investments 
that are at work in the entrenchment if political positions as well as political 
aspirations.  
Identity as performativity 
Butler offers another seemingly trenchant critique of feminism ‘as an identity 
politics.’
169
 Her influential Gender Trouble (henceforth GT) opens with a series of 
provocative quotes: from Julia Kristeva, who writes that ‘[s]trictly speaking, 
‘women’ cannot be said to exist;’ to Luce Irigaray, according to whom, ‘woman does 
not have a sex;’ to Michel Foucault, who argues that ‘the deployment of sexuality 
establishes the notion of sex.’
170
 By opening with the ideas of these philosophers, 
Butler signals that she intends to critique the central feminist concepts of: woman, 
femaleness, femininity, sex, and gender. She then poses the question as to ‘whether 




The main focus of Butler’s theoretical project is to submit the notion of a unified 
subject to ‘a deconstructive critique’ by displacing identity markers (sex, gender, 
race, sexuality, and the body) ‘from the contexts in which they have been deployed 
as instruments of oppressive power.’
172
 Butler begins this project with a 
thoroughgoing rejection of the modernist subject of liberalism – there is no ‘there’ 
there. That is, there is ‘no abiding substance’ that constitutes a prediscursive self, 
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rather there is only a ‘fictive subject’ that is the effect of a stylised set of acts.
 173
 This 
does not indicate that there is no subject, only that the subject is not to be found 
where it is normally expected to be, i.e. either behind or before its deeds. Butler’s 
central point is that rather than a substance, the subject is a ‘process.’ That is, the 
subject becomes a subject through praxis.  
 
Commenting on de Beauvoir’s claim that ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman,’
174
 Butler writes: 
 
If there is something right in Beauvoir’s claim that one is not born, but 
rather becomes a woman, it follows that woman itself is a term in 
process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to 
originate or to end. As an on-going discursive practice, it is open to 
intervention and resignification. Even when gender seems to congeal 
into the most reified forms, the ‘congealing’ is itself an insistent and 
insidious practice, sustained and regulated by various social means. It 
is, for Beauvoir, never possible finally to become a woman, as if there 





GT shows how gender ‘congeals’ into a form that posits it as having always already 
been there.
176
 Butler asserts that contrary to appearances, gender is a process without 
origins or endings; it is something that the subject ‘does’ rather than something the 
subject ‘is.’ Departing from the commonly held assumption that sex, gender and 
sexuality all exist in a mutually constitutive relationship to each other, Butler claims 
that gender is not natural. If sex, gender and sexuality are not essentially connected, 
then it becomes possible, for example, to have a body designated ‘female’, but to not 
display ‘feminine’ traits. The ‘telos,’ rather than being one that is substantiated, 
remains open and never finalisable.  
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From Butler’s deconstructive approach three main points can be made. Firstly, there 
is not a prediscursive universe onto which either sex or gender identity (woman) can 
be mapped.
 177
 Secondly, gender identity is brought into being through ‘a compulsory 
and naturalised heterosexuality.’
178
 Lastly, the practices that produce gender 
difference are ‘displaced from view’ and are ‘sustained through corporeal signs and 
other discursive means.’
 179
 That is, gender is ‘performative in the sense that the 





Gender as performative, according to Butler, has very clear implications for identity 
politics. Appropriating the identity of ‘woman’ for feminist identity politics is just as 
foundational as that which it seeks to disrupt.
181
 What is called for instead is ‘an 
open coalition’ that does not carry with it the ‘presupposition or goal of unity’ and 
‘affirms identities that are alternately instituted and relinquished according to the 
purposes at hand.’
 182
 Women therefore, cannot be the foundational locus of feminist 
politics; rather it is the doing of identity politics that will create and transform the 
identities that are enacted. This does not result in the complete deconstruction of 
identity or politics, but instead establishes as political the terms by which identities 
are constituted.
 183
 Being a woman is a matter of becoming in the sense of praxis. In 
undertaking work with others, there is hard work to do that is always transformative. 
 
In the wake of both the diversity and poststructuralist critiques of the subject, there 
has been a questioning of where feminist theory and activism is headed. Is collective 
feminist action possible at all without a coherent, worked out notion of what a 
woman is? How do women work together without recourse to a settled notion of the 
subject? How are feminists to constitute and maintain political relations without 
recourse to the subject ‘woman’? How can feminists identify with others in order to 
act politically, without transcending difference, without appropriating different 
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others? There have developed a variety of calls for a post-identity politics, in the 
next section I look at two influential approaches – coalitional and transversal 
politics.  
‘Beyond identity politics’ 
Coalitional politics 
As a way to move beyond the identity crisis in feminism, some theorists are 
increasingly calling for coalition building as a model for political mobilisation.
184
 
They do so on the basis of a belief that coalitions resolve the impasse in feminist 
identity politics between the political claims of diversity and the political need for 
unity. Coalitions, as fluid alliances between diverse subjects, seem better suited to 
deal with the complex intersections of race, gender, class and sexuality than do the 
earlier second-wave strategies of mobilisation based on a focus of gender identity. 
Unifying diverse groups together on the temporary basis of a specific and shared 
goal, appears to allow diverse groups to work together without suppressing the 
differences that might otherwise lead to fracturing.  
 
Proponents of coalitional politics argue that this sort of approach avoids re-
entrenching a hierarchical, oppressive identity structure and at the same time 
unsettles and disrupts the parameters that constitute the group. By bringing subjects 
together across established lines of difference, coalitional politics are said to create a 
space for previously stigmatised or oppressed/suppressed identities. Coalitions are 
formed when diverse groups form in pursuit of a specific and shared goal, ‘according 
to the purposes at hand; it will be an open assemblage that permits of multiple 
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Bernice Reagon’s account of coalitional politics underscores the necessary place of 
coalitional politics in feminism. In a widely influential speech on coalitional politics, 
Reagon emphasises not only the necessity of coalitional work, but also the hard, 
often painful work that it requires of participants.
186
 Joining a coalition is not a 
choice, she maintains: ‘You don’t go into a coalition because you like it. The only 
reason you would consider trying to team up with somebody who could possibly kill 
you, is because that is the only way you can figure out how to stay alive.’
187
 It is the 
inclusive nature of coalitions that makes them such hard work because they involve 
reaching out to and working together with others with whom one might disagree 
with over important matters and whom one may dislike or even fear. The desire to 
work together is not driven by mere preference, but by a desire to survive.  
 
According to Reagon’s account of coalitional alliances, diverse groups come 
together for purely tactical reasons, driven by self-interest (i.e. ‘it is the only way 
you can figure out how to stay alive’). Yet, such a purely self-interested strategy 
appears to neglect the demand for reciprocal recognition and affirmation. Early 
critics of a universal ‘sisterhood,’ like Lugones and Spelman, view self-interest as 
not only an inappropriate, but an insufficient motive for white women in attempting 
to build connections with women of colour.
188
 According to Lugones and Spelman, 
the only ‘motive’ that makes sense for building alliances is ‘friendship’ because ‘the 
task at hand is such a difficult one.’
189
 Lyshaug raises two concerns with Lugones 
and Spelman’s positing friendship as the only fitting basis for the building of 
feminist coalitions. Firstly, relying on friendship as the basis for alliances carries 
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with it the danger of perpetuating women’s problematic association with selflessness 
and the pressure to be ‘other-centred.’
190
 Furthermore, friendship constricts the 
possible range of political solidarity too narrowly. If friendship is what is to be relied 
on as a basis for working together, this would seem to indicate that the possibility of 
political solidarity extends only to those with whom one is personally acquainted and 
for whom one holds in affection. Spelman and Lugones are right that it is certainly 
difficult to see how self-interest could be a sufficient basis for the establishment of 
durable and meaningful connections, especially when there may be present 
ambivalent if not outright hostile feelings towards others. But neither does 
friendship, so narrowly construed, seem to offer a sufficient basis. If neither self-
interest nor friendship can form the basis for political solidarity, what can?  
Jodi Dean’s ‘reflective solidarity’ 
Jodi Dean is another feminist who offers an account of coalitional politics that 
purports to move ‘beyond identity.’
191
 In Solidarity of Strangers: feminism after 
identity politics, Dean develops an alternative coalitional model that aims to 
acknowledge the importance of reciprocity in relations of solidarity. She argues that 
since differences present themselves only in a ‘context of communicative 
engagement,’ the differences that divide us make an alternative ‘reflective solidarity’ 
possible.
192
 Using a Habermasian communicative action account, Dean reconstructs 
the communicative foundations that make up ‘feminist coalitional practices’ in order 
to theorise the ‘perspectives and orientations we need to adopt if we are to work 
together.’
193
 According to Dean, the sort of dialogue that leads to ‘reflective 
solidarity’ is dialogue in which all participants take a responsive stance towards each 
other. That is, each participant responds responsibly to the other with whom she is in 
dialogue. By this, Dean means that each participant must take up a reflective 
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perspective, which is what she refers to as the ‘hypothetical thirds.’
194
 ‘Hypothetical 
thirds’ signify ‘the space occupied by the excluded other, the perspective that would 




According to Dean, by taking up the perspective of the ‘hypothetical third,’ 
reflective solidarity avoids constructing a group identity that is premised on the 
exclusion of the ‘other.’  Furthermore, since reflective solidarity is premised on 
dialogue that is proccessual, it avoids effacing difference. By emphasising the 
communicative nature of difference in politics, Dean outlines a more complexly 
ethical account of coalition politics than that provided by either Reagon or Lugones 
and Spelman. Yet, what Dean seems to have missed is the amount of on-going work 
cooperation with those with whom one might not identify requires. Such work 
requires what Nancy Fraser calls ‘transformative’ adjustments.
196
 This 
transformative identity work requires that, for instance, Brown’s ‘wounded 
identities’ undertake the personal and intrapersonal work necessary to acknowledge, 
work through and transform their ‘wounded attachments’ vis-à-vis each other.  
 
I am suggesting that it does not seem to be enough to simply know all there is to 
know of each other, as I take Dean to mean. There is another sort of work that needs 
to be undertaken here that differs in quality from a mere fact-finding and gathering 
exercise. Understanding unity amid difference, inequality, oppression and, to use 
Brown’s language, ‘injury,’ as a relational task, points to the need for feminists to 
approach identity politics as something more than a cognitive issue. Mutual 
recognition must reach across diversity and requires more than being sure that we are 
fully informed in a factual manner of the differences that separate us. There is not 
only cognitive work that needs to be undertaken, but also personal work. Yet, 
coalition work, like that of Reagon and Dean, does not give an account of the kind of 
self that might be capable of this sort of on-going, transformative work.  
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Coalition work requires that the self engage in constantly changing and intensely 
inclusive, cooperative work with different others, both close and distant. It is risky 
work, as Reagon so rightly emphasises. The risks of working with differentially 
placed others range from having to explore long-held myths, as in the case of 
Northern Ireland, which I discussed above. It also might entail confronting mutual 
hatred, being ostracised or intimidated; and experiencing new vulnerabilities. I am 
agreeing here with Porter, that to undertake this sort of political work, one must 
begin with accepting the ‘responsibility of the risk,’ and this entails on-going self-
reflection and self-transformation.
197
 Coalition work in the context of feminist 
identity politics requires selves that can, not only cultivate flexibility with respect to 
one’s own self-understanding, but also be receptive to that which is different, 
unappealing and sometimes threatening. It requires tolerance for ambiguity and 
change. Certainly such dispositions cannot be assumed, for they are dispositions that 
require cultivation. But proponents of coalitional politics appear to pay very little 




Theorists like Reagon appear to assume that doing coalitional work will of itself 
cultivate the required dispositions in the self undertaking the work. Although she 
refers to how participating in coalitional work will ‘stretch your perimeter,’
199
 
Reagon gives only instrumental and self-interested reasons for selves to undertake 
the work required in coalitions. If our motivations are primarily tactical and self-
interested, is it not just as likely that we would simply end up re-entrenching existing 
identity differences – just as likely that we would not undertake the necessary work 
to understand and overcome our cognitive limitations? If the work is too difficult, 
would we not simply turn away? Would we not simply remain mired in ressentiment 
thereby unable to undertake the transformative work necessary to work through ours 
and others’ ‘injuries’? An ethically richer account of the self must be incorporated 
here, and the conception of this ethics must be conceived in practical terms, that is, 
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as an ethics that ‘takes its start from a plight,’
200
 the plight of our limited cognitive 
grasp of the world and each other in it. Coalitional theorists, Like Reagon, when they 
neglect to outline the content of such an ethics, fail to appreciate and grapple with 
the implications of their own insights into the relational nature of identity.   
 
Dean’s Habermasian account of reflective solidarity similarly suffers from this 
shortcoming. She fails to develop an account of what sort of self might be required 
that could carry out communicative engagement in a situation in which that self does 
not identify with others in some essential way. As Lyshaug points out, Dean’s 
account of communicative engagement remains formal and does not address the 
personal work that needs to happen in difficult contexts.
201
 When Dean concedes that 
‘citizenship in a pluralist society requires support for the other in her difference’ and 
because of this ‘we must allow her the freedom to remain a stranger,’ she does seem 
to acknowledge the limitations of her formal model of communicative 
engagement.
202
 Dean goes so far as to quote Kristeva, who endorses the view that 
instead of taking the other as stranger, we should recognise the ‘stranger’ within 
ourselves. Being aware that we are all ‘strangers to ourselves,’ Kristeva points 
towards this as being the basis for universal connection with actual others.
203
 In 
appealing to Kristeva’s plea for the cultivation of a self-awareness of the other 
within us as the basis for a universal ethical relation with concrete others, Dean is 
underscoring the importance of attention to the self-transformation that is necessary 
before ‘reflective solidarity’ can be pursued and cultivated with others. This is work 
that the self must undertake on itself. In order for this to happen though, Dean’s 
account of the mechanisms of solidarity must be supplemented by an account of a 
self that would be able to sustain the sort of attentiveness that would allow for this, 
but she does not. Transversal politics moves in this direction and I now turn to look 
at how far it does.  
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Transversal politics 
Transversal politics is a form of coalitional politics that has its origins in Italian 





 Transversal politics is both a descriptive term that refers 
to political activity and organisation in different contexts, as well as a normative 
model of activity. In contrast to Dean’s Habermasian ‘reflective solidarity,’ 
transversal politics offers a non-Habermasian dialogic ethics. Unlike a Habermasian 
approach, in transversal politics alliances are formed that move beyond the quest for 
consensus at all costs. Alliances are forged precisely on the understanding that there 
may not be any common agreement that can serve as a rallying foundation. 
Therefore, the need for common agreement is not the starting point, but is rather the 
aim: ‘what can be agreed upon is the need for a common project, for an aim (not for 
common premises), for an ethos, not a universal ethics.’
206
 Underlying transversal 
politics is a dialogically situated epistemology, which recognises that there are 
multiple positions in the social world and that each one of these positions yields its 
own unique standpoint. Because of the multiplicity of social positions, no position 
can be taken as providing knowledge that is not unfinished, nor is any knowledge 
position invalid. ‘Truth’ is only achieved through dialogue with other people 
differentially positioned.  
 
Transversal politics follows the principle of ‘encompassment’ of difference by 
equality.
207
 What this means is that although differences are to be regarded as 
important, notions of difference should always be encompassed by notions of 
equality rather than replace them. Furthermore, differences are not hierarchical and it 
is assumed, a priori, that others will always be regarded with respect in their 
difference. Others’ positionings are respected at the same time that they are 
acknowledged for their differential social, economic or political power structuring. It 
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is in this manner that transversal politics work to maintain the integrity of the 
individual in a group context. 
 
Yuval-Davis draws several implications from these premises. First, feminists must 
work to avoid seeing themselves, unless through democratic elections, as occupying 
positions of representation of their communities. Rather, they should view 
themselves as advocates whose work it is to lend support to a shared cause. In 
carrying out advocacy work, the feminist must be ever mindful of the complexity of 
her own social position vis-à-vis other group members, in general, as well as in 
specific face-to-face encounters. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the advocate be 
a member of the particular group she is advocating for since ‘[i]t is the message, not 




Key to this sort of advocacy style of politics is an emphasis on the dialogical process 
and the concepts of ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting.’
209
 ‘Rooting’ is the notion that any 
participant in a political dialogue brings with her a reflexive knowledge of her own 
position and identity. At the same time that the participant is ‘rooted’ in her own 
identity position, she must be open to listening to others, who are likewise ‘rooted.’ 
In listening to others, the ‘messenger’ must be open to actually putting herself in the 
others’ (‘rooted’) position. This openness to the ‘other’ is ‘shifting.’ Yuval-Davis 
elaborates on this scene of ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ as follows: 
 
The idea [is] that each participant brings with her the rooting in her own 
membership and identity, but at the same time tries to shift in order to put 
herself in a situation of exchange with women who have different 
memberships and identities. They call it transversalism – to differentiate 
it from ‘universalism’ which by assuming a homogeneous point of 




Central to the concepts of ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ are that first, the ‘shifting’ that is 
required of the agent does not lead to abandonment of her self-centring. That is, she 
does not give up her own ‘rooting’ (read identity). Second, the ‘shifting’ works 
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counter to a homogenisation of the other. Instead of accepting the other as a 
‘stranger’ (as Dean’s account does), agents undertake trying to find out what the 
other’s ‘rooted’ position is. ‘Shifting’ and ‘rooting’ work towards both a recognition 
and acceptance of difference.  
 
The process of ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ in transversalist politics works to open up the 
dialogic possibilities in identity politics for dealing with the problem of the limits of 
cognitive knowledge. Here is what Yuval-Davis has to say about the boundaries of 
such information gathering dialogue: 
 
Transversal politics do not assume the dialogue lacks boundaries and that 
each conflict of interest is irreconcilable. However, the boundaries of 





The process of ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ works to shift emphasis away from the 
‘messenger’ and onto the ‘message,’ thereby, functioning to protect plurality in the 
group. Again, what is most important is the ‘message’ rather than the ‘messenger.’ 
Communication takes precedence over identity. So, while we are allowed to remain 
‘rooted’ in our own identities (we do not need to leave some parts of ourselves ‘at 
the door’ as the NIWRM required), we all need to undertake the work of ‘shifting’ 
sufficient enough to agree on the ‘message.’  
 
Yuval-Davis acknowledges that there are some limitations inherent to transversal 
politics. First, it relies only on the dialogic encounter to come to agreements, but 
when this encounter breaks down, there simply is no alternative decision-making 
process to fall back on. Because transversal politics does not favour an emphasis on 
shared identity, but rather favours an emphasis on the process (i.e. ‘message’ over 
‘messenger’), different standpoints might prioritise different projects. So, for 
example, in a project loosely defined as gaining control over a woman’s body, one 
standpoint might prioritise legalising abortion, and another standpoint might 
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prioritise the right to be protected from forced sterilisation. If both priorities can be 
pursued at the same time, then there is no conflict. But very often, there are not 
unlimited resources and decisions must be made in regards to what should be 
focused on given limited resources. When such difficult choices must be made, 
according to Yuval-Davis, the transversal approach is simply unable to cope because 




Several further issues arise, which I highlight here. Firstly, transversal politics’ 
process of ‘shifting’ is premised on the notion of self-centring (i.e. maintaining one’s 
roots and values) and refraining from homogenising the other while taking up a 
stance of respect for the other in her difference. Although the complementary 
practices of ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ work to open the dialogic possibility of identity 
politics, these also carry with them the danger of being restricted to an invited elite 
within a given ‘epistemological community,’
213
 which already holds in common 
attitudes towards power and conflict. Secondly, transversal politics appears to work 
with differences that are negotiable and does not offer any explanation as to how 
differences that are not negotiable are to be approached. What happens when 
‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ do not lead to ‘shifting’ sufficient to negotiate? Thirdly, and 
most importantly, by over-emphasising the importance of the ‘message,’ 
transversalism seems to have left unelaborated those individuals involved in the 
dialogue. What if ‘rooted’ communication cannot be ‘shifted’? And what if the 
dialogist is convinced to give up her own ‘rooted’ position, abandoning those she is 
meant to represent? What are the individual efforts and attitudes that should be 
cultivated in these instances?  
 
These sorts of issues are given illustration in the example of The Northern Ireland 
Women’s Coalition (NIWC), which provides a notable case of women organising 
across identity differences in a fractured polity on the basis of transversalist 
principles. The NIWC intentionally adopted a transversalist approach at both its 
formation as well as its maintenance. It followed the principles of transversalism all 
the way up - from within its organization structure as well as its decision-making 
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procedures – the Coalition operationalized transversalist politics. By way of 
concluding this discussion on transversal politics I turn to this case. 
Transversal politics and the NIWC 
The NIWC was formed to ensure that women would not be excluded from the newly 
created Northern Ireland Forum for Peace and Reconciliation and the All-Party Talks 
process.
214
 Until that time, the NIWC had been a loose group of cross-community 
activists and academics who had worked together on campaigns to address a variety 
of women’s issues in the country, including the representation of women in politics 
was well as a host of other related issues to do with childcare, domestic violence, and 
so forth.
215
 The NIWC was created at an open meeting to which women's groups, as 
well as individual women were invited.  
 
At this meeting there was agreement that the elections were an opportunity to 
highlight and publicise the under-representation of women in the political 
discussions about the future of Northern Ireland.
216
 Similar to the early Women's 
Rights Movement in Northern Ireland, the NIWC was made up of ‘women from both 
nationalist and republican traditions, in the main, but not exclusively Catholic, and 
from unionist and loyalist communities, in the main, but not exclusively Protestant, 
as well as women who hover between these cultures, rejecting either identity.’
217
 The 
fundamental difference with the formation of the NIWC was that the coalition was 
prepared to acknowledge and to address the divided loyalties amongst its members. 
What this meant in practice was that any agreements that were reached on fractious 
issues had to be worked out. Whereas, the NIWRM took an avoidance approach to 
the issues of identity differences that interfered with the unity of gender sameness,
218
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the NIWC, by adopting a transversal approach, began from a position of 
acknowledging differences.  
 
Although in early meetings a majority of participants agreed that the remit of the 
NIWC would be to put forward candidates for the upcoming elections, some women 
did not agree and did not return. The dilemma articulated by these women is 
reflected in the following excerpt from a letter they sent to a Belfast-based feminist 
magazine,mjn nb  
 
As feminists we agree with the [NIWC] that the proportion of women 
nominated by all the other parties is abysmally low, and we sympathise 
with their efforts…..The Women’s Coalition is not agreed on a policy on 
future constitutional arrangements for this island. If one or more 
Women’s Coalition candidates are successful they will necessarily have 
to take a position on the key constitutional issues under negotiation. 
Inevitably, they will not be able to represent the views of all the people 
who have voted for them…..the Women’s Coalition’s inability to agree 





The main dilemma expressed by these women was how it would be possible for the 
Coalition to, on the one hand, give expression to the divisive identity positions 
occupied by its members while at the same time, take a unified position on specific 
political issues. This led the NIWC to more carefully work out its commitment to 
ensuring that all of those who were interested would have the opportunity to 
participate in the process of creating the Coalition. A team was formed to produce a 
paper outlining the process for the creation of the Coalition as well as setting out the 
protocols to be followed by the new party. At a subsequent meeting, three core 
principles were identified to frame NIWC policies: inclusion, equality and human 
rights. The working out of these core principles was done in open discussion 
meetings centred around three papers which set out the fundamental principles. The 
three principles were applied both in the Coalitions relationships to other parties and 
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groups as well as within the Coalition itself and formed an ethical framework for 
policies and positions.  
 
A transversal approach was taken in the NIWC’s election campaign and expressed in 
their stance in regards to the constitutional question, upon which the group refused to 
take a fixed position. Refusing to take a position on the constitutional issue meant 
that the Coalition was open to negotiation, accommodation and the inclusion of 
views from all participants to the process. Instead of simply stating their position, the 
Coalition intentionally listened to others’ views and tried to incorporate them. The 
NIWC prioritized open dialogue above all else and that it was only through open 
dialogue that any sort of goals could be achieved. After the elections, the Coalition 
had secured two seats at the Forum Dialogue and the right to send two delegates to 
the All-Party Talks.
220
 Pearl Sagar, who was from a Protestant working class 
community activist background, was nominated along with Monica Williams, who 
as from a Catholic background, as the NIWC’s representatives at the peace talks.   
 
Researchers like Meyer hold up the case of Róisín McAliskey as a paradigmatic 
example of the success of a transversal approach to cope with hard cases.
221
 The 
republican political activist, McAliskey, was arrested in 1996 and held on terrorist 
charges. Upon her arrest she was several months pregnant and, as the daughter of the 
Republican activist, Bernadette Devlin McAliskey, her case drew international 
coverage. Early on the NIWC discussed the case and whether or not they should 
support the campaign calling for McAliskey to be bailed. The case was discussed in 
open forums. Meyer recounts how the discussions were often very tense. Eventually, 
the forums culminated in framing support for McAliskey within the framework of 
the common values of the Coalition. On the basis of human rights, members 
eventually were able to agree that the McAliskey case represented an injustice and 
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that any incarcerated woman had a right to due process before the law and access to 
adequate medical attention.  
 
Supporting McAliskey and formally joining the growing international campaign for 
her release was what seemed to be the obvious position to take given the principles 
of the ethical framework that the Coalition worked within. Yet, the initial responses 
by Coalition members were tentative and delayed.
222
 Perhaps this can still be 
understood within a transversal framework. After all, a transversal framework 
acknowledges our ‘rooted’ positions. It presupposes that members will walk in the 
door with their nationalist or republican positions and will look at the McAliskey 
case vis-à-vis their and her ‘rooted’ positions. But when members recount the degree 
to which the case unsettled them, then explaining how they simply ‘shifted’ from 
their ‘rooted’ positions to framing the McAliskey case in terms of the Coalition’s 
core values, as Meyer does, seems to miss something important. Some Protestant 
Coalition members recount how difficult they found thinking about McAliskey 
separate from her mother, the renowned Republican activist Bernadette Devlin 
McAliskey. For them, Devlin represented a painful and bitter past, which triggered 
feelings of fear and bigotry. Although Meyer tells the story of how these participants 
were able to let go of their fear and prejudice to take up a position of support for 
McAliskey through the terms of transversalism, the description seems to offer little 
more than a very basic account of the work that these agents had to undertake in 
order to make the shift. Accounts like these seem to me to highlight how hard 
situations trigger the affective dimension of identity and identity politics.  
 
This affective dimension reactivates a primary wound and forces the self to reflect 
on self-to-self and self-to-other alterity. What seems to be missing from a transversal 
approach is how it is that the self is able, from its ‘rooted’ position, to access shared 
unifying standards as standards. How exactly does the self examine her relation to 
herself? How does the self examine her relation to the other, in particular when the 
relation is an injurious one?  Is there not self-reflective work that must happen before 
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the self can access and connect to notions of a substantive good – in this case the 
rights of prisoners? Does a ‘rooted’ position allow for the personal transformative 
work that such hard cases seem to require?  
 
In summary, both coalitional approaches like those of Reagon and Dean, as well as, 
transversal politics in feminist theory attempt to move beyond the identity crisis in 
feminist theory by acknowledging and accommodating diversity among women 
without abandoning the idea of unity of feminism as a political movement. Both 
collective approaches attempt to unite diverse groups of women together in pursuit 
of temporary and specific goals. Yet, neither approach appears to offer a satisfactory 
account of the sort of agent that would be capable of the work that needs to be 
carried out within such projects. These approaches appear to rely on a conception of 
the agent that remains underdeveloped and it is unclear that they can account for the 
transformations at the level of the self that might be necessary.  
 
Collective politics place the self in an ethical situation in which ethics must be 
conceived of in very practical terms. The agent is in a concrete relation with different 
others working towards concrete goals. I am sharing the view here with Korsgaard 
that ethics ‘takes its start from a plight.’
223
 The ‘plight’ that drives this conception of 
the problem of ethics is the same as that expressed by Nietzsche, that in addressing 
the demands of the world, each one of us is limited by our perspective: 
 
Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival 
‘knowing’ the only kind of ‘knowing’; and the more feelings about a 
matter which we allow to come to expression, the more eyes, different 
eyes  through which we are able to view this same matter, the more 




In response to our ‘plight’ Nietzsche argues that it is necessary to integrate 
perspectives. Integrating perspectives is the only way that we can respond in a less 
limited way to each other and to our world. But Korsgaard, in making the claim that 
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ethics is ‘deeply practical’ is making the further claim that ethics is not only about 
the search for ‘truth.’
225
 Our ‘plight’ also takes its start from our needing to live 
together. Therefore, the dialogic encounter of which both coalitional and transversal 
accounts centre, cannot only be taken to serve an epistemic end, but the more 
complex social goal of how to solve social problems.  
 
What are the dispositions that will aid the self in allowing for ‘perspectival’ seeing 
and knowing? What forms of action and practice must be cultivated by the self?  
How will a position of political solidarity be structured? What work must the self 
undertake? Missing from coalitional and transversal accounts is a rich account of the 
self. What sort of participant does the self need to be? What sort of self will be able 
to take up a non-reductive relation to the other? How does the self allow, indeed, aim 
at transformation of the self within this context? A richer account of the self must be 
incorporated here in order to answer these questions - a conception that takes its start 
from the ‘plight’ of our limited cognitive grasp of the world and each other in it. In 
the next chapters, I begin to argue for a rephrasing of identity politics for feminism 
along terms closer to the discourse of ethics.  
Conclusion  
This chapter argues that identity politics interrupts the abstract, neutrality of 
liberalism’s subject and provides a counterpoint to the disembodied individual of 
liberal theory. Identity politics are practical politics in the sense that their aims are 
emancipatory and transformative. This is a form of politics that requires concrete and 
situated individuals to form political and social bonds with each other as others to 
establish and maintain shared values and ideals. This is work that is both individual 
as well as collective. Yet, the key debate in identity politics is generally seen to be 
the working out of identity categorically. The terms of the feminist identity politics 
debate have most generally been set up around the issue of identity as polemical. 
That is, either you are for identity or you are against identity. Identity within this 
scheme is configured as categorical – the subject is female, raced, sexualised, and so 
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on. To reduce the complexity of the identity question to questions of category is to 
miss other important questions to do with identification. 
 
Four approaches to the issue of identity politics in feminism have been explored.  
These accounts offer differing approaches to the issue of selfhood and how it relates 
to the practical politics of acting together required by identity politics. All were 
found to have limitations specifically in the conception of the self that each relies on. 
Since identity politics are practical politics insofar as they require that a group, or 
groups, of very diverse agents form bonds with each other in order to undertake 
political work on specific and often changing projects, the self is called on in an 
ethical manner. The picture of the agent must be of one that is able to take up a 
relationship not only with the ‘other,’ but also with herself that is at once reflective, 
that recognises the constitutive nature of her relationship to the good, where the good 
is not merely a representation of the self’s interests but is constitutive of those 
interests.  
 
This chapter argues that while the equality-difference (including diversity) models of 
feminist identity politics do engage largely with the issue of identity as category, 
they also grapple with those questions that can be gathered under the context of the 
term praxis: How do women go about working with one another? How do women 
establish and maintain values and ideals? How do women reflect on themselves? 
Working within the parameters of identity as a matter of category does not allow for 
a conception of a self that is able to successfully navigate the work that is required of 
the self if identity politics entails grappling with questions to do with praxis. 
Deconstructionist approaches attempt to work from the premise of an unsettled 
identity category and, in so doing, underscore the need to re-think issues of praxis 
along the lines of diversity. Post-identity accounts, like those found in coalitional 
and transversal politics, attempt to sidestep the issue of identity as category. In doing 
so, these accounts fail to offer a sufficient account of the sort of self that would be 
capable of taking up the work required by collective politics in a context of diversity 
and inequality. A closer look at the issues at play in feminist identity politics debates 
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underscores the need for a reconsideration of the relationship of identity to the issue 
of political praxis within the context of feminist solidarity. 
 
This chapter has provided some sense of the key issues within the feminist identity 
politics debate. It has outlined various feminist responses to the issue of women’s 
subordinated position in liberalism and what is at stake when identity is taken only 
as a matter of category as well as when identity is ‘moved beyond.’ The next chapter 
argues for a rephrasing of feminist identity politics in terms closer to the traditional 
discourse of ethics than to the more traditional understandings of politics in order to 
emphasise the ongoing and difficult work that is required of agents participating in 
collective politics in a context of diversity and inequality.  
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3 
Identity politics and the subject of ethics 
Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the contemporary debates on feminist identity 
politics and highlighted some of the philosophical complexities and tactical 
challenges that articulating and carrying out collective agendas for emancipatory 
aims entail. Both difference and diversity feminism underline the difficulties of 
grounding political action on some assumed fundamental identity. Yet, both 
approaches have tended to confine the self within the parameters of identity as 
category. They have sought to define women vis-à-vis men or women vis-à-vis other 
women. Such approaches raise the question as to how identity politics can be 
rearticulated in light of the resultant fragmentations. Deconstructionist approaches 
argue that such politics cannot be practiced with recourse to a notion of identity as a 
matter of a settled category – either hidden or liberated. Coalitional approaches
226
 
suggest that it is possible to practice politics without recourse to a notion of identity, 
but in doing so they take women’s identity as given. To sidestep the issue of identity 
though cannot entail a complete abandonment of the agent, for identity politics as 
practical politics entail, indeed depend upon, individual selves identifying with 
others and carrying out collective actions. What sort of self is required for such 
work? What must the self be capable of? The aim of this chapter is to begin to show 
how an answer to such questions might be formulated.  This chapter argues that 
some of the work of the postmodern feminists Brown and Butler can be drawn on 
and that they offer a productive way to begin answering these questions.  
 
The postmodern/structuralist challenge to the autonomous subject of liberalism has 
not been embraced unequivocally by feminism and is indeed a point of on-going 
contention. Seyla Benhabib, for instance, accuses postmodernist theorists of: 
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‘Relishing in diversity, basking in fragmentation, enjoying the play of differences 
and celebrating the opacity, fracturing, and heteronomy of it all.’
227
 Whilst Benhabib 
acknowledges that feminist theory has benefited from postmodernist critiques, she 
also identifies some problems in their conception of the subject and the vision of 
agency underlying it. In her view, postmodernist approaches have rendered both 
notions not only simplistic, but also empty from a normative standpoint.
228
 Linda 
Alcoff similarly views poststructuralist accounts as severely limiting feminism to 
nothing more than ‘the negative tactics of reaction and deconstruction.’
229
 According 
to Alcoff, postmodernism is complicit in endangering feminism’s own attack 
‘against classical liberalism by discrediting the notion of an epistemologically 
significant, specific subjectivity.’
230
 Feminists influenced by poststructuralist 
thought, Alcoff accuses of lacking the vision of both ‘a positive alternative’ and ‘a 




Benhabib and Alcoff centre their main objections to the deconstruction of the subject 
on notions of agency, vision and motivation. These notions they view as crucial to 
any viable feminism or feminist theory. The perceived loss of political efficacy is the 
most significant reason for feminist antipathy towards poststructuralist 
understandings of identity: deconstructing the identity of women obviates the 
possibility for agency and therefore, renders feminist politics impossible.
232
 Many 
feminists cannot conceive of political action and change without the unified subject 
of liberalism. Indeed, Benhabib attributes the ‘identity crisis’ in feminism to 
poststructuralist critiques of identity and argues that this crisis ‘may eliminate not 
only the specificity of feminist theory but place in question the very emancipatory 
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ideals of the women’s movement altogether.’
233
 In other words, the feminist project 
of emancipation is not possible without recourse to some sort of regulative principle 




This chapter will argue that, contrary to accusations that post-structuralism empties 
out the category of the subject and renders it a ‘social dupe,’
235
 it actually 
incorporates and takes seriously the issue of difference/diversity in identity. Not only 
does post-structuralism allow for difference/diversity within the context of engaging 
in political issues, but it also works at not concealing the grave difficulties of acting 
without the totalising and exclusionary logic of modernity. It therefore, centres the 
complexity of politics and social life.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: The first section offers a further re-reading of 
Wendy Brown.  Although, as was discussed in the previous chapter, by developing 
the notion of ‘desire’ in the subject through Nieztschean ressentiment, Brown has 
been accused of paralysing the subject, I develop the argument here that she can also 
be read as dealing with the founding scene of pain (Shklar’s ‘felt’ experience of 
oppression) of identity politics. This serves to open up the possibility for an 
understanding of the subject as in an ethical relation with the other that takes 




In the next section, I return to Judith Butler’s work. Although Butler has usually been 
enlisted on the side of those feminists seeking to develop (or critique) a non-identity 
approach to the issue of the subject in feminism, I present Butler as offering a re-
thinking of the body (troubled by gender questions) in which the constructing and 
valuing of bodies becomes an ethical and political issue. It is by unsettling the 
presumption of an a priori material universe into which humans appear as identity 
that I argue allows for a reading of Butler’s project as being about the ethical and the 
political working together in relation to subjectivity. I end with the suggestion that 
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both Brown and Butler’s work should be read as suggestive of a re-phrasing of the 
problematics of identity politics in terms closer to (post-modern) ethics than to 
politics.  
Wendy Brown: A self with inner depths? 
Recall from Chapter Two that in States of Injury, Brown argues that the 
emancipatory goals of feminist identity politics are undermined by an investment in 
‘injury’
237
 and that her aim is to investigate why it is that the constitution of identity 
leads so often to self-subversive effects upon political articulation.
238
 Brown situates 
her analysis of identity politics within Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinarity’ power.
239
 
That is, how disciplining power works on subject formation. Disciplinary 
productions ‘work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, 
naming and normalising social behaviours as social positions.’
240
 Through its 
attention to an ‘anatomy of detail,’ ‘disciplinarity’ power produces social identities 
as categories.
241
 The ‘crack mother,’ for example, is produced as a totalising identity 
through the discourse of law, medicine and social services.
242
 Identity is produced 
both through and as category. 
 
According to Brown, the failure of liberalism to be truly universal, in combination 
with the ever increasing individuation of liberal subjects through disciplinary 
production, leads to the emergence of politicised identity. Politicised identity 
emerges out of and within the terms of liberalism. As such, political identities both 
exceed and are an integral part of what defines liberalism. Along lines similar to 
Haraway, who pronounces her ‘cyborgs’ as the ‘illegitimate offspring’ unfaithful to 
their origins, thus rendering their absent fathers ‘inessential,’ Brown argues that if 
politicised identity can be thought of similarly - as the ‘illegitimate offspring’ of 
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liberalism - their fathers are not absent.
243
 Instead, liberalism is ‘installed in the very 
structure of desire fuelling identity-based claims’ (italics in original).
244
 This leads 
Brown to proclaim that: ‘the psyche of the bastard child’ is not ‘independent of its 
family origin.’
245
 Since politicised identity moves within the constraints of 
liberalism, if the transformative elements of identity politics are to be developed, it is 
necessary to understand the constitution of ‘desire.’
246
 This leads Brown to pose the 





In order to answer the question of the ‘desire’ of politicised identity, Brown 
identifies what she views as an overlooked limitation of the Foucaultian ‘disciplinary 
subject.’
248
 According to Brown, in Foucault, power can always produce resistance – 
even in the ‘disciplinary subject.’ Although Brown wishes to retain, and develop, 
Foucault’s construal of ‘freedom as a practice,’ she also wishes to call attention to 
his neglect of the issue of ‘desire’ in the subject: ‘Foucault seems to tacitly assume 
the givenness and resilience of the desire for freedom, a givenness that arises 
consequent to his implicit conflation of the will to power in the practice of resistance 
with a will to freedom.’
249
 Brown maintains that the question is not when or where 
the practice of freedom may be possible, as it is for Foucault, but what it is that can 
motivate or thwart the ‘desire’ for freedom?  
 
Brown’s next move is to raise the issue of the Foucaultian ‘disciplinary subject’ and 
the tacit presumption of a ‘will to freedom’ in relation to feminist identity politics. 
Brown views modernist feminist approaches (including liberal, difference and 
diversity) as working from the assumption that the knowledge or discovery of the 
‘truth’ about women’s subordination (gender) will, as a matter of inevitability, lead 
to women’s emancipation (freedom). But, she probes the idea that the ‘truth’ 
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inevitably leads to the anticipated freedom. What if it does not? What if the ‘truth’ of 
the subordinated nature of the gender norms that constitutes women’s identity does 
not lead to emancipation? This possibility, according to Brown, suggests that 
feminist theory needs to look, not only at its own relation to power and ‘truth,’ but 
also at the issue of motivation, which includes both the will and ‘desire.’  
 
According to Brown, identity, and its relation to the political, are rooted in the notion 
of ‘desire’ and not in a will, as Foucault conceived it, inevitably aimed at freedom. 
To develop this line of argument, Brown draws on Nietzsche’s account of 
ressentiment. In the next section I turn to a more detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s 
notion of ressentiment than was offered in Chapter two. I emphasise those elements 
which are key to understanding Brown’s argument about the central role that ‘desire’ 
plays in identity politics and its intertwinement with morality, which begins to move 
in the direction I plan to take to reconceptualise the problematic of identity politics in 
language closer to ethics.
250
  
A Nietzschean ressentiment  
The term ressentiment in Nietzsche is used as a description of a psychological state, 
which is a particular instance of a more general psychological condition.
251
 The more 
general psychological condition is a reactive one and is a feeling in response to, or 
reactive of, some state of affairs. This is not just any state of affairs, but is one that is 
unpleasant to the person affected as well as one over which the person affected is 
powerless to change. Therefore, ressentiment should be understood as a response, not 
to some internal state within the person affected, but rather as an internal response to 
something external to the affected person: 
 
This reversal of the value-positing glance – this need to direct one’s 
view outward instead of back to oneself – is a feature of ressentiment: 
in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, 
external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in 
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It is in On the Genealogy of Morals that Nietzsche systematically develops the term 
ressentiment to deconstruct contemporary morality.
253
 The main question that he 
raises is what the meaning of morality is. Relatedly, he asks who it is that claims the 
status of moraliser and why. He asks what uses of power are made in the name of 
and through morality. That is: ‘[u]nder what conditions did Man invent for himself 
those judgments of values, ‘Good’ and ‘Evil?’’
254
 Taking a genealogical approach to 
the deconstruction of morality, Nietzsche begins with inverting the history of an 
aristocratic equation of power and truth, goodness, beauty, happiness and piety.
255
 
Nietzsche approves of this ancient equation for the homage it pays to man’s noble 
instincts. It is through ‘the slave revolt in morality’ that the ancient equation becomes 
inverted -  a 2,000 year-old revolt that signifies the birth of Western civilization. 
Though it is one that:  
 
…we no longer see because it – has been victorious….The slave revolt 
in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives 
birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true 





Nietzsche insists that morality originates from within powerlessness and functions as 
compensation for that powerlessness. Morality is something that develops in the 
powerless (the slaves) as revenge for their powerlessness to act. Morality enacts the 
slaves’ resentment of the power that they are unable to either equal or overthrow. In 
this way, moral ideals function as a critique of a certain form of power. Morality is a 
complaint against strength, the aim of which is to shame and discredit domination by 
securing the position of the ‘true’ and the ‘good.’ It is only through these positions 
that domination is judged. Morality itself is thereby transformed into power and 
triumphs. But morality should not be confused with Nietzsche’s revered ‘will to 
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 It should not be forgotten that the triumphant power of ressentiment is 
born out of weakness and the accompanying values of resentment, which are 
pettiness and a lack of strength. Out of ressentiment ‘a race of such men of 
ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also 





Brown suggests that politicised identity and feminist political identity can be read 
through the lens of Nietzsche’s ressentiment. Not only does Brown suggest that 
identity politics and feminism share ressentiment’s ‘epistemological spirit and 
political structure,’ but that ressentiment can also account for the reluctance of 
feminism to engage with the notion of truth as post foundational.
259
 That is, the 
reluctance, or refusal of feminist identity politics of the liberal, difference and 
diversity kind, to engage in letting go of the task of delineating the category of the 
(female, feminine) subject, can be understood through the terms of Nietzsche’s 
ressentiment.  
Ressentiment and the subject of feminist identity politics 
Specifically addressing the issue of feminist theory and the problem of the identity of 
its subject, Brown starts from the observation that much contemporary feminist 
theory relies on the terms: ‘the subject, truth, and normativity.’
260
 In its reliance on 
these terms, contemporary feminism firmly, although ambivalently, locates itself 
squarely within the terms of liberalism. It is, after all the terms of liberalism that 
made possible the feminist critique of identity and the subject in the first place. Yet, 
Brown notes that, although most feminists have been critical of the liberal subject - 
seeing it as complicit in the inferior position of women in society - any serious 
endeavours to question the subject per se are confronted with ‘palpable feminist 
panic.’
261
 This ‘panic’ most often takes the form of a concern over the retention of an 
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‘object of political struggle.’
262
  According to Brown’s diagnosis, what is actually at 
stake here is a ‘desire’ to retain women's ‘experiences, feelings, and voices as 
sources and certifications of post foundational truth.’
263  
This is a concern to hold 
onto notions of authenticity, which are largely viewed by feminism as providing the 
very ground for identity politics.  
 
It is in the area of the subject of feminism (in the notion of ‘woman’) that Brown 
argues feminism holds a ‘complex relationship to Truth.’
264
 Feminism’s relationship 
with truth is complex in the sense that it is a contradictory one. That is, although 
feminism at once rejects the concept of ‘Truth’ for its masculinity, it holds the 
contradictory aim of substituting its own grounded knowledge as ‘Truth.’ This is 
Harraway's problem of how to simultaneously provide an account of ‘radical 
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects;’ a critical 
practice for recognizing one’s own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings; 
and hold a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world.’
265
 
According to Brown, this raises the obvious question of how feminists can hold onto 
a settled notion of the identity of ‘woman’ to organise around for carrying out 
projects, yet those projects are, themselves, about the transformation of that identity. 
It is here, according to Brown, that feminist identity politics clearly intersects 
Nietzschean ressentiment.  
 
Brown argues that understanding identity as ‘truth’  traps identity within the terms of 
Nietzschean moralisation, thereby casting identity not as something that can be 
picked and chosen from as meets on-going (and yet to be determined) needs. Rather, 
it is, as Foucault warns, something over which we have much less control. ‘Truth’ 
does not simply avoid the political, somehow standing outside of politics. To the 
contrary, ‘truth’ holds a tight, strangling relation to politics in the sense that it 
functions to de-politicise what is actually political. It is this sort of feminist identity 
politics that functions along the same logic as Nietzsche's deconstruction of morality: 
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‘What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the 'good,' likewise a danger, a 
seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was a possibility living at 




The tendency in feminism towards moralisation, as in Nietzsche, is born out of 
powerlessness and serves as compensation for that powerlessness. Enacting the same 
sort of revenge pursued by Nietzsche’s powerless slaves, ressentiment aims for (its 
telos is) that which the powerless cannot change due to an incapacity for action. 
Moral ideas serve to critique a certain kind of power; they are a complaint against 
power - they are an effort to shame and discredit domination through the securing of 
the ‘ground of the true and the good’ from which judgement is passed.
267
 Revenge is 
merely imaginary and takes the place of ‘the true reaction, that of deeds.’ 
Ressentiment cannot hold any promise for the future and it has no space for political 




Can ressentiment do other than re-enact a scene of pain? How might the investment 
in pain (ressentiment) be transformed into an emancipatory politics? Nietzsche 
points to cultivating the virtue of forgetting, but recall from Chapter two that Brown 
finds this possibility ‘inappropriately cruel.’
269
 It is also in his ‘privileging of 
individual character and capacity over the transformative possibilities of collective 
political action,’
270
 according to Brown, that the limits of Nietzsche’s usefulness are 
met. Yet, although Brown finds the limits in Nietzsche’s ‘privileging of individual 
character,’ she herself does not dismiss the centrality of the individual, only that the 
individual must be located within the context of collective action. Turning away 
from Nietzsche, Brown suggests that a ‘slight shift’ in the articulation and grounding 
of political claims is what is necessary: 
 
What if it were possible to incite a slight shift in the character of 
political expression and political claims common to much politicized 
identity? What if we sought to supplant the language of “I am” – with 
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its defensive closure on identity, its insistence on fixity of position, its 
equation of social with moral positioning – with the language of “I 
want this for us”? This is an “I want” that distinguishes itself from a 
liberal expression of self-interest by virtue of its figuring of a political 




Rather than a ‘desire’ for futurity foreclosed, as Nietzsche saw it, by the logics of 
rancour and ressentiment, Brown suggests that it is possible to ‘reopen desire.’
272
 If 
this is to be possible, it will be necessary to ‘acknowledge the elements of suffering 
and healing’ that must be negotiated.
273
 The ‘memory’ of ‘desire’ will have to be 
rehabilitated from within identificatory processes prior to its wounding. How is this 
to be imagined?  Is there, as Brown seems to suggest, a ‘desire’ that exists prior to 
wounding? ‘Desire,’ according to Brown, is constituted through wounding. If I am 
right to read Brown in this way, there is no ‘desire’ available to be recovered prior to 
wounding, but rather a ‘desire’ that will need to be rehabilitated from within the 
wounding. I want to suggest that in order to ‘reopen’ ‘desire’ ‘prior to its wounding,’ 
the notion of ‘desire’ will have to be approached in a way that is similar to that found 
in Aristotle.  
 
Orexis (desire) in Aristotle, is tied to the emotions and is a constituent cause of 
motion. However, desire must be guided, as Nietzsche’s story of ressentiment so 
painfully points out. In Aristotle, orexis is guided by right reason; these together are 
what cause us to act, that is, they are what motivates us. Moral virtue and desire 
interact and relate closely with practical wisdom.  Orexis provides final motivation 
for virtuous action, but it does not work in isolation. In Aristotle, we desire the good, 
and practical reason guides us in attaining it. The issue of Foucault’s subject’s tacitly 
presumed will to freedom, or telos of freedom, becomes converted to the good as the 
subject’s telos.  
 
It may not seem that Brown’s account of identity and ‘desire’ (ressentiment) could 
be squared with this latter notion of Aristotle’s.  But I want to suggest - and I 
develop in later chapters - that Brown’s work, upon which I have drawn, can be 
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taken and developed in just such a direction. Brown’s argument for a ‘slight shift’ 
away from ‘I am’ to ‘I want this for us’ necessarily places the self at the centre of 
this project in relation to the collectivity, and as such there is work that must be done 
by the subject in relation to the other. Thus, when Brown writes that the problematic 
of pain at the heart of identity politics can be relieved if it is given ‘the chance to be 
heard into a certain release, recognised into self-overcoming, incited into 
possibilities for triumphing over, and hence losing, itself,’
274
 she is not formulating 





Brown is making an argument for collective transformative political projects 
premised on a notion of diversity in which differences are ‘grasped from a 
perspective larger than simply one point in an ensemble.’
277
   
 
As I suggested in Chapter Two, coalitions and collective politics place the self in an 
ethical situation, but an ethics that must be conceived of in very practical terms. As 
Brown points out, the agent is in a concrete relation with others working towards 
concrete goals. This practical ethics, to borrow from Korsgaard again, ‘takes its start 
from a plight.’
278
 The ‘plight’ that drives this conception of the problem of the self in 
an ethical situation is that in addressing the demands of the world, not only is the 
agent limited by her perspective, but she is also engaged in trying to figure out how 
to live together with differentially placed others.
279
  How does Brown draw such an 
agent?  
 
Brown supplies a picture of this self, albeit in sketch form, less affirmative than 
contrastive. The subject cannot be defined against: the private sphere, the body, 
reproduction and production and such other similar categories. It is not contained 
within the conventional boundaries of political theory. Instead it is vulnerable to 
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disruption, invasion and reconfiguration.
280
 The ‘I am’ is not not present, but is re-
understood as potentially transformative and ‘in motion.’
281
 The potential for 
transformation is carried out in the context of identity politics, which is premised on 
the shared experience of oppression. Following Nietzsche, the shared experience of 
oppression is ressentiment. In Brown the practical politics of identity politics must 
grapple with this. The projects of identity politics necessitate a turn to ethics that is 
not confined to the parameters of the self’s relations with others, but must be 
expanded to include the work that the self must carry out on herself as well.  
 
Although Brown voices a strong concern for any sort of moralising tendencies, I read 
her as pointing towards an ethical rephrasing of the identity politics problematic. To 
move away from ressentiment and to acknowledge the role of and presence of the 
workings of ressentiment, Brown asserts is to allow in the possibility of bringing in 
an investigation of the complexity of power positions, struggles over subject 
positions, and to use these as a basis for thinking, acting, forging and maintaining 
new, better ethical positions. It is in her more recent work that Brown extends this 
Nietzschean interpretation of morality, refining and critiquing it and importantly 
distinguishing morality from moralism. I turn to this in the following section.  
 
Morality versus moralism  
In Politics out of History, Brown distinguishes between morality and moralism and 
suggests that there is ‘a difference between a galvanising moral vision and a 
reproachful moralising sensibility.’
282
 She notes that the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines morality as ‘ethical wisdom [or a] doctrine or system concerned with moral 
conduct or duty.’
283
 Moralism, on the other hand, is defined as ‘addiction to 
moralizing…[it is a] religion….reduced to moral practice.’
284
 Moralism is the 
inversion of morality: 
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From this account, moralism would appear to be a kind of temporal 
trace, a remnant of a discourse whose heritage and legitimacy it claims 
while in fact inverting the discourses sense and sensibility. At the 
extreme, moralism may be seen as a kind of posture or pose taken up in 
the ruins of morality by its faithful adherents; it is thus a ‘fall’ from 
morality, a ‘reversal’ of morality, and an impoverished substitute for, or 




Although both moralism and morality try to take up a position that is distant from 
politics, they are not the same. As an ‘addiction,’ moralism is akin to a ‘posture’ or a 
‘pose’ that the self takes up and is compulsive rather than reflective.
286
 Morality on 
the other hand, is associated with deliberate action. In its secular enactment, 
moralism is ritualised and closely associated with punishment. In moralism the self 
is enacted outside of its historical context, although actively implicated within a 
specific moment.  
 
Nihilistic and impoverished, moralism is the opposite of morality and, according to 
Brown, is where ressentiment is located. It is in thinking through the distinction 
between moralism and morality that Brown refines her usage of ressentiment as well 
as critiques Nietzsche’s account for having failed to distinguish between ‘active 
moral struggles against insubordination and the reproaches and nay-saying of what 
he called slave-morality.’
287
 Drawing on Ghandi and Martin Luther King’s 
affirmation of the capacity of the subjugated to act positively for political and social 
emancipation, Brown makes a distinction between the ressentiment of moralism and 
the more open possibility of morality.  
 
Whereas in politics, morality is largely confined to issues pertaining to rightness in 
action and defining the moral limits of power, the political movements associated 
with Ghandi and King were based in morality as opposition to a ‘specific immoral 
regime.’
288
 The struggles of both King and Ghandi were articulated through the 
language of moral rightness and in opposition to power. These political movements, 
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although premised on and articulated through morality, turned that moral principle 
into a specifically, self-conscious power, the aim of which was to distinguish itself in 




A Nietszchean analysis falls short, according to Brown, in its lack of an account of 
the difference between active moral struggles carried out against subordination and 
the nay-saying slave morality. Ghandi and King exemplify affirmative moral 
struggles that are characterised by an openness that does not reiterate subjugated 
identity, but rather a contingent and affirmative collective project. What Brown is 
emphasising here is the tentative and social nature of these sorts of affirmative moral 
struggles – neither element of which Nietzsche allowed for.  
 
Brown goes on to argue that although movements like those of Ghandi and King did 
not completely eschew the identity constituted under oppression, nor did they 
premise solidarity upon it. Instead, solidarity was premised on a set of shared beliefs. 
These movements were driven by opposition to the particular political systems and 
social arrangements of segregation, colonialism and caste society. They were not 
driven by reproaching ‘others’ (whites or British) or by indeterminate anti-racism 
campaigns. In other words, these emancipatory movements took place within and 
through the terms of liberalism’s universal human rights. Yet, although these 
movements do not reflect those identity politics movements characterised by 
Nietzschean ressentiment, in that they do not turn on a solidarity premised on and 
expressed through identity born out of oppression, Brown critiques them precisely 
because of their lack of attention to difference. By embracing liberalism’s universal 
concept of personhood, they not only do so at the expense of all that is contingent 
and context-specific in political life, but they inherit all that comes with the concept 
of the person that sits at the heart of liberalism. Brown’s central point is that morality 
holds an uneasy relationship with power and critique. If this is overlooked, morality 
all too easily slides into moralism.  
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How does morality not slide into moralism? To slide into something implies 
passivity. It is the opposite of active. It has the implication that one has ceased being 
vigilant and ceased being active. Guarding against ‘sliding’ means remaining active. 
Morality is marked by openness and an affirmation of passion. Morality is positive 
and politically necessary to any collective political project. In contrast to this, 
moralism precludes debate in that it is ‘intensely antagonistic toward a richly 




It is through this elaboration of the similarities and differences between moralism 
and morality and their complex relationship with politics that Brown is able to begin 
to show how she might move productively beyond the Nietzschean terms of 
resssentiment. She recasts moralism (ressentiment) as marking a crisis in the political 
telos of identity based politics: ‘such politics [is] not only a sign of stubborn clinging 
to a certain equation of truth and powerlessness, or as the acting of an injured will, 
but [is] a symptom of a broken historical narrative to which we have not yet forged 
alternatives.’
291
 Moralism indicates a crisis and stagnation. Identity politics that 
partake so often in moralism suffer from a lack of ‘a vision for the future that 
overcomes the political significance of differences and thus lacks an affirmative 
collective subject.’
292
 Moralism functions as a prohibition on practice as our actions 
are reduced to moralistic reproaches.  
 
I now turn to look at Judith Butler’s work, which takes a similar path to that of 
Brown’s. Whereas Brown takes a Nietzschean lead, Butler takes a Foucaultian and 
Levinsinian path and ultimately a Spinozan one. Viewed as a whole, Butler’s work 
demonstrates scepticism about ethics and at the same time begins to paint a different 
concept of ethics. This is most apparent in Gender Trouble (GT) and The Psychic 
Life of Power (PLP). In so doing, Butler’s work disrupts the traditional boundaries of 
ethical theory. Where most modern moral theory begins its conception of ethics from 
the starting point of action and presumes a moral actor, Butler takes us one step back 
and locates ethics in the very conception or construction of a person (or body) as 
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such. Butler’s ethical turn does two positive things for feminism. First, it firmly 
positions the matter of the body in the ethical domain thereby decisively embodying 
the subject. Second, this she accomplishes through her notion of subjectivation and 
performativity; the body brings with it its internal life.  
Judith Butler and the ‘(re)turn’ to ethics 
In this section, I promote my view that Butler’s work is indeed about ethics, a view 
that is not generally accepted. Salih, for example, claims that ‘Butler’s whole work’ 
can be defined in terms of ‘the ethical impetus to extend the norms by which humans 
are permitted to conduct liveable lives.’
293
 Lloyd counters this sort of reading, 
arguing that it is not ‘judicious to read Butler’s discussions of heteronormativity in 
GT say, or her account of the resignificatory potential of hate speech in Excitable 
Speech, in terms of such an ethics.’
294
 Lloyd contends that these two works of 
Butler’s deal solely with political rather than ethical concerns. For Lloyd, the issue is 
how best to understand the relationship between politics and ethics at work in 
Butler’s work, and how this relationship might have changed in the development of 
her later work. 
 
Contrary to such readings of Butler’s work, I argue that even at the outset of GT, 
Butler is developing a notion of ethics that shares a similarity to Foucault’s later 
work in his History of Sexuality (Volumes 1, 2 and 3)
295
 in which he views ethics as 
self-constitution and as transformative. The cultivation of the self though is based in 
the contingent and political nature of identity (which Butler elaborates in GT and 
Bodies That Matter (BTM).
296
 The scene of self-constitution is not one that Butler 
appears to be arguing that ethics is to be prioritised over, and separated from, 
politics.  Indeed, Butler herself has been sceptical of making an ethical turn for 
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political ends. She has expressed the worry ‘that the return to ethics has constituted 
an escape from politics.’
297
 It is precisely because these notions - the subject, 
subjectivity, ethics and politics - are constitutively enmeshed, that who gains 
recognition as an ethical subject is political. And if the question of subjectivity is a 
political one, then the question of how subjects can work in concert towards some 
shared (political) aim is an ethical one. Thus, these two aspects of Butler’s thought 
actually work in tandem rather than separately. This is seen ever more clearly in 
Butler’s most recent work in which she engages increasingly explicitly in the 
development of an ethical project as the means by which to undo restrictively 
normative conceptions of life. And so there is value in pausing to re-examine her 
earlier work on identity politics and the self in this light.  
 
In what follows, I draw out those elements in Butler’s work that address self-
constitution as an ethical project. Beginning with Butler’s early work on subjectivity 
in GT, I argue against the most familiar critiques of this work to show that what 
Butler is formulating here is not a normative argument about the subject, but rather a 
diagnostic one about what it is to be and to experience being a self.
298
 I then turn to 
some of Butler's most recent work to demonstrate how she is rephrasing the 
problematic of identity politics in explicitly ethical terms. Viewed in its entirety, this 
body of work encourages me to begin to articulate a rehabilitation of ethics as a 
move toward an energised political future for feminism as a collective political 
project.  
The subject of ethics or the ethical subject? 
Liberal conceptions of the subject tend to assume a substantive person who is the 
bearer of various essential and non-essential attributes. The body itself is 
unambiguous and thus of no ethical significance or consequence.
299
 Butler makes 
                                                 
297
 Judith Butler, ‘Ethical ambivalence’ eds. Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, Rebecca L. 
Walkowitz, The Turn to Ethics (London: Routledge, 2000), 15. 
298
 For critiques of this kind, see Weir, Sacrificial Logics; Hekman, Private Selves, Public Identities; 
Benhabib, ‘Feminism and Postmodernism;’ Stavro, ‘Rethinking identity and coalitional politics, 
insights from Simone de Beauvoir.’ 
299
 Kant situates authentic moral motivation within the realm of Reason. Although he writes that all 
rational humans possess the capacity for Reason, women are not considered moral. Women are 
 
 94  Chapter Three
 
clear in GT that the body is not at all straightforward. She argues that there is ‘no 
abiding substance’ that constitutes a self, rather there is only a ‘fictive subject’ that is 
the effect of a stylised set of acts.
300
 Butler follows Foucault’s lead in positing the 
body as not unformed matter, being-in-itself, or some kind of innate biological 
substance. Rather, the body receives its matter as a kind of ethical substance, which 
it takes on on behalf of the society in which it is formed. The implication that 
follows this is that there is no pre-social or pre-cultural moment for the body. It is 
only in through the repetitive practicing of social values that the body comes to 
matter as the bearer of properties, sexual and physical. These inculcations are then 
praised or stigmatised by the social structure and the body’s own position within that 
structure.  
 
Gender is not given over by the body. Instead, it is a process which is devoid of 
either origin or end. Contrary to the many understandings of Butler that she is 
promoting the idea that gender is something that is done to us, she actually, on 
careful reading, is arguing that gender is something we do.  Gender is not something 
that we are. This manoeuvre requires a de-linking of sex and gender, but before 
unlinking gender from sex, from the assumed relationship between the two, Butler 
declares that all ‘gender is, by definition, unnatural.’
301
 This marks a radical 
departure from the commonly held assumption of earlier feminists like Rubin
302
 that 
sex, gender and sexuality exist in a natural expressive relationship to one another. 
Instead, Butler claims that gender is not natural, which carries the implication that 
there is no necessary relationship between one’s body and one’s gender. It therefore 
becomes possible to have a designated female body yet not display traits considered 
feminine.  ‘Sex by definition,’ she writes, ‘will be shown to have been gender all 
along.’
303
 That is, bodies are (must be) constructed as either male or female.  Sex and 
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human sexuality are not natural features of human bodies; rather, bodies themselves 
are constructed as male or female, in and through the reiteration of certain discursive 
practices – gender. By questioning the unalterable character of sex and suggesting 
that sex itself is ‘as culturally constructed as gender’ it turns out that there is no 




It seems very clear that Butler is following Foucault’s lead on the idea that the 
demand to secure a true or core identity is tangled up in the politics and power of 
ethics. It was Foucault who pointed out that juridical systems of power produce the 
subjects they subsequently come to represent. ‘The least glimmer of truth,’ he wrote, 
‘is conditioned by politics.’
305
 This Foucaultian understanding of the body reveals 
‘the political stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identity categories 
that are in fact effects of institutions, practices, discourses.’
306
 That is, in allowing a 
thorough-going denaturalisation of the categories of sex and gender, the ontological 
domain – what is considered to be natural or real - is opened to questions of value 
and valuing, which is the domain of ethics.  
 
If ethics is not only a matter of addressing questions to do with how we treat others, 
but also a question of what sorts of people we should be, Kantianism would have us 
as rational persons with the capacity to adhere to the categorical imperative, while 
Butler takes us into a realm thought to be outside of ethical approaches - to the body 
itself. Whereas in Kantianism, the body itself is of no ethical consequence, for Butler 
the body becomes/is our ethical capacity. Without the iteration of specified gender 
norms we are not persons. In other words, like other mainstream approaches to 
ethics, Butler agrees that we cannot ask about the form of the ‘good life’ in isolation 
from the kind of self that is to live this life. For Butler, as for Kant, one is not a moral 
person, thus part of the ethical community, until one has achieved certain 
qualifications. Kantianism holds that it is a capacity for rationally autonomous moral 
agency that makes a being a person and makes persons matter morally. That is, 
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criteria set out in advance must be met in order for morality to come into play. Butler 
appears to agree with this when she writes: 
 
The domains of political and linguistic representation set out in advance 
the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result 
that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a 
subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first 




Unlike Kant though, she is not making a normative, but rather a diagnostic argument. 
Butler argues that recognition is a requirement for entering into the realm of 
morality/justice. Kantianism and the ‘normal’ theories of ethicspresent the body as a 
passive medium – it is a person. It is deemed a moral subject in so far as it is 
rational.
308
  The body, in short, is not ethically interesting; it is outside the 
boundaries of ethics. Butler asks though, if the body is nothing more than a passive 
medium on the surface of which cultural meanings are inscribed or if the body itself 




Contrary to the Kantian vision of what constitutes a person, Butler argues that the 
notion of a person is always first gendered. It is the inscription of gender recognition 
upon a body (gender performance) that is constitutive of personhood. What qualifies 
one as being a subject, according to Butler, is that one inculcates one’s designated 
gender – one is either male or female. ‘Persons only become intelligible’, she writes, 
‘through becoming gendered.’
310 
Therefore, gender is at once an essential identity 
and a social context; gender is relational, contextual and necessary to the self, though 
not fundamental, a point which I address below.  
 
What I think Butler offers here is a concept of the self and the body, troubled by the 
question of identity (gender), where the constructing and valuing of bodies is both an 
ethical and a political issue. She unsettles the presumption of some pre-existing 
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secure material universe into which bodies appear.  Where the ‘normal’ theories of 
ethics appear to begin from a unitary account of a subject, Butler shows how they 
actually begin from an assumed notion of what an ethical subject is, thereby 
delimiting the terms of what is deemed the task and boundaries of ethics. By 
showing how the matter of gendered bodies is hidden from what is deemed the 
proper work of moral philosophy, she allows for an expansion of this work. She 
contests the separation of ethics from embodiment and also from conflict. This is 
made clearer by her work on the performativity of gender to which I now turn.  
Performativity as participative activity 
Gender is not simply the social construct, or translation, of sex, nor is it merely 
difference, nor does it amount to identity. If gender is none of these, then what is it? 
Butler’s answer to this question in GT is that gender is ‘performative.’
311
 That is, 
gender is an act that constitutes the ‘identity it is purported to be’ through the 
‘stylized repetition’ of ‘bodily gestures, movements and styles of various kinds.’
312
 
Gender is a composition of the acts of its performance and therefore cannot be 
equated to ‘a stable identity or locus for agency from which various acts follow; 
rather gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior 
space through a stylised repetition of acts’ (emphasis in the original).
313
 It is the 
performativity of gender, rather than some natural essence, that constitutes gender. 
 
Although some have taken up Butler’s work, particularly in regards to the notion of 
performativity, as signifying a liberatory ideal, others have been trenchantly critical. 
Weir, for instance, complains that: 
 
What’s lost here is any recognition of the participants of these 
performances, and hence, any meaningful differentiation among 
unreflective, deliberate, dogmatic, defensive, anxious, ironic, 
playful, and parodic performances and particular subjects. 
What’s lost then, is any meaningful concept of agency, and any 
meaningful concept of subversion.
314
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Alcoff similarly critiques Butler for offering only the choices of either embracing 
‘the essentialist subject’ or embracing ‘the void.’
315
 Benhabib has criticised Butler’s 
notion of performativity as being a ‘complete debunking of any concepts of 
selfhood, agency, and autonomy.’
316
 Stavro makes a similar criticism more recently 
when she writes of Butler, and other poststructuralists, that ‘their critiques of identity 
are so thoroughgoing that they endorse difference at every turn and refuse all 
identity, thereby ignoring the positive aspects of identification required for 
generating new social and political movements.’
317
 Stavro’s conclusion is that 
conceiving the subject as predicated on a critique of identity as foundational 
(performativity) precludes the possibility of agency and therefore, the ability to think 
through forms of collective action.  
 
In my view, these criticisms of Butler’s notion of gender as performativity are both 
right and wrong. It is true that in GT Butler does not seem to offer much explicit 
exploration, or explanation, of agency, and I will address this in the next section. 
What I emphasise here is that I think that what these critics miss is Butler’s main aim 
with performativity, which is not only to describe the foundational role of gender in 
feminist identity politics. Butler’s aim in GT is to emphasize gender as construction - 
not only as something which is imposed on the subject, but as something which the 
subject also actively participates in. In BTM, Butler endeavours to clarify the project 
of GT. She writes that in GT her intention was to describe gender not as something 
that is in any sense put on anew by the subject each morning, but rather as a 
‘constitutive constraint’ ‘without which we would not be able to think, to live, to 




By invoking gender as performativity, Butler sought to clarify that gender is not only 
a constraint – it is not something that is merely done to the subject. By carrying out 
the performativity of gender, the subject is not passive, but rather is actively 
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complicit. Gender as a constitutive constraint is therefore something that can be 
resisted since its performativity is a temporal process ‘which operates through the 
reiteration of norms.’
319
 As a temporal act, gender performativity does not amount to 
merely repeating acts that are always ‘intact and remain self-identical.’
320
 Instead, 
the performativity of gender is repeated anew, again and again in multiple contexts. 
It is similar to a citation in that it is a deferential gesture that brings into ‘being the 
very authority to which it then defers.’
321
 Understanding the performativity of gender 
through citationality, Butler contends, results in the opening up of the ‘contingent 





Therefore, I think that Butler’s theory of performativity does outline her theory of 
agency, which can already be seen in GT. Gender as performative is neither fully 
determinist nor is it fully voluntaristic. The agent is compelled to reiterate gender 
norms and is thus constrained by this scene of citability. The constraint of citation is 
constitutive, yet it can never fully determine gender subjectivity and it is here - in the 
not fully determined - that a theory of agency is outlined. Sex is constructed through 
the perfomativity function of gender. This construction takes place in time and is 
itself a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of norms; sex is both 




McNay argues that Butler’s theory of performativity offers only an account of the 
possibility of agency.
 324
 She also faults Butler for not explaining how a performative 
politics might be able to transcend the private sphere to have an impact on collective 
values and identity norms.
325
 McNay presses Butler’s performative subject to 
disclose from where she does her choosing of which gendered acts to pick up 
(subversively). That is, where does the agency of the subject come from? There is 
                                                 
319
 Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex,’10. 
320
 Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex,’244. 
321
 Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex,’ 109. 
322
 Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex,’ 220. 
323
 Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex,’ 10.  
324
 Lois McNay, ‘Agency, Anticipation and Indeterminacy in Feminist Theory,’ Feminist Theory, 
Volume 4, Number 2 (2003), 141, 176 
325
 Lois McNay, ‘Subject, Psyche and Agency: The Work of Judith Butler,’ Theory, Culture & 
Society, Volume 16, Number 2 (1999), 176. 
 
 100  Chapter Three
 
agency in performativity – it is a matter of resignification and resistance, but it is 
true, it is an individualised agency. I take McNay’s criticisms and concerns to be 
those of the problem of the individual participating in collective political projects in 
contexts of diversity and inequality (which I raised earlier in Chapter two).  Thus, 
Stavro is not incorrect to critique the possibility of collective action here.
326
 These 
are valid concerns to raise, but ones that I think that Butler does address. I take 
Brown’s side here and maintain that Butler does as well. There is work for the 
individual to do in participating in collective politics and it is for this reason that 
Butler, similarly to Brown, needs to retain the individual. On the one hand, Butler is 
being criticised for having done away with the individual and on the other hand she 
is being criticised for not offering an explanation of how the performativity of 
gender, which is an individual act, links to collective politics. It is in the Psychic Life 
of Power (henceforth PLP) and Excitable Speech that Butler attempts to answer what 
the relationship between the individual, what she calls, psyche, and the social is and 
it is to this that I turn in the next section.  
Constrained agency and the inner life  
Although in PLP Butler continues to argue that any internal core of subjectivity must 
be rejected, she concedes that some version of a stable core is necessary to psychic 
health; in order for the subject to ‘persist in a psychic and social sense there must be 
dependency and the foundation of attachments.’
327
 Building on Althusser, Freud and 
Foucault, Butler formulates the argument that social naming is a form of alienation 
emanating from power. From Althusser she takes the claim that interpellation calls 
into existence that which did not exist. It is in the moment of turning to the name that 
the subject comes into existence. That is, identity comes into an individual 
consciousness through another person and not from a first-person experience as in, 
for instance, Locke. Althusser chooses a policeman as hailer in his example of 
interpellation of the subject. For Althusser, the ultimate source is always ideology, or 
the power of the state.  In his description of effective interpellative performatives, 
obedient subjects automatically turn around in response to the call of the law.  
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Whereas in BTM, Butler insists that the law does not possess a divine performative 
power to bring what it names into being, she comes closer to doing just that in PLP 
when she compares Althusser’s policeman’s ‘Hey you there!’ to a religious baptism 
or God’s naming of Peter and Moses - names that compel a subject into social being. 
This characterisation of divine naming presupposes a subject who is willing to turn 
around and embrace the terms by which it is called. This raises the question as to 
whether the act of naming itself is what brings the subject into being. Butler argues 
this suggests that the subject is formed in the repeated acts of acquitting itself of the 
guilt of which it is accused by the law. The dual actions of guilt and acquittal 
condition the subject. What interests Butler most is the possibility for subversion 
when the interpellation misses its mark. It is for this reason that she emphasises the 
potential of unstable identities and misrecognition. There is no subject before the 
law. The subject only comes into being through the simultaneous acts of submission 
to and mastery of interpellation. This is the Nietzschean formulation of there being 
no doer behind the deed – there is only the doing.  
 
Subjectivation produces a subject that, although brought into existence through 
subordination, can act: ‘Such subjection is a kind of power that not only unilaterally 
acts on a given individual as a form of domination, but also activates or forms the 
subject.’
328
 Adopting this account of subjectivation via Althusser and Foucault, 
Butler then moves to make a psychoanalytic critique of Foucault.
329
 According to 
Butler, Foucault's analysis of the psyche is not thick enough to yield an 
understanding of why it is that the subject chooses its subjection.
330
 But she does not 
embrace psychoanalysis uncritically, for she wants to critique it as well for its 
tendency toward ‘romanticised notions of the unconscious defined as necessary 
resistance.’
331
 Rather than portraying resistance as inevitable and natural, Butler 
suggests that it must be understood as generated in power. Understanding power as 
formative of resistance, she contends, dismantles theories that would have the 
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unconscious hold revolutionary potential, that serve to decontextualise, romanticise 
and de-historicise the unconscious.  
 
It is in her critique of Foucault's account of subject agency that Butler invokes and 
rethinks the notion of the interpellation of the subject. In interpellation, there is 
always a psychic remainder after the naming. Identity is never adequate to that which 
it names – there is always something leftover and it is this remainder that is the 
source of individual agency. Because agency is the remainder of the interpellation of 
identity, it cannot be understood as in any sense prior to the subject, as some pre-
existing, separate resource. That is, it is only in the naming (interpellation) that 
agency is even possible. And, it is only on the basis of this excess – the difference 
between identity and the self – that the former can be resisted. So, contradictorily, 
interpellation (identity) is always oppressive and yet, identity is what makes 
resistance at once possible and necessary. Butler puts it as so: 
 
The desire to persist in one's own being requires submitting to a world 
of others that is fundamentally not one's own (a submission that does  
not take place at a later date, but which frames and makes possible the 
desire to be). Only by persisting in alterity does one persist in one's 
'own' being. Vulnerable to terms that one never made, one persists [i.e. 
continues as a subject] always, to some degree, through categories, 





Why is it that we respond when we are interpellated? Interpellation establishes the 
connection that Butler is making between the development of conscience and the 
guilt that is signalled and drives the turn. As Magnus points out, what Butler does 
here is to propose a link between subject formation and self-beratement of 
conscience, which carries the implication that all subjects suffer from the internal 
subjection of guilt.
333
 Magnus goes on to dismiss Butler’s account of agency in PLP 
as ‘fundamentally’ negative.
334
 I do not disagree that it is largely negative, but it is 
not fundamentally negative. Butler’s main point is similar to the one Brown makes 
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through Nietzsche’s ressentiment – namely, that it is a serious theoretical mistake to 
take for granted the ‘internality of the psychic.’
335
 Butler clearly implies that there is 
something particularly effective, and therefore, pernicious about techniques of 
subjectivation: these techniques force individuals back on themselves, and fix them 
to their own identities ‘in a constraining way.’
336
 Not only are we attached to forms 
of subjectivity, which entail effects of domination, but more importantly, we are 
fixed to them in an extremely thorough-going and seemingly natural way; they have 
become attached to us as if they were a second nature and therefore, it will require 
hard work to free ourselves. 
 
A central point that Magnus overlooks is that by invoking the notion of 
interpellation, in Butler's account of subjectivation the individual does not call itself 
into being. Rather, interpellation is a collective account of subjectivation. That is, the 
subject is always called by another. Consequently, the self that is called into being 
does not define itself. And if the self does not define itself, yet is the holder of an 
inner life that always defies and longs for the interpellation, then the self that is 
called must remain ultimately opaque to the caller. Therefore, to be interpellated is 
always inaccurate because to be named always attaches the subject to that 'truth' of 
category from which actions are read from the alleged accuracy of some object 
name. So, for instance, to name the subject a woman locates her on a certain life’s 
trajectory that may or may not be accurate to her own vision of her life’s trajectory. 
But interpellating is never accurate either. The one doing the interpellating, 
Althusser’s policeman calling the self, cannot ever be sure of the accuracy of the call 
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These are the threads that Butler picks up on and develops in her latest work, Giving 
an Account of Oneself, and her turn to Levinas.
338
 The psychic and ethical 
dimensions that I argue were always present in even Butler’s earliest work, are made 
ever more explicit in her most recent work. In the next section, I turn to this most 
recent work to show how Butler develops a clearer theory of the self in collective 
political engagement that does not actually depart from her earlier work.  
The (re)‘turn’ to ethics 
In her later work, Butler thinks through Levinas’ ethics on intersubjectivity together 
with Foucault’s ethics of self-care. By merging these two thinkers, Butler develops 
an account of the self in an ethical situation that is simultaneously beholden to the 
other (Levinas) and to pre-existing social norms (Foucault). To be a subject within 
these terms is to be ‘implicated, beholden, derived, sustained by a social world that is 
beyond us and before us.’
339
 In Levinas, the ethical situation precedes ontology – the 
‘I’ only comes into existence through the ethical relation. Because the ‘I’ as such 
only comes into being as an ‘I’ through the ethical relation, the ‘I’ is necessarily a 
subject of responsibility, beholden to the other. It is the capacity that the subject 
holds to ‘be acted upon’ that places it in a relation of responsibility.
340
 Because it is 
the ethical relation that calls the subject into existence per se, this relation of 
responsibility is not one that the subject has the power to do away with. 
 
Drawing on Foucault, Butler incorporates into Levinas’ claim - that ontology does 
not precede ethics - the social as prior to ethics: ‘In asking the ethical question – 
“How ought I to treat another?” - I am immediately caught up in a realm of social 
normativity, since the other only appears to me, only functions as an other for me, if 
there is a frame within which I can see and apprehend the other in her separateness 
and exteriority.’
341
 In formulating a conception of the subject, the ‘I’ is formed in 
relation to norms that always precede her.  
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The central problem of how to conceive of the self in the context of ethical 
engagement for Butler is how to go about accepting the limits to self-knowledge. 
The capacity for self-reflection in the Butlerian subject is preceded by, and thus 
constrained by, the very norm which is constitutive of subject formation. The result 
of this constraint is that any story the subject undertakes to tell of herself is picked 
up mid-plot. There is always a delay in the story – the teller is always already being 
reconstituted even as she produces herself. This delay can ever only result in a 
partial, incomplete re-telling. The teller is never able to give a single truthful 
rendition; the story told by the teller is always a revision. Furthermore, there is 
always something that is lost in the telling. There is always something that cannot be 
accounted for.  
 
If there is always something lacking in the storyteller’s account, how does it become 
possible for the subject to give a moral account of herself? Is the opacity of the tale 
not simply an indication of ethical failure? In formulating her answer to such 
questions, Butler reverses the logic to argue to the contrary. It is precisely narrative 
failure that gives rise to a ‘certain ethical disposition.’
342
 It is the self's own opacity 
to herself that occasions her capacity to confer a certain kind of recognition on 
others. Butler’s question of ’who are you?’ is an intersubjective one, for in realising 
an answer to the question of subjectivity, Butler’s subject acknowledges that her 
identity is opaque to herself, that her knowledge is ‘perspectival knowledge,’ and 
held in part by the other. In this way, in Butler, subjectivity and ethics are again 
profoundly interlinked.  
 
In Undoing Gender, Butler poses the following questions:  
 
How might we encounter the difference that calls our grids of 
intelligibility into question without trying to foreclose the challenge 
that the difference delivers? What might it mean to learn to live in 
anxiety of that challenge, to feel the surety of one’s epistemological 
and ontological anchor go, but to be willing, in the name of the 
human, to allow the human to become something other than what it 
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For Butler, the ethical question is one that is posed closer to that of ‘what sort of 
person should I be?’ than it is to the conventional ethical question of ‘what should I 
do?’ This latter question is posed within the framework of Butler’s construal of 
identity as the result of the experience of being acted upon, rather than acting on the 
world. Whereas, the former question arises from within the constructive manner in 
which she develops her notion of performativity. Butler certainly appears to be 
making an ethical turn.  
 
Yet, as I noted at the outset, Butler herself has expressed an ambivalence towards 
making an ethical turn. In her own turn to ethics, she remarks that she worries that 
the ‘return to ethics has constituted an escape from politics.’
344
 Butler works through 
this concern in her essay aptly entitled, ‘Ethical ambivalence.’
345
 The essay centres 
specifically on the work of Nietzsche and Levinas. Nietzsche’s subject is self-
constituting, wills power and turns away from the violence that brought it into 
existence. Levinas poses a subject that is brought into being through a primary 
violence that splits the subject when the Other imposes demands on the ‘I’ – 
demands that demand not only attention from the ‘I,’ but the ‘I’ itself. Levinas’ ‘I’ 
also practices a forgetfulness found in Nietzsche in that in taking up its responsibility 
to the Other, the ‘I’ forgets the violence of the primary split. Thus, according to 
Butler, both Nietzsche and Levinas share an understanding of the subject that ‘bears 
no grudges, assumes responsibility without ressentiment.’
346
 Yet, there are paradoxes 
in both philosophers’ accounts of the subject, maintains Butler, that make their ethics 
impossible.  
 
Nietzsche paradoxically calls simultaneously for the destruction of values, the 
annihilation of slave morality and articulates a resentment towards the Jews whom 
he attributes with ressentiment. Levinas on the other hand, although he rescues the 
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Jews from Nietzsche’s resentment, in the process sets the Jew as victim.
347
 Although 
Levinas does not express any of the resentment towards the Jews that is found in 
Nietzsche, he does portray the Jew as persecutor,
348
 thus exposing the presence of 
resentment in his ethics. Butler concludes with the suggestion that: ‘Certain kinds of 
values, such as generosity and forgiveness, may only be possible through a 
suspension of this mode of ethicality and, indeed, by calling into question the value 
of ethics itself.’
349
 She does not develop this project here, but does so later in her 
work on Spinoza. 
 
In her essay, ‘The Desire to Live: Spinoza’s Ethics Under Pressure,’ Butler moves to 
contrast Nietzsche and Levinas’ morality to Spinoza’s foundational notion of conatus 
– the ‘desire to live.’
350
  It is here that Butler can be seen to be placing herself firmly 
within the ethics tradition. Her views on her engagement with Spinoza capture this 
when she remarks that she holds him as yielding an ethics in not ‘the conventional 
sense if, by morality, we mean a more or less codified set of norms that govern 
action. But if, for Spinoza, any morality is to be called virtue and we understand 
virtue, the virtuous life, as governed by reason, as he claims we must, then it follows 
that the conatus will be enhanced by the virtuous life.’
351
 In attributing to Spinoza a 
certain ‘ethical optimism,’
352
 Butler is invoking both an unconventional 
understanding of ethics and a more conventional one, in the language of virtue, a 
theme I return to with the help of Foucault in Part Two. I would like to conclude with 
Butler though by drawing out this particular thread in Butler’s work. I raise the 
following questions: What can we expect of Butler’s opaque agent? What agency is 
she able to exercise in her constrained position? What are the inner resources upon 
which she can draw? In short, what ethical dispositions can we count on in the 
Butlerian subject? 
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As already established in the preceding sections, Butler’s subject is directly opposed 
to the liberal, pre-social agent that moves rationally and intentionally in the tacitly 
assumed direction of freedom. Butler’s ethics implies that the liberal subject renders 
an ethical stance towards close and distant others difficult, since the necessity of self-
mastery and settled knowledge claims only heightens the likelihood of violence. In 
contrast, in Butler, what we find is an ethics predicated on the acceptance of the 
limits of self-knowledge (‘perspectival knowing’) that is characterised by a bearing 
of humility.
353
 It is only when a disposition of humility works to include others as 
well, that the failure of autonomous sovereignty becomes a condition of, rather than 
a barrier to, ethics. 
  
The disposition required by traditional (Kantian) understandings of ethics is a 
deontological command. This command raises questions to do with what I should do 
and how I should act, which are premised on the certainty of who I am and who you 
are. Butler’s ethical disposition, on the other hand, is characterised by a receptivity 
and capacity to not search for and not necessarily to find satisfaction with closure in 
the question of who you are. Instead, the frustration of being unable to answer for 
oneself ‘who am I?’ is suspended. Therefore, a willingness to let go of the search for 
‘truth’ and the related search for categorical answers and judgment premised on such 
answers – i.e. who are you in particular? – is required of the agent. Tell me who you 
are, so that I may know how to categorise you and therefore, that I know what 
treatment I owe you. The search for the cognitive knowledge that would be 
sufficiently complete to answer such questions accurately can never be finished and 
so, from the beginning the search is doomed to (ethical) failure. 
 
Through integrating and extending Butler’s earliest work in GT, PLP, BTM and, in 
particular, her latest work on Spinoza, we can understand this ethics as a matter of 
the self taking up a reflective relationship to itself and not taking this up only as a 
cognitive, fact-finding task, but as a matter of taking the responsibility for shaping a 
collective future. The agent does not not have responsibility on account of the 
constraints of self-knowledge. To the contrary, as Butler notes:  
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Ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at that moment of 
unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies before us, 
when our willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes 




It is only when the self accepts the constitutive relationship it has with the other, that 
it can take up a stance of patience in relation to the Other. It is here that Butler draws 
together the connection between the cultivation of an ethical disposition and what 




In summary, Butler offers a conception of the subject as opaque and unfinalisable. 
She suggests that given this subjectivity, the agent comports herself towards others in 
a patient and humble manner. This has several implications for transformative 
political projects. Identity politics, projects premised on the sameness of a category, 
carry a deep desire for certainty. Butler points towards the very premise of ethical 
action to be that of uncertainty. Rushing suggests that Butler leaves us with a 
‘politics of unsatisfaction.’
356
 Butler does not offer an action plan in advance of some 
project. This Butler views as impossible. We cannot answer in advance what political 
action should be taken since politics is always about specific, contingent moments in 
time engaging real people. Since we cannot determine in advance what should be 
decided in specific moments, what dispositions we bring to bear on each other and to 
each situation matter profoundly. It is because of this uncertainty that Butler’s 
conception of ethics and the ethical agent at work here play a crucial role in 
understanding how the cultivation of dispositions towards the other is preparation for 
politics and therefore inextricably tied up with politics – the two cannot be separated.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that both Brown and Butler point towards the necessity of 
ethical reflection in the context of difference. That is, the ‘I’ is always already in the 
context of a relation to the ‘other,’ grounded in the context of want/desire for 
something, some envisioned shared future. In Butler, the grounding context of power 
and embodiment (gender identity) in this ethics cannot be transcended. Therefore, 
this ethics is not a matter of embracing and establishing, or rehabilitating normative 
criteria, but rather it is a matter of articulating responsibility and freedom within the 
struggle for emancipation. In both Brown and Butler, this is an ethics that rejects the 
binary opposition between an agonistic conception of politics and the liberal project 
of normative justice.  
 
Pursuing ethics within the context of postmodern feminist politics may seem 
contradictory. Postmodern politics is both generally, and in its feminist form, in 
conflict with, if not mutually exclusive from, moral philosophy. Yet despite this, I 
have made the case that both Brown and Butler have indeed pursued ethics within 
democratic struggles and have pointed to a direction in ethics that leads neither to 
contradiction nor to ‘an escape from politics.’
 
This ethics is not one that calls for the 
subject either to bow in obedience to the moral law (Rawls), nor does it call for the 
construction of the normative criteria that would enable the subject to pre-judge the 
outcomes of political struggles. Instead, both Brown and Butler point in the direction 
of an ethics that is based on a ceaseless accountability (to the other) without recourse 
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Part Two: Reframing the identity politics debate: 
attending to the self 
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4 
The turn to ethics: the subject of ethics 
Introduction 
In Part One, I rely on the term ethics to indicate a reframing of the identity politics 
debate in feminist theory. To pose the question of the problematics of feminist 
identity politics as a question of ethics is to understand ethics not only as having to 
do with the intersubjective encounter, but also as one to do with the ‘good life.’ The 
purpose of this chapter is to articulate further this ethics. What is this move towards 
ethics? How does the subject of ethics differ from the liberal notion of the subject as 
free and autonomous? Is it distinguishable from morality? How can ethics as 
transformative praxis be motivated by the relation of the self to the other? In this 
chapter I focus on three issues which arise from an engagement between feminist 
identity politics and postmodern accounts like those of Brown and Butler. First, a 
turn away from subjective autonomy does not inevitably lead to the abandonment of 
the self, but requires a resignification of the internal resources of the self in the form 
of self-reflection. Second, the resignification of the role of self-reflection entails 
distinguishing morality from ethics. Finally, this distinction makes clear that such an 
ethics is not morality, or moralism, but rather, ethics understood as a praxis that 
holds the self as central. 
 
In the previous chapter, drawing on the work of Brown and Butler, I demonstrated 
how their work points in the direction of an ethics that is not grounded in definitive 
identity categories or established normative criteria. Central to this ethics are the 
notions of both freedom and responsibility (as obligation to the other). Yet, as Brown 
shows through her notion of ressentiment, freedom cannot be assumed. Brown’s 
suggestion is that freedom finds its direction only in and through, not only the 
framework of that irreducible dimension of democratic politics which is agonal – the 
relation of the self to other – but also in relation to collective projects. Butler pushes 
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this picture further, basing the agency of the subject in and within the other, 
transforming the self/other relation beyond one of objectification. Butler offers an 
account of the relation between the self and the other that is not based on power and 
truth, but rather on a ceaseless responsibility and accountability. Both Brown and 
Butler point to an ethics grounded in the social antagonisms of collective politics.  
 
The ethics I am describing is not an ethics that is exhausted in the sense of an ethical 
responsibility to the other, but one that is motivated by the desire for transformation, 
for change. When Brown posits and contextualises her critique of identity politics 
from within the context of the issue of ‘desire,’ she moves what has been an 
institutional analysis to the inner life of the subject. Likewise, in her conception of 
the agent, Butler points to cultivation in the self of those dispositions necessary for a 
non-appropriative, accountable relation to the other. Both Brown and Butler appear 
to be centring the role of the inner life of the self. In this chapter, I work to develop 
and extend this theme.  
 
This chapter is organised in three broad sections. The first section clarifies the 
distinction I am making between the terms ethics and morality. The ethics/morality 
distinction has been the subject of an on-going debate within the philosophical 
branch of moral philosophy as well as in political theory. My intention here is not to 
either offer an exhaustive account of this debate or to resolve it. Rather, I indicate 
that there is a substantive difference between the two terms, and one that is necessary 
to be made for this project.  
 
The second section suggests that the starting point of feminist identity politics 
broadly parallels a debate in Anglo-American mainstream political theory 
exemplified by Sandel’s critique of liberalism. In invoking Sandel’s critique of 
deontological liberalism, I do not enter into the feminist debate over the potentialities 
or shortcomings of communitarianism, but rather I draw out an element that is shared 
by both. In particular, I engage with Sandel's critique of Rawls, which although most 
generally viewed as being one about the distinction between ethics and morality – 
the right versus the good – can also be seen as positing the central role of self-
 




After drawing out the role of self-reflection, the final section of the chapter then 
closes by looking at some of Foucault’s later work. By drawing on Foucault, I begin 
to elaborate a definition of ethics that points in the direction that I plan to move. It is 
towards an ethics of praxis, of becoming, within the context of difference. This 
signals a shift that Brown made away from the negativity of resistance and the 
politics of ressentiment towards an aesthetics of existence that serves as a framework 
of an ethics of praxis. A framework derived within the notion of praxis moves both 
within and beyond the delimiting factors of difference in identity politics. The self 
within this ethics of praxis is not reducible to the practices of the self in the private 
sphere. So, although I signal a turn inward, this turn inward is in order to turn 
outward. The turn inward is one that is transformative and is meant to emphasize a 
futural dimension missing from both resistance and ressentiment.  
Making the distinction between ethics and morality 
The distinction most generally drawn between the terms ethics and morality, 
involves a definition of the good life (for humans) and the rules that govern human 
relations.
357
  According to this distinction, the broad category of ethics is the domain 
of normative thinking about living in general and includes the ‘ends we propose to 
infuse meaning into our lives and also includes morality.’
358
 Morality, on the other 
hand, is that ‘part of ethics in which we take others importantly into account.’
359
 
Morality takes actions as its most natural object and is concerned with how our 
relations to other people are to be regulated. Character, motivation and feelings are 
important to morality only insofar as they effect action. According to this distinction, 
ethics is a broader term than morality and subsumes within it the latter. That is to 
say, morality is a subclass of ethics, concerned with ethical concepts in particular – 
namely notions of duty, obligation and right.  
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In political and moral philosophy, the two terms are often either taken to mean the 
same thing or, if there are any distinctions, they are left unelaborated. MacIntyre’s 
remarks about Kant’s notion of ethical life signal a more serious constraint at work in 
the seeming interchangeability of the two terms:  
 
Kant stands at one of the great dividing points in the history of ethics. 
For perhaps the majority of later philosophical writers, including many 
who are self-consciously anti-Kantian, ethics is defined as a subject in 
Kantian terms. For many who have never heard of philosophy, let alone 




What interests me is what either term assumes or has to say about the self. How is 
the self understood or constrained within the terms of morality, or the terms of 
ethics? Is there a difference? If there is a difference, what sort of difference does this 
come down to?  
 
The term morality fits with liberal theory and the Kantian idea that we appear as 
rational, whole beings before the law. This is the liberal idea of the citizen. The 
citizen appears in the social world already formed, capable of rational and clear 
thinking, having already worked out his interests. We need only ask and he shall 
articulate. Moral judgments in ‘Kantian terms’ are detached from the particularity of 
feelings and context. Reason serves as the foundation of morality and the 
‘categorical imperative’ is the mode of rationally universalising and rendering 
context-less moral judgments. What motivates the moral agent is reason and the will. 
Passion, emotion and feeling cannot serve as grounds, or as explanation, for 
motivation.  
 
Social and political considerations are not allowed a central role in moral systems. 
Reason is elevated over passion (emotion) and creates a division between the right 
(justice, rationality) and the good (values, emotions). Within the terms of (Kantian) 
morality a radical separation between the two questions of right and the good is to be 
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made. The right is not derived from the good, and the good can have nothing to say 
to the former. If there is a relationship between the two, it is one that is simply 
unclear. What is clear though is that morality is placed beyond the realm of the 
emotions and ‘the inelegant, messy, dense, historically suffused world.’
361
 The 
subject is to be thought of as ‘detached and autonomous, willing to surrender’ the 
partiality of its relationships and circumstances to impartiality when rationally 
necessary.
362
 Any reliance upon emotion, situated experience, or embodiment is 
corrupting to the rationalism upon which this account relies. The concerns raised by 
the issue of identity are of a secondary order.  
 
The Kantian view of morality stresses ‘autonomy and rationality as the defining 
characteristics of moral subjects.’
363
 The individual is viewed as generalised rather 
than concrete and there is a reliance on abstract moral principles. This is the 
conception of the self that looms behind liberal theory; it is one in which the capacity 
for rationally autonomous agency makes a being a person, and makes persons matter 
morally. Morality attempts to reduce the self to one set of characteristics – the 
rationalism in our breast. It assumes that the self exists in stasis. It ignores the 
protean, situated nature of the self. The form of the ‘good life’ and what should 
constitute it do not come into play as concerns. 
 
Morality then is largely defined by Kant and in political theory Rawls’ theory of 
justice is most generally taken to be an attempt to make Kant’s approach to morality 
political.
364
 Rawls himself claims that his theory of justice is Kantian. Specifically, 
Rawls describes his concept of the ‘original position’ as ‘a procedural interpretation 
of autonomy and the categorical imperative.’
365
 Indeed, the priority of the right over 
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the good is one of the most central and Kantian elements of A Theory of Justice.
366
 It 
is a Kantian picture of the self that lies at the heart of A Theory of Justice: 
 
Kant held, I believe, that a person is acting autonomously when the 
principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible 
expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being. The 
principles he acts upon are not adopted because of his special position 
or natural endowments, or in the view of the particular kind of society 




In contrast to morality, ethics approaches the agent as situated in a web of both 
partial and impartial relations. It offers a less codified set of norms that guide action 
and allows for the raising of questions to do with the good. In ethics, the moral agent 
is assumed to be an embodied member of a community. Ethics takes its central task 
to be that of addressing what is concrete and particular in moral situations. Most 
importantly, because ethics pays attention to the contributions of character, practical 
judgement, the role of emotions and moral perception in deliberating about actions 
and motives, it does not lose sight of the self. Ethics holds that both action and 
intention are important. It takes, therefore, the inner life of the self to be important.  
 
I do not mean this to signal that I take issue with the importance of external actions. 
Rather, my meaning is that if I do not differentiate between the terms morality and 
ethics, I thereby find myself confined, as MacIntyre warns, to the boundaries of 
morality, within which it is not possible to capture the whole of the domain over 
which ethics should extend. If ethics is to do the work on the question of the ‘good 
life’ (Brown’s ‘what do I want for us?’), it needs to have an understanding of the self 
that includes more than its physical attributes, or the most basic measurement of its 
Being; it needs an understanding of the self that includes its inner life and reflective 
capacities.  
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In the next section, I argue that this starting point broadly parallels the well-known 
debate in Anglo-American mainstream political theory exemplified by Sandel’s 
critique of Rawls and the limits of liberalism. This debate brings into sharp focus the 
ethics/morality distinction.
368
 Sandel’s critique of modern liberal theory shows how a 
view of ethics as morality is overly focused on the external world of relations and 
actions, and leaves the inner reflections of the self unaccounted for. Once the self is 
vacated, a sufficiently differentiated and complex account of the ‘good life’ becomes 
impossible since the self who is to be living this ‘good life’ does not appear to be an 
active participant.  
Self-reflection and the limits of liberalism 
Sandel’s 1982 Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (henceforth LLJ), offers a 
trenchant critique of (deontological) liberalism qua John Rawls.
369
 I focus on 
Sandel’s critique because it exemplifies the more general critique of modernity that 
focuses its attention on the issue of the subject in the context of the distinction 
between ethics and morality. In particular, Sandel’s critique works to draw out the 
dimension of the inner life of the self. In what follows, I do not intend to enter into 
the debate as to whether or not Sandel’s work, in particular in LLJ, is most properly 
to be understood as communitarian.
370
 Nor do I address the issue of the potentialities 
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or shortcomings of communitarianism for feminism per se.
371
 Instead, I am most 
interested in LLJ insofar as it critiques liberalism in the area of the nature of the 
subject that has wider implications for the more general critique of modernity and 
shares many similarities with the (feminist) identity politics critique as well.   
 
Sandel’s main aim is to argue against an approach inherent in much liberal social 
contract theory that depends upon the notion of what he terms ‘possessive 
individualism.’
372
 Sandel locates the limits of liberalism in its conception of the self. 
He exposes a theme in deontological liberalism, spanning from Kant through to 
Rawls, that posits the self as constituted prior to its ends. What I aim to draw out of 
Sandel’s critique of (Rawls’) deonotological liberalism is the crucial role of self-
knowledge and self-reflection in relation to both the good and the right.  
Liberalism and the ‘unencumbered self’ 
In LLJ, Sandel undertakes an extensive critique of Rawls’ liberal theory and, in 
particular, the conception of the subject to which it inheres. Sandel focusses his 
critique not on how it is that people should be treated, but rather on the 
unacknowledged claims of an essential human nature that liberalism relies on. 
Contrary to liberalism’s claim that it ‘does not rest on any special theory of 
personality’
373
 and that the key assumptions of a liberal society ‘involve no particular 
theory of human motivation,’
374
 Sandel argues that in fact, liberalism does ‘imply a 




Sandel begins his examination of the ‘vision of the person’ at the foundation of 
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liberalism that both inspires and undoes it,
376
 with Rawls’ subject of A Theory of 
Justice. Sandel begins by noting that although Rawls’ project may appear to be very 
similar to that of Kant’s, Rawls departs radically from Kant’s transcendental and 
disembodied subject.
377
 In Kant, the right is ‘derived entirely from the concept of 
freedom in the external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with 
the end which all men have by nature [i.e., the aim of achieving happiness] or with 
the recognised means of attaining this end.’
378
 The right must be free from any 
situation and have its basis prior to any empirical ends. The subject is deemed free 
only when guided by principles independent of empirically situated ends. If the 
moral law cannot be based in any ‘special circumstances of nature’ then, according 
to Kant, it must be based in the subject. That is, ‘namely a rational being himself, 




Although the Kantian subject turns out to be ‘us,’ since the moral law is something 
that is not found, but rather something that we will, Sandel points out that the ‘we’ 
who will the moral law are not a ‘we’ understood as particular and situated persons, 
but a ‘we’ understood as ‘transcendental subjects.’
380
 Therefore, rather than serving 
as a guarantee, the transcendental is only a possibility that must be presupposed if 
‘we’ are to think of ourselves as free moral agents. That is, if I were to think of 
myself as wholly situated, I would never be capable of being a free moral agent since 
every use of my will would only ever be conditioned by some situated desire. The 
will can never be the first cause, but is always only ever the effect of some cause that 
is prior to it. Because the will must act autonomously and free from influence of any 
given situation, Sandel concludes that a Kantian ethic requires a notion of the subject 




Since Rawls’ main aim is to avoid Kant’s obscure transcendental subject, he must 
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recast Kant’s disembodied subject within the ‘canons of a reasonable empiricism.’
382
 
Rawls wants to preserve Kant’s main project, but in place of Kant’s background of 
transcendental idealism, Rawls seeks to offer ‘a domesticated metaphysics more 
congenial to the Anglo-American temper.’
383
 Therefore, according to Sandel, Rawls’ 
goal is to provide a foundation for the right that is prior to the good, with the 
difference being that Rawls’ right is situated in the real world rather than 





The ‘original position’ is a purely hypothetical device used to bring about a certain 
conception of justice. What Rawls seeks to offer with the ‘original position’ is a 
consideration of the fundamental principles that individuals would agree to for the 
just ordering of society when everyone is stripped of the self-knowledge of the 
identity markers of class, race, gender, etc., and equipped only with a general 
knowledge of economic systems and psychology. According to Rawls, from the 
‘original position’ individuals proceed cautiously, knowing that once they lift the 
veil, they will be embodied and positioned within society and could find themselves 
to be in the ‘worst off’ position.
385
 Therefore, those principles chosen behind a ‘veil 
of ignorance’ would be directed at ensuring the ‘worst off’ are in the best possible 




The ‘veil of ignorance’ serves to ensure that political and moral rights are based on 
what all persons share in common. That is, it serves the function of ensuring that 
differences are considered contingent and are deemed either irrelevant, or 
obstructions to be overcome. Neither moral judgements nor political institutions 
should appeal to ‘those contingencies (i.e. social identities) which set men at odds 
and allow them to be guided by their prejudices.’
387
 What becomes clear is that the 
subject as a distinct individual comes first and then relationships are formed with 
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others. Sandel describes this individual as ‘the unencumbered self, a self understood 




Rawls’ ‘unencumbered self,’ argues Sandel, fails to escape the pitfalls of Kant’s 
transcendental self. Furthermore, the self Rawls has presented is simply incoherent – 
it simply cannot and does not exist. Rawls’ subject, like Kant’s, is still located 
beyond experience and is therefore, incapable of forming, or being formed by, 
commitments that are so fundamental to the subject that it is just not possible that the 
subject could be conceived of without them.
389
 In Rawls’ subject there are no 
characteristics that are essential; all characteristics are contingent. Intrasubjectivity is 
not a constituent element of the subject, but is rather merely one attribute among 
others.  
 
How are we to understand identity in the picture of deontological liberalism?
390
 
What constitutes identity in the Rawlsian self? In the Rawlsian subject, identity is 
something that is given in advance. Because subject constitution is located in 
advance of situation and relation, the question of identity (i.e. ‘who am I?’) is one 
that just does not exist. The only relevant moral question for the Rawlsian subject 
has to do with deciding which ends to choose. And that is a question best addressed 
to and by the will. Yet, if the Rawlsian liberal subject is constituted independent of 
and prior to ‘purposes and ends’ surely this begs the question as to how it is that the 




Sandel suggests that Rawls attempts to resolve the question of the relation of the self 
to its ends is by conceptualising the self as a ‘subject of possession.’
392
 The ‘subject 
of possession’ is simultaneously distanced from, though not completely detached 
from, its ends. The ‘subject of possession’ is locatable in an assumption of what 
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Rawls terms ‘mutual disinterest.’
393
 That is, any group of individuals does not take 
an interest in the interests of others. Sandel points out that although the assumption 
of ‘mutual disinterest’ may appear to be some sort of psychological assumption, 
when placed within the context of the ‘original position’ that it occupies in Rawls, in 
actuality it functions as an epistemological claim.
394
 That is, the assumption of self-
interest amounts to a claim about what kind of self-knowledge the subject must be 
capable of in order to be, and to function as, a ‘subject of possession.’ ‘Mutual 
disinterest’ is both ‘the main motivational condition of the original position’ and 




Sandel’s main point is that in order to be a deontological self, it is not enough to be 
any sort of ‘possessive self,’ but rather the sort of ‘possessive self’ whose identity is 
given in advance of its interests, aims and relations with others. Thus, possession can 
be understood here in two ways. The self is at once related to and distanced from the 
thing that it possesses. That is, the thing that I possess belongs to me and not to you; 
I may possess something that I gradually lose interest in and thus, distance myself 
from it - there is something that was mine, but is no longer because I have let go of 
it. But likewise, if I become more and more attached to, or obsessive of, for instance, 
some desire or ambition, it can become attached to me in a constitutive manner. It 
moves from being mine to being me. I move from possessing the thing to it 
possessing me; it becomes indistinguishable from my identity. Sandel suggests that it 
is in this way that possession is related to agency. Both types of possession suggest a 
different notion of agency and in turn a differing relation of the self to its ends.  
 
The question now is how exactly these ends relate to agency. How does the self 
come by its ends? How does it let go of its ends? In short, how does the self go about 
transforming itself? I turn to these questions in the next section.  
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Agency and self-reflection 
Agency, Sandel suggests, is a way of repairing dispossession and is related to 
restoring self-command: ‘Agency is the faculty by which the self comes by its 
ends.’
396
 Sandel suggests that there are two senses in which a self might come by its 
ends – either by choice, or by discovery. This is respectively, voluntarist or cognitive 
agency. The former agency is characterised by the voluntary exercise of the will - 
only the will can transcend the space between the self and its ends without closing 
that space. The will is free to jump in and out again - unattached, detached from 
anything.  
 
Ends can become indistinguishable from the self, resulting in dispossession in the 
sense that the ends are given in advance of the self. According to Sandel, the only 
way to repair dispossession is to be found in the capacity of reflection, which has the 
function of a ‘distancing faculty.’
397
 Where the faculty of the will serves to diminish 
the space between the self and its ends, reflexivity turns inwards and examines the 
self as an object of reflection, thereby establishing a space between the self and its 
ends. The turn inwards allows the necessary space between the self and its ends that 
is required to view ends less as being constitutive of the self’s identity and more as 
being an attribute. 
 
In contrast to Rawls’ account, Sandel’s self is constituted by its ends, but can 
accomplish a distance from those ends (transformation) through self-reflection. The 
self ‘turns its lights’ upon itself in order to reflect upon itself as an agent.
398
 The self 
is confronted by all manner of competing claims, goods and ends, which may 
compete for constitution of the self. Thus, the boundaries between the self and a 
cacophony of ends appear not so much as fixed, but as endless. Sandel invokes 
reflexivity as a distancing faculty that yields the detachment necessary for the self to 
transform its identity through the knowledge of the self. Self-reflection, according to 
Sandel: 
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…succeeds by restoring the shrunken space between the self and its 
ends. In reflexivity, the self turns its lights inwards upon itself, making 
the self its own subject of inquiry and reflection. When I am able to 
reflect on my obsession, able to pick out and make it an object of my 
reflection, I thereby establish a certain space between it and me, and so 
diminish its hold. It becomes a mere attribute and less constituent of my 




Self-knowledge is the relationship that the self has with its pre-given ends and self-
reflection is necessary in order for those ends not to completely constitute the self. 
Therefore, transformation is not possible without both self-knowledge and self-
reflection. Without the ability to ‘turn its lights inwards,’ the self is unable to take up 
the distance required in relation to its ends, etc., which is the distance necessary to 
transform the self.  
 
Rawls’ picture of the self as antecedent to and independent of ends, according to 
Sandel, renders self-knowledge and thus, reflexivity impossible. By placing the self 
in a position that is antecedent to experience and situation, the limits of the self 
become fixed in the antecedent space. Because the self is always already transparent 
to itself, the self can never be an object to itself. There is no reason to formulate and 
ponder the question of ‘who am I?’ and its related issues to do with identity 
formation, constitution and transformation. The only relevant question for the 
antecedent self is: ‘what ends shall I choose?’ and, as has already been established, 
this question finds its proper address in the will. In this way, a voluntarist conception 
of agency exemplifies Rawls’ theory of the person. The subject of possession, 
distanced from its ends, is able to employ its will to repair that distance, always 
already governed by the principles of justice. Rawls’ person is distinguishable from 





The antecedent, individuated subject who stands at a distance from its ends, can only 
be achieved by placing the self outside of time and place. The result is that identity 
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becomes fixed and is not transformable: 
 
No commitment could grip me so deeply that I would not understand 
myself without it. No transformation of life purposes and plans could 
be so unsettling as to disrupt the contours of my identity. No project 
could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question 
the person I am. Given my independence from the values that I have, I 
can always stand apart from them; my public identity as a moral person 




The self that stands outside of time and at a distance from its ends, precludes the 
constitutive sense of possession and thereby rules out both ‘intersubjective’ and 




‘Intersubjective’ or ‘intrasubjective’ forms of self-understanding do not assume that 
the self can unproblematically and transparently tell its own story. Sounding not 
dissimilar to Butler, Sandel goes on to elaborate how such forms of self-
understanding do not hold that the self can, from a moral point of view, speak for 
itself by itself.
403
 The opacity of the self is only reduced in dialogue, in relation to 
others, though it is never fully dissolved.
404
 Reflective self-understanding is 
constrained by the understanding that ‘others made me, and in various ways continue 
to make me the person I am.’
405
 This means that the self is not antecedent to its 
social location. The self cannot reflect on itself atomistically. To do so would be to 
neglect the intersubjective component of its historical, social and political milieu.   
 
If, in Rawls, the self comes by its ends by choosing (for it is voluntaristic), it needs 
to be asked what exactly happens in that moment of choice? Here is what Rawls has 
to say: 
 
I shall suppose that while rational principles can focus our judgments and 
set up guidelines for reflection, we must finally choose for ourselves in 
the sense that the choice often rests on our direct self-knowledge not 
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only of what things we want but also of how much we want them. 





Reflection, self-reflection, is given a truncated role in the Rawlsian conception of the 
good. Reflection on the good is a matter of deciding what we want and how much of 
it we want. Sandel points out that although Rawls has made the point that the good 
for any particular person is ‘decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection,’
407
 
the objects of reflection are limited to: firstly, possible alternative plans and what 
their consequences might be if carried through, and secondly, the desires and 
interests themselves.
408
 The self is not ever itself an object of reflection. What this 
neglects, of course, is the constitutive nature of our social ties, or what Sandel later 
calls ‘constitutive ties.’
409
 Since, in Rawls, the self is given in advance, reflection 
cannot lead to the sort of self-understanding that could play a role in either the 
constitution of the identity of the self or in the transformation of that identity. 
 
Sandel points out that Rawls does in fact, address the constitutive nature of social 
ties, but in doing so he relies on liberalism’s trenchant separation between the public 
and private spheres. Indeed, in this regard we find Rawls contrasting ‘the conception 
of the person connected with the public conception of justice’ with ‘citizens in their 
personal affairs, or within the internal life of associations’ who here ‘may have 
attachments and loves that they believe they would not, or could not, stand apart 
from.’
410
 The person that is connected with the public on the other hand, grapples 
with no attachments that might be seen in some manner to be essential to who he is, 
or in some way constitutive of whom he is. So, although we may be ‘thickly 
constituted selves’ in the private sphere, in the public sphere we easily shed this 
‘thick’ self and enter ‘unencumbered.’
411
 How can this split personality be 
explained? How can the self be encumbered and constituted in its private life, yet 
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upon stepping into the public sphere, is not only able to shed its private identity, but 
is also able to remain unaffected, and undefined by any public ties?  
 
Sandel surmises that Rawls cannot be making a psychological claim, but must rather 
be making an epistemological one.
412
 That is, in order for the self to be able to 
perform the detachment required of it in the public sphere, the self must regard itself 
as distinct and independent from its ends, whatever these are, in both the public and 
private spheres. And it is here that the deontological self is exposed as incoherent. 
For to allow private ends to be constitutive of the self, opens the door to the 
possibility that public ends are also likely to be constitutive: 
 
Once the bounds of the self are no longer fixed, individuated in 
advance and given prior to experience, there is no saying in 
principle what sorts of experiences could shape or reshape them, no 





The self is, therefore, not only tied to and constituted by its identity in the private 
sphere; it is also tied to and constituted in the public sphere. Just as politics are not 
beyond the self, so is the self not beyond the reach of politics – in both, what 
liberalism has traditionally defined as the public and the private spheres.  
 
For the Rawlsian subject, the good is completely open and accessible so long as it is 
taken as the interests of an autonomous agent (individuated prior to ends). In 
deontological liberalism, just as the right is a voluntaristic collective choice (in the 
‘original position’), the good is also an individual, voluntaristic choice. The good is 
understood as something akin to a satisfaction of preferences, or interests that are 
‘out there,’ separate and distinct from the self. The parties in the ‘original position’ 
‘think of themselves as beings who can and do choose their final ends (always plural 
in number).’
414
  That is, the self forms a preference for some good voluntarily, which 
precludes the possibility of the good being in any way constitutive of the self.  
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But the good cannot merely be conceived of as preferences or interests that are just 
‘out there’ at a distance from the self. According to Sandel, the good is more than 
this; the good is constitutive of the self. The good as constitutive of the self, 
therefore, functions to bring the self out of its transcendent or antecedent position. 
Whereas in Rawls’ schemata, the self is defined by the right (to the extent that in the 
‘original position’ we are guided by a rationality that inevitably leads us to delineate 
the right principles of justice) and not by the good, what Sandel is getting at is that it 
is, in fact, the good that defines the self.  
 
Once the liberal abstract self is dislodged from its a priori position certain radical 
results follow. Sandel’s critique of Rawls’ self helpfully sketches how self-
knowledge, self-reflection and agency are inextricably bound up with the identity of 
the self. Self-knowledge is both something more complicated than (in Rawls) simply 
knowing what and how much one’s wants and desires are, and it is also something 
much less private. In fact, self-knowledge is radically situated in intersubjective 
contact, and this intersubjective encounter is not merely instrumental to self-
knowledge but is actually constitutive of it. It is self-reflection (along with self-
knowledge) that allows for transformation.  
 
At this point, I would like to draw a number of conclusions from Sandel’s critique of 
Rawls’ deontological liberal subject to move in a further direction. First, one of the 
pervasive themes is that identity does not pre-exist situation. The self only makes 
sense and makes sense of itself intrasubjectively through an intersubjective situation. 
On my reading of Sandel’s final conclusion of LLJ, this necessarily undoes the 
partitioning off of the antecedently formed public self from the situated private self. 
The self cannot have both a private self that is encumbered and a public self that is 
‘unencumbered;’ both are situated and constituted inter/intrasubjectively. This begs 
the question though of how constitutive attachments, and the self’s relation to the 
good as constitutive, relate to agency.  What ensures agency? Agency afterall 
suggests change, but what direction will the change take? If agency is ensured only 
in interasubjectivity, what ensures that the social relation is non-reductive?   
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In Sandel’s understanding of the self, it would seem that it is reflective self-
knowledge that ensures agency. Self-reflection is critical to maintain and is what 
creates a distance between the subject and the good as well as the right. That is, we 
may be constituted by the good as well as by the right, but self-reflection ensures that 
we are not thereby undone by them. Yet, the agency we hold is not boundless, it is an 
agency limited by intersubjectivity. The subject is always already in a concrete 
relation with others. If the capacity for critical self-reflection and self-knowledge 
allow for agency, what does this look like in the intersubjective context? How does 
the self ‘turn its lights inwards’? What is this ‘turn’? From where does it originate? 
What motivates the turn? What does it aim for? What happens in the moment of 
turning? 
 
Sandel does not consider these questions. Therefore, I find in Sandel a limit that 
signals the necessity to move beyond him. Having foregrounded the central role that 
the inner life (intrasubjectivity) of the self must play – the self turning its ‘lights 
inwards’– Sandel seems to presume too much about the self, or at least does not offer 
enough of an explanation. Therefore, retaining the point that Sandel has made - that 
there is a connection between self-knowledge and self-reflection and these are 
connected to agency – in the next section I ask how we might better understand the 
connection between the two.  I turn to Foucault’s account of the self in his later 
work, in particular in his trilogy History of Sexuality,
415
 to argue that Foucault takes 
us in a useful direction for considering the connection between self-knowledge and 
self-reflection.  Foucault helpfully, makes a similar, but more elaborate, distinction 
between ethics and morality
416
 and in so doing, offers the resources to develop 
further an understanding of the relationship between self-knowledge and self-
reflection.  
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Foucault’s distinction 
Foucault’s morality/ethics distinction 
Foucault makes a similar distinction between ethics and morality to the one I have 
been trying to make. According to Foucault, the term morality refers to those ‘values 
and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of 
various prescriptive agencies.’
417
 Foucault distinguishes moral values and codes 
from the actual behaviour of individuals in relation to them. Ethics, on the other 
hand, he defines as ‘the manner in which one ought to ‘con-duct oneself.’
418
 That is 
to say, ethics is the manner in which one ought to ‘form oneself as an ethical subject 




According to Foucault, any morality has three aspects: First, there is the moral code, 
which may be more or less explicitly formulated; second, there is the actual 
behaviour of those subject to the moral code; and third, there is the way in which 
individuals constitute themselves as moral subjects in relation to the moral code, or 
‘subjectivation.’
420
 Whereas morality is associated with the history of different moral 
systems and the institutions that enforce them, ethics refers to the work of self-
transformation that individuals perform on themselves. Ethics, understood as 
‘subjectivation,’ contains four main elements: (1) the ethical substance, (2) the mode 
of subjection, (3) the ethical work, and (4) the telos. Ethical substance pertains to the 
substance of moral conduct (i.e. feelings, behaviour and intentions) and asks which 
part of the self should be subject to work on the self. The mode of subjection deals 
with how it is that subjects identify their obligations and asks which rules the subject 
should follow according to which reasons. Ethical work takes up the issue of the 
specification of the practices that the self must engage in in order to achieve its 
ethical ends. These first three practices are what Foucault refers to as ascetics, or 
askesis. The final aspect, telos, asks what mode of being, or living, constitutes the 
goal of this work and raises the question of what sort of person the subject desires to 
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For Foucault, moral conduct is not to be equated with following rules and laws. 
Rather, morality involves all of the four aspects delineated above and so, ethics and 
morality are constructed as interdependent: 
 
In short, for an action to be ‘moral,’ it must not be reducible to an act or a 
series of acts, conforming to a rule, a law, or a value. Of course all moral 
action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, 
and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply, ‘self-awareness,’ 
but self formation as an ‘ethical subject,’ a process in which the 
individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his 
moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, 
and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. 
And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve and 
transform himself. There is no specific moral action that does not refer to 
a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call for the 
forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical 
subject without ‘modes of subjectivation; and an ‘ascetics’ of ‘practices 




Ethics is the work of self-transformation that subjects perform upon themselves.
423
 
Foucault prioritises ethics because it is the aspect which is most liable to change, and 
it is in the area of the self-to-self relation that critical reflection occurs. An 
understanding of this aspect, according to Foucault, is absolutely crucial to the task 
of reconstitution. In substituting ‘a history of ethical problematisations based on the 
practices of self, for a history of systems of morality based, hypothetically, on 
interdictions,’
424
 Foucault changes the ethical problematic from the moral law to 
what Grosz terms ‘ethical self-production.’
425
 In this way, ethics proper is to be 
understood as the self’s relation to itself.
426
 Yet, Foucault insists that ethics cannot 
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In ‘ethics-oriented moralities,’ Foucault argues that the practices of the self are not so 
much concerned with the approximation of the moral law as they are with the project 
of self invention: ‘To be modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of 
passing moments; but it is to take oneself as the object of a complex and difficult 
elaboration.’
428
 Thus, in contrasting the ethical with the more juridical moral model, 
Foucault says: ‘What I mean by [‘arts of existence’]….are those intentional and 
voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also 
seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to 
make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain 
stylistic criteria.’
429
 He poses the question of how it is that as modern subjects we 
‘directly constitute our identity through some ethical techniques of the self which 




In the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality (The Use of Pleasure 
and The Care of the Self), Foucault sets out to examine the practices of the self 
developed through antiquity.
431
 He argues that the Delphic principle of self-
knowledge has come to function as an imperative and governs our modern practices. 
He attributes this in part to the influence of Descartes. The Delphic principle does 
not enter anew with Descartes though, but was already present in ancient Greek 
thought. The Delphic principle we have inherited from the Greeks replaced the 
earlier principle of ‘care for the self.’ Whereas, with Descartes, self-knowledge and 
‘care of the self’ are separate, according to Foucault, for the ancient Greeks, the two 
principles were intertwined. The ‘care of the self’ was what formed the main rules 
for personal as well as social conduct. It was actually the principle of ‘care of the 
self’ that brought into action the Delphic principle as something like a form of 
technical and directive advice that the individual could be prescribed to follow when 
consulting the Delphic Oracle.  
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Foucault argues that the ancient hierarchy of the two principles (care of self and 
know thyself) has now been inverted.
432
 Nowadays the predominant principle is to 
know thyself. Foucault attributes this to a modern tendency to view ‘care of the self’ 
as immoral, narcissistic and as an escape from following rules. Although Foucault 
does not claim that there exists anything like a direct continuity between ancient 
Greece and the development of Christianity, his genealogy of sexuality does point 
towards some continuity between the roots of Greece with present day Western 
sexual ethics. Christianity took the ancient Greek notion of ‘care of the self’ and 
modified it in such a way as to make renunciating the self a condition for spiritual 
salvation and paradoxically located self-knowledge within the context of self-
renunciation. Furthermore, Foucault argues that the very basis of our modern 
morality does involve at least a concern for the self in the sense that respect for an 
external law is opposed to those internalised understandings of morality connected to 
‘care of the self.’ Yet, because modern Christian morality is ascetic, the self can be 
rejected and the Delphic principle obscures the principle of ‘care of the self.’ Finally, 
Descartes’ notion of the cogito has positioned the thinking subject as the basis of 
Western epistemology. According to Foucault, this raises the question of how the 
philosophy of the self, or indeed the practice of self constitution, might be 
understood differently if the ethics of self-care had prevailed.  In the next section I 
turn to Foucault’s account of this issue. 
Ethics as ‘care of the self’ 
According to Foucault, we moderns find ourselves in a position in which religious 
systems, moral codes and irrefutable scientific truths no longer give shape to our 
lives. We are in the same position as the ancient Greeks for whom the question of 
‘how should I live?’ could only be approached by cultivating a self-to-self relation in 
which the self was not a pre-given substance, but rather produced through a labour of 
care (epimeleia) and skill (techne). Thus, the sort of ethical practice that is called for 
by our contemporary situation is aesthetic in the sense that it shares with artistic 
practices the giving of form. By positing the individual as an artist in relation to the 
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living of her life, Foucault’s intention is to construe the constitution of the ethical 
subject as not simply a matter of living by an established moral code. Rather, the 
aesthetic understanding of the subject is meant to present living life as a matter of 
giving one’s life a ‘style.’  
 
Although Foucault derives the idea of aesthetics from the Ancient Greeks, O’Leary 
points out that Foucault does not take on all of the associated ideas.
433
 For instance, 
Foucault does not retain the Greek idea that beauty necessarily coincides with the 
‘good.’ For Foucault, the aesthetic is that sphere of life within which the individual 
works at developing techniques that will yield form to her life and her 
intersubjective relations. The goal is not merely to produce something that is 
beautiful to look at - as a piece of art is - but rather is about the cultivation of an 
attitude. The cultivated attitude is not only one that is to be taken up in relation to the 
other, but is taken up in relation to one’s own life, to one’s self - as to a material 
which can be formed as well as transformed. Life understood as something that is to 
be formed and transformed, signals that the subject has no ultimate purpose, no pre-
given shape, and ultimately, no justification. If the subject is neither given nor a 
necessity, then what is it?  
 
The subject is an accomplishment and it is only in as much as the subject is not pre-
given, but is something to be achieved, that the subject is to be thought of as having 
a future and thus, being capable of (self)-transformation. It is here that we can see 
clearly that Foucault moves beyond the reactionary force of resistance, the place 
where Brown identifies a severe and insurmountable shortcoming in Foucault’s 
earlier work. The limitations, which Brown had identified in Foucault’s notion of 
resistance, are now opened up into an experimental ethics of becoming, the aim of 
which is: ‘the creation of new forms of life, relationships, friendships….through our 
ethical and political choices.’
434
 For now, I do not address Foucault’s reference to our 
‘choices.’ This is a problem that I deal with only in the next chapter. For now, I 
simply move in the direction Foucault is taking us in the development of an ethics 
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that places the self at its centre. This ethics of becoming can be viewed as a shift 
away from the politics of reaction, which in Brown is ressentiment, to what Fanon 
terms ‘actional’: ‘There is always resentment in a reaction….To educate man to be 
actional is the prime task of him, who having taken thought, prepares to act.’
435
 To 
be ‘actional’ is to individuate, to locate in the individual a capacity for action. If we 
cannot internalise the moral code nor seek liberation in our identities, Foucault 
establishes a reflexive figure: ‘The relations we have to have with ourselves are not 





According to Foucault, ancient ethics demands an aesthetic regulation of action 
rather than a rigorous codification of individuals on the basis of the choices they 
make. This aesthetic regulation is dependent upon varying and variable 
circumstances to do with needs, appropriateness, social status, health and climate. 
Behaviour is to be adjusted to the variability of circumstances rather than obedience 
to the law: 
 
In this form of morality, the individual did not make himself into an ethical 
subject by universalizing the principles that informed his action; on the 
contrary, he did so by means of an attitude and a quest that individualised his 
action, modulated it, and perhaps even gave him a special brilliance by virtue 




The subject’s ‘quest’ for ‘individualised…action’ does not signal that the will of the 
subject has in some way transcended existing power structures. Quite the opposite, 
what this points to is a complete contextualisation of action and circumstances. 
Therefore, particular acts, rather than being swallowed up by a universal law, in 
Foucault, are submitted to the complex stylisations of existence – dietetics, 
economics and courtship. That is, the individual makes ‘himself’ into an ethical 
subject by reflecting on his situation (social status, health, climate) whilst 
considering his needs. The Foucaultian individual is deeply embedded rather than 
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ahistorical and because of this, a rational, universal application of obedience to the 
law is simply not appropriate to guide action.  
 
Ethics should be understood as aesthetics on the basis of its technical and ascetic 
modes, rather than on the basis of any striving for unity and purity. That is to say, 
ethics is aesthetic on the basis of it being about giving something form.  
Therefore, although Foucault has taken his direction from the ancient Greeks, he 
does not take on their notion that beauty necessarily coincides with the ‘good.’ In 
contrast to the Greeks, Foucault views the aesthetic sphere as that place within which 
the individual works to develop those techniques that will yield a form to his life. 
The working out of techniques for living a good life necessarily includes relations 
with others. The aim of this work is thus not like that of art, to create something that 
is desirable to look at. Rather the aim is to cultivate the attitudes necessary to create 
a good life. This calls on the subject to relate to his life and himself as to a material 




If the life of the subject is material that can be formed and transformed, this must be 
an indication that for Foucault neither the subject, nor the life of the subject, has any 
ultimate (pre) given shape, purpose or indeed, justification. The subject as form has a 
history, unlike the subject as substance, and therefore, has a future insofar as it is 
transformable. Now, this would seem to raise the following question: Why should I 
live my life in one particular way rather than another? It is exactly for this reason 
that Foucault sees it as necessary to develop techniques to work on the 
transformation of the form and to reflect upon the end – the telos to which the 
subject directs his efforts. The aim, or telos, of Foucault’s ethics is freedom. Freedom 
for Foucault though is not an end state, but is rather to be thought of as a sort of 
continual practice. It is an understanding of ethics as praxis and this idea I develop 
further in the next chapter. Before I move on to this though, in the next section I end 
with examining some of the feminist criticisms of Foucault’s approach to ethics. My 
goal is to begin to clarify my vision of a Foucaultian ethics of praxis as an 
appropriate avenue by which to address the problematics of feminist identity politics 
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identified in Chapter Two. Although there is a developing acceptance regarding the 
usefulness of Foucault’s late work among feminist theorists, in what follows, I look 
briefly at two feminist critiques of this later work in order to draw out what I think 
are the strengths in Foucault’s ethics for my own purposes.
439
 
‘Care of the self’ and feminist identity politics  
Braidotti has expressed serious reservations that Foucault’s later work on ancient 
Greek ethics could be of any serious use for feminists.
440
 She concedes that in this 
body of work Foucault does make an important contribution with regard  to the 
issues of the status of the subject, identity and the role of truth as a form of power 
through his critique of power. She argues though that he very unhelpfully holds on to 
the ancient Greek association between the ‘care of the self’ and political life. 
According to Braidotti, this connection is one that is derived through the male body 
and maintaining it amounts to an idealisation of masculinity.  
 
Braidotti argues that what Foucault derives from the ancient Greeks - in relation to 
governing oneself, managing one’s estate, and participating in the administration of 
the city - merely emphasizes the key value of ‘ethical virility’ as the ideal on which 
the system as a whole rests.
441
 In turn, what this implies is the perfect coincidence 
between one’s male sex and an imaginary construction of masculine sexuality. 
Moreover, Foucault stresses the accordance of both maleness and masculine 
sexuality to the ruling social representations of what ought to be the universal ethical 




It is Braidotti’s view that an emphasis on sexual difference provides superior 
theoretical and practical tools for the project of redefining ethics in a way that 
exceeds the modern (liberal) conception of the subject.
443
 Braidotti views Foucault as 
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standing in stark contrast to such a project. Braidotti is not mistaken; Foucault’s 
‘care of the self’ is derived from male subjectivity. Foucault does not consider 
gender difference as a category in his account of political and ethical individuality, 
and Braidotti is correct to surmise that for the purposes of the feminist project of 
difference, Foucault is likely to have limited usefulness. However, my project begins 




 also offers a trenchant critique that draws on Foucault’s later work on 
ethics. She takes issue with what Foucault defines as the necessary relations at work 
in ‘care for the self’ and care for others, which Foucault delineates in the following 
passage: 
 
But if you take proper care for yourself, that is, if you know 
ontologically what you are, if you know what you are capable of, if you 
know what it means for you to be a citizen of a city, to be the master of a 
household in an oikos, if you know what things you should and should 
not fear, if you know what you can responsibly hope for and on the other 
hand, what things should not matter to you, if you know finally, that you 
should not be afraid of death – if you know all this, you cannot abuse 




Rozmarin views Foucault’s assumption here as one that simply cannot be accepted 
by feminists.  For her, Foucault is defining the basic ethical problem as that of 
determining how to avoid the misuse of power. For her, it is obvious that in 
following the ancient Greeks, Foucault thinks of individuals as fundamentally having 
power over others. Rozmarin argues that in a feminist context, any assumption that 
individuals hold power over others simply cannot be taken for granted since in many 
contexts women are deprived of any social power. Thus, according to Rozmarin, the 
fundamental question of power should be: ‘What are the material and cultural 
conditions that enable women to adopt an ethos through which they can gain the 
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I accept Rozmarin’s criticisms of Foucault insofar as they are contained within the 
feminist project of gender difference. For the purposes of thinking through the limits 
of difference feminism in the context of feminist identity politics, and in particular 
the problematic of organising and working across differences from within the 
category of ‘women’ (diversity feminism), defining the basic ethical problem as one 
to do with power over others, and how to avoid the misuse of that power, is 
imperative.  If women do not all belong equally and unproblematically to a universal 
category, but from within that singular category coexist in multiple subject/identity 
positions, then feminism cannot think of itself as somehow devoid, or above power. 
 
Foucault posits an ethical subject that is neither the mere imbiber of universal moral 
laws nor completely liberated from the historical, social and temporal context of her 
identity. The subject is neither the unencumbered self of liberal theory, but nor is the 
subject the fully encumbered self of essentialist identity. This is the ethical situation 
that I am trying to develop, one that provides an ethical framework that places the 
individual at its centre - neither enmeshing her in the internalisation of a universal 
moral code nor freeing her completely of her identity.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have made a distinction between the terms ethics and morality in 
order to signal the direction I take Brown and Butler to have been pointing towards 
in the previous chapter. On the basis of this distinction, I have drawn on a debate in 
liberal theory that I take as broadly paralleling feminist identity politics. In order to 
highlight the central role of the inner life of the self, something that I argue both 
Brown and Butler also centre, I have looked at Sandel who draws out the inner life 
of the agent as a matter of self-knowledge and self-reflection. Sandel’s self though 
seems to simply ‘turns its lights’ upon itself in order to reflect upon itself as an agent. 
Yet if self-reflection is what is necessary to carry out transformative work on the self, 
we need to know what happens in the ‘turn.’ In order to elaborate on what the nature 
of this relationship we must have with ourselves, I turned to Foucault’s later work on 
ethics. I argued that Foucault can be drawn on to elaborate Sandel’s self-reflective 
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self. I argued that what we find in Foucault is that when the self ‘turns its lights’ 
inwards, self-knowledge and self-reflection are mediated through ‘care of the self’ 
and that this offers a deeper understanding of the inner life of the self and its relation 
to the project of self-transformation. It is in precisely this direction that I would like 
to develop. Foucault’s work here establishes a new mode of relating to the self in 
which freeing oneself of identity is not what is stressed. Rather, Foucault insists that 
the relations we hold with ourselves are not those of identity, but ones of 




Developing an ethics along the lines of Foucault raises two issues though, firstly, to 
return again to Brown’s issue, what direction does freedom take? How can we 
imagine an ethics of self-reflective praxis in the context of feminist identity politics? 
Does it ignore the issue raised by Brown of the vicissitudes of ressentiment? 
Secondly, according to my reading of Sandel, individual self-reflection is necessarily 
intersubjective. Foucault gives us a self that is capable of taking on the self-
transformative work necessary to participate in an ethics of praxis, but what seems to 
be missing here is the problematic of the ‘other.’ Rajchman suggests that ‘what is 
most ‘difficult’ in the work of Foucault: the least resolved, the more open’ is the 
problematic of friendship.
448
 What can be said about the ethical relationship the 
individual has to others? In order to develop the notion of an ethics that is able to 
address the issues of the problematic of the self in identity politics, we must know 
what the relationship the self has to others is like. Is it a non-reductive one? Does 
Foucault’s ethics give an adequate account of the intersubjective context of identity? 
It is to these issues that I turn in the next chapter.  
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5 
Ethics as praxis: the self, transformation, desire, 
vision and the good 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that there is a distinction to be made between the 
terms ethics and morality. I made this distinction very broadly and then made it more 
particular through Sandel and Foucault. Both of these understandings of ethics point 
to what I have referred to as an ethics of becoming, or praxis. The subject of an 
ethics of praxis is not a priori to context, having worked out in advance both needs 
and wants. An ethics of praxis is expressive of a shift in the ethical problematic from 
adherence to a universal moral code to a more protean understanding of a mode of 
being. This is in keeping with shifting the analysis of the political subject of identity 
politics into a more psychological and less institutional line of enquiry, which I 
showed both Brown and Butler to be pointing towards in Chapter Three. It is a shift 
away from those narrower conceptions of the self in identity politics. Sandel posits 
the central role of the inner life – self-knowledge and self-reflection. Foucault’s 
experimental praxis extends on this by incorporating into the role of self-reflection, 
not only self-knowledge, but also self-care. This latter notion – ‘care of the self’ - 
stresses the sort of relation the self must have with itself - it is a relation ‘of 
differentiation, of creation, of innovation.’ 
 
Chapter Five primarily pushes further in the direction that Chapter Four has taken. 
My aim is to bring Foucault’s work into dialogue with the problematic of identity 
politics that I have already defined in Chapter Two. Namely, that identity politics is 
about difficult and personal work, which the self undertakes in tandem with 
differentially placed others. I have defined this work as practical work (praxis) in the 
sense that it involves the self in relation to itself, in relation to others, to values and 
to projects. This sort of work necessitates a turn inwards. The turn is one that is 
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enabled by the self’s relation to others and is undertaken for the purpose of being 
able to work better with others. Therefore, the self is not left unchanged, but is 
transformed by and through this inward turn.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: In the first section, I explore in more detail 
Foucault’s study of the Greek and Greco-Roman practices of the self as elaborated in 
his The History of Sexuality, volume III, The Care of the Self. I pay careful attention 
to how Foucault elaborates his ethics as praxis. This involves looking carefully at 
‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heatou) and drawing out how this entails hard work – 
there are many tasks which the self must intentionally undertake here. In the second 
section, I focus on those elements in Foucault’s understanding of ethics to do with 
transformation of the self and show how such an ethics deals with the issue of 
alterity in a manner that is constructive within the problematics of identity politics.
449
 
Due to the collective nature of the practical work of identity politics, the issue of 
alterity is central. Poststructural feminism has argued that any recourse to a shared 
essential identity is not a viable basis for shared political projects, so the following 
questions must be posed to an ethics of praxis: How does it deal with the issue of 
alterity? Is it apparent how the individual is to maintain a non-reductive relation to 
others? In short, how does the agent undertake the hard work of collective projects 
with different others? I move to look at how Foucault’s aesthetic ethics accounts for 
alterity by looking at the most common critiques of his ethics. In the third section, I 
return to the starting point of identity politics, namely to the issue of ressentiment. 
Although Foucault’s ‘care of the self’ does not entirely neglect the issue raised by 
Brown (ressentiment) of the presumption of the direction that the telos takes, I argue 
it could be strengthened. In order to do this, I draw on some of Iris Murdoch’s work 
to show how within an ethics of transformation (praxis) this problem could be 
elaborated. I conclude that Foucault’s ethics as praxis is heading in the same 
direction that I have suggested Butler is pointing towards – namely, an exploration 
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of virtue ethics as a way to further develop this project.  
Self-care and alterity 
As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘care of the self’ implies that Foucault’s ethics 
is to be understood as praxis. That is, ‘care of self’ is not intended to only refer to a 
general attitude or unfocussed attention, but rather that it is also time-consuming 
labour that is to be undertaken by the self. Foucault uses the Greek term epimeleia to 
describe this labour, which designates not only a preoccupation, but an entire set of 
occupations, which encompass all those activities of the head of the house, those 
tasks of a ruler over his subjects, and the care to be given to the sick.
450
 In regards to 
the self in particular, epemeleia implies that this labour is time-consuming.  
 
‘Care for the self’ is a laborious activity that takes time and as such one of the main 
problems encountered in the cultivation of the self, is how to determine just how 
much time one should devote to the task. That is, should one set aside only a few 
moments of each day? Should the early morning, or the late evening be set aside for 
introspection, for the memorisation of useful principles, or for reflection on the 
foregoing day? Should one interrupt one’s usual activities from time to time to go off 
on a retreat to commune with one self, to look over one’s life as a whole? At what 
point in one’s career should one wait to undertake such self-reflective activities? 
Should this time be undertaken at the beginning of a career, or at the end, or 
somewhere in between?  
 
The time that one spends cultivating oneself is filled up with exercises, practical 
tasks and a vast array of activities. Cultivating the self is not about resting. It is not to 
enter into a state of passivity, but rather, activity. There is a multiplicity of 
considerations to be undertaken. For instance, in caring for the body, one undertakes 
health and exercise regimes. One meditates, reads and reflects on readings through 
careful note taking. Notes are re-read and reflected upon at a later date. In short, one 
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 and this inward retreat is an on-going effort, the goal of 
which is to reactivate general principles, build persuasive arguments and to refrain 
from becoming angry at ‘others, at providence or at things.’
452
   
 
An important element of the labour of self-care is also the conversations that one has 
with friends, confidants, and guides or directors. These conversations are undertaken 
in person as well as through correspondence. The purpose of these interchanges is 
for one to reveal ‘the state of one’s soul’ as well as to seek and to give advice.
453
 The 
latter is of benefit to the giver of advice for through this exercise he actualises 
himself. But it is also of benefit to the receiver. Interaction and correspondence with 
others constitutes an exercise in the cultivation of the self and is therefore also a way 
of caring for others. Foucault puts it so: ‘around care of the self, there developed an 
entire activity of speaking and writing in which the work of oneself on oneself and 




This reciprocal exchange with the other, which one needs to take part in, was not 
merely a side effect of ‘care of the self.’ Rather, it was integral to it. Indeed, one was 
considered as exercising a right when one elicited the help of others in care for the 
self. And in turn, one was obligated to reciprocate when others solicited one’s 
assistance. It is here that one of the most important aspects of the activity of ‘care of 
the self’ is to be found, for it ‘constituted, not an exercise in solitude, but a true 




Foucault writes that ‘care for the self’ is social in several respects. It took place in 
the more or less institutionalised structures of the neo-Pythagorean communities, or 
the Epicurean groups, in which the more advanced members took on the task of 
tutoring the rest. Tutoring was done either on an individual basis or collectively. One 
could also attend to oneself in school-like settings. Foucault notes that Epictetus, for 
instance, taught in this sort of a setting. Both private citizens wishing to prepare for 
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life, as well as others intending to train as professional philosophers, were trained in 
‘spiritual direction.’
456
 In Roman aristocratic society, philosophers were taken on to 
serve families as private consultants.  
 
Attention to the self did not only depend on schools, lectures and professionals for its 
base. It also found support in familial relations, friendship and obligation. As already 
pointed out above, when one appealed to the assistance of another in the task of 
caring for the self, one exercised a right. And in extending assistance, as well as 
receiving the lessons the other gave, one was performing a duty. This exchange in 
the interplay of ‘care of the self’ and the assistance of others serves to strengthen and 
deepen relations: ‘[t]he care of the self – or the attention one devotes to the care of 
others should take of themselves – appears then as an intensification of social 
relations.’
457
 Foucault presents Seneca’s letters to Lucilius as an example of the 
deepening of a pre-existing relationship. In these correspondences, gradually, the 
spiritual guidance initiated by the older Seneca, transforms into a shared experience 
which both benefit from. Seneca writes to Lucilius: ‘I claim you for myself; you are 
my handiwork’ and adds: ‘I am cheering on one who is in the race and so in turn 
cheers me on.’
458
 Foucault’s point here is that ‘care of the self’ is inextricably linked 
to ‘a soul service’ which includes exchanges with the other in a system of reciprocal 




Although ‘care of the self’ is a social practice which is the intertwinement of the self 
and the other in its practice, the individual still remains primary. The work of 
transformation of the self is carried out on and within the self. Although it is worth 
emphasising that Foucault is not now to be taken as formulating a Levinsinian-style 
ethics in which the self is only called into being by the other. Foucault is very careful 
about delineating the boundaries of this connection.  
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‘Needful’ bodies and souls 
In ancient Greece, the ‘care of the self’ is closely correlated with medicine. The 
focus of ‘care of the self’ is where the ills of the body and soul both communicate as 
well as contaminate each other. It is that point where ‘the bad habits of the soul can 
entail physical miseries, while the excesses of the body manifest and maintain the 
failings of the soul.’
460
 The interconnectivity of body and soul meant that if one did 
not want an ill soul to infect the body, one had to be sure to improve the soul and 
vice versa. For an adult, the body that needs caring for is not a young body. Rather, it 
is now a ‘fragile, undermined body, threatened by petty miseries – a body that in turn 
threatens the soul.’
461
 This concern for the health of the body took the form of fear of 
excess, economy of regimen, attention to dysfunction, and a taking into account of 
climate, season, diet and way of life. In short, all the factors that might disturb the 
proper balance of the body, and therefore, the soul are to be taken into consideration.  
 
The connection between the health of the body and the soul, on the basis of a 
harmonisation between medicine and ethics, Foucault argues, led to a very important 
consequence. In acknowledging oneself as either being ill, or in danger of becoming 
ill, the practice of the self implies that one should not only consider oneself 
imperfect, ignorant, in need of correction, training and instruction, but also as 
someone who requires treatment by either oneself or someone else who is 
competent.
462
 Everyone needs to make the discovery that they are needful. We all are 
likely to need medicine or competent assistance. It is here, in the realisation of one’s 




The establishment of a relation to oneself as ill is all the more necessary in regards to 
the well-being of the soul since maladies of the soul, unlike those of the body, are not 
visible. Maladies of the soul are often not readily apparent and therefore, can persist 
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for a long time without being detected and can blind those whom they afflict.
464
 
Unhealthy individuals may not know they are afflicted, which can cause ills of the 
soul to be mistaken for ‘virtues (anger for courage, amorous passion for friendship, 
envy for emulation, cowardice for prudence).’
465
 The aim of the physician is, firstly, 
to make the patient well and, secondly, to make sure that the ill person is at the very 
least aware that he is ill. Therefore, recognising oneself as needful is the very first 
step towards self-knowledge. 
Self-knowledge and ‘care of the self’ 
As discussed above, the practices of the self are both personal as well as social and 
self-knowledge occupies a central role. Furthermore, self-knowledge does not 
merely amount to an invocation of the Delphic principle, but instead is complex and 
takes the form of precise instructions, specified examinations and a code of 
exercises.  
 
‘Testing procedures’ are tests that allow the individual to establish self-mastery by 
progressively testing what it is possible to live without.
466
 The purpose of these tests 
is not simply renunciation per se, but rather to cultivate independence through 
establishing what is superfluous and what is not. Foucault illustrates this by looking 
at the example of Epictetus. Epictetus, whom already practiced a Spartan diet, took, 
on certain days, a reduced ration of food with the aim of seeing how much his 
pleasure would be diminished.  The point of this sort of reductive testing was to 
demonstrate that it is always possible to have access to what is strictly necessary, and 
that one should guard against being apprehensive of the thought of possible future 
privations. Foucault points out that this should not be understood as sanctioning a 
withdrawal from oneself, or the world. Rather, one should ‘do what the crowd does, 
but in a different way.’
467
 This ‘different way’ is the way that one has learned ahead 
of time through voluntary exercises, which enables one to maintain a detached and 
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independent mind in any (social) situation.  
 
These practical tests are to be carried out in conjunction with rigorous self-
examination. What this entailed was morning examination, the purpose of which was 
to review what the tasks and responsibilities of the coming day were to be, as well as 
an evening exam, which was devoted to reviewing the foregoing day. The latter 
examination, although suggestive of a division of the self into an accusing judge and 
a guilty subject, Foucault argues, is actually better understood as something more 
akin to an inspection. In describing this self-examination, Seneca employs the words: 
‘scrutinize,’ ‘to shake out,’ ‘to inspect,’ and to ‘remeasure.’
468
 The self-to-self 
relation established through this examination, according to Foucault, is not a judicial 
one, but rather is like an inspector who is inspecting a piece of work, or task, that has 
been accomplished: ‘The fault is not reactivated by the examination in order to 
determine a culpability or stimulate a feeling of remorse, but in order to strengthen, 
on the basis of the recapitulated and reconsidered verification of a failure, the 




Added to all of the foregoing is the labour one undertakes on oneself as object. This 
task is more than a test that measures what one is capable of. It is also more than a 
matter of assessing if one is at fault in regards to the rules of conduct. The task of 
thinking of oneself as the object of thought is a consistent attitude that one adopts 
towards oneself. It is not something that one exercises at intervals. Epictetus uses the 
metaphor of a ‘night watchman’ when he says that one should keep watch over what 
enters the gates of the cities and houses.
470
 Epictetus further elaborates how one 
should exercise on oneself the same functions of an assayer. That is, similar to a 
moneychanger, one should not accept any coin before having ascertained its worth. 
This is not to be understood as Socrates’ aphorism: ‘An unexamined life is not worth 
living.’ Foucault contends that Epictetus intends something very different. Epictetus’ 
examination is one that is meant to deal with representations in a manner that tests 
them in order to make a distinction between them so as to avoid the tendency to 
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accept initial understandings, or interpretations which may be incorrect:  
 
We ought not to accept a mental representation unsubjected to 
examination, but should say, ‘Wait, allow me to see who you are and 





One’s aim is not to uncover an original meaning behind the representation, but to 
evaluate one’s relationship with what is represented in order to accept in relation to 
one’s self only those representations that depend on the subject’s voluntary and 
rational choice. That is, one should only accept what is one’s intentional choice. 
Representations that are outside of the understanding of the individual are to be 
rejected as inappropriate objects of desire. The inspection is a ‘test of power and a 
guarantee of freedom.’
472
 This testing is the way by which the individual ensures that 
no attachments are formed that are not intentional. Constant scrutiny must be 
exercised over representations – not in order to uncover origins, or hidden meanings, 
but in order to assess the relationship between oneself and that which is represented.  
 
The individual is in no sense controlled by the representation, nor vice versa. Rather, 
it is precisely at the point where the individual approves or disapproves of the 
representation that the locus of control is to be found. It is the inspection that both 
tests the power, as well as guarantees the freedom, of the individual. ‘Care of the 
self’ is a very personal mode of political resistance. It is both the motivating 
foundation and the articulation of the embodied and desiring subject.  
 
The shared goal of all of these practices of the self is the ‘conversion of the self.’
473
 
‘Conversion of the self’ requires that one shifts both one’s activities and attention to 
ceaselessly caring for the self. This is not to be understood as implying that all else 
should be given up and that one should devote oneself entirely to oneself. Rather, it 
should be understood as a shift in activity. That is, in the activities that one should 
engage in, one must realise that the main objective one must set for oneself is to be 
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‘sought within oneself, in the relation of oneself to oneself.’
474
 This self to self 
relation is the final point of the ‘conversion’ and all of the practices of the self belong 
to an ethics of control. It seems a fair question to raise at this point if this is to be 
taken as implying that this is, in some way, an agonistic struggle of resistance 
against force. 
 
Foucault addresses the concern of agonism, noting that although the relation to the 
self is commonly presented in juridical terms, it is also defined as a concrete 
relationship that allows for the self to take pleasure in itself. Thus, the relation that 
one has to oneself is not one characterised by having overcome something forcefully 
and thereby taken possession of it. Instead, it is about having succeeded in gaining 
access to oneself, one now is taking pleasure in oneself.  For Seneca this pleasure is 
not defined by something external to the self. Instead, it arises out of the self and 
from within the self. Again, Foucault quotes Seneca writing to Lucilius: 
 
Disce gaudere, learn how to feel joy, I do not wish you ever to be 
deprived of gladness. I would have it born in your house; and it is born 
there, if only it is inside of you….for it will never fail you when once you 
have found its source….look toward the true good, and rejoice only in 
that which comes from your own store [de tuo]. But what do I mean by 




Hadot points out that in this passage, Seneca is opposing joy with pleasure and that 
Foucault is mistaken to construe the joy Seneca writes of as ‘a form of pleasure.’
476
 
Hadot’s more important point is that Seneca finds joy, not in the self, but in ‘that best 
part’ of the self. What this suggests is that the self does not reach for a realm in 
which it is self-satisfied, rather the labour of caring for the self is an on-going task. 
Each morning and each evening the self undertakes the labour of its self-examination 
for the body and the soul are fragile and always in danger of succumbing to ill 
health. The conversion to self is the striving always for ‘that best part of the self.’ It 
is not to uncover, or discover, some hidden truth about the self.  
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The preceding analysis of Foucault’s self-formation confirms that the self’s 
aesthetics of existence is practicable. That is, self-formation is a difficult task that 
requires the self to remain engaged in ongoing practical work. The next issue is to 
look at the extent to which care for the self is ethical in respect to the issue of alterity 
and difference. How does Foucault’s self attend to the other? Is there a tension 
between a transformative praxis and the ethical obligation of alterity? What seems 
clear from the preceding analysis is that for Foucault an action is ethical insofar as it 
maintains and secures freedom for the self. Freedom is not unrestrained though for it 
is constrained by ethics. That is, freedom is ethical only when it is practiced in a 
deliberate way and given a deliberate form. This conception of ethics implies that 
what the individual does with its freedom is important. What the individual does 
with that freedom affects others. We must pay attention to how we constitute 
ourselves as moral subjects of our own actions. ‘Care of the self’ appears to regulate 
the individual’s conduct towards others, but what if the only way to secure one’s 
freedom is by infringing on someone else’s? What if instead of using freedom in a 
reciprocal strengthening of someone else’s, one persists in caring only for oneself? 
Foucault himself voiced this very concern when he asked: ‘Are we able to have an 
ethics of acts and pleasures which would be able to take into account the pleasure of 
the other? Is the pleasure of the other something that can be integrated in our 




In the next section, I turn to these questions and look at the extent to which it can be 
argued that Foucault’s study of ancient Greek care of the self can be defended as 
supplying a self that is able to take up a non-reductive relation in a context of 
alterity. In order to do this, I look at some of the most common critiques that have 
been voiced against Foucault’s aesthticised account of ethics.  
Alterity and ‘care of the self’ 
Foucault’s emphasis on the ancient Greek practices of aesthetic self-formation has 
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been popularly critiqued as an abdication of responsibility and an aggrandizement of 
the self. Many have been critical of his late ethical project for purportedly pursuing 
individual satisfaction at the expense of collective political projects. What all these 
critiques seem to raise as a concern is the issue of how an ethic that is centred on 
self-concern effects collective political engagement. How does a self that undertakes 
such a radical inward turn contend with the issue of alterity? Is Foucault’s 
development of the Greek concern for self-constitution not simply a version of self-
absorption? How does the radically autonomous individual take up a relationship of 
responsibility to any other person? Most worrying of all, is there not a very real 
danger that aesthetisation of all aspects of life leads inevitably to meaningless? This 
is voiced very forcefully by Eagleton when he writes: 
 
The wholesale anesthetization of society had found its grotesque 
apotheosis for a brief moment in fascism, with its panoply of myths, 
symbols and orgiastic spectacles, its repressive expressivity, its appeals to 
passion, racial intuition, instinctual judgment, the sublimity of self-
sacrifice and the pulse of blood. But in the post-war years a different 
form of anesthetization was also to saturate the entire cult of hedonism 
and technique, its reifying of the signifier and displacement of discursive 





Critics like Eagleton, along with Wolin and others,
479
 view Foucault’s ethical project 
as achieving the erasure of the boundary between the aesthetic domain and other 
spheres of life. For them, aesthetics is in fact, the opposite of ethics. In this section I 
look at some of the main critiques of Foucault’s ethics and argue that by reading 
Foucault too narrowly, they gloss over and miss some of the more subtle and 
important points of his work. In fact, they miss that, quite to the contrary, Foucault 
does not represent aesthetics as oppositionally positioned to ethics, but that it is the 
necessary, albeit it insufficient, condition of an ethical self that can approach alterity 
in not only a non-reductive manner, but as the transformative task that it is. 
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The critiques of self-creation as ethics 
The self-created ‘monad’ 
According to some critics, Foucault’s aesthetic self cannot yield a ‘politics of 
alliances’ and contribute in any meaningful way to ‘coalition building’ which are the 
type of politics necessary to respond to the unfreedom of our time.
480
 Theoretical 
projects like Foucault’s, they contend, ‘de-emphasize community and 
intersubjectivity,’ favouring instead ‘highly individualised modes of being.’
481
 
According to Eagleton, ‘Foucault’s vigorously self-mastering individual remains 
wholly monadic.’
482
 He is closed in on himself and devoid of any capacity for 
emotional intimacy or community ties. Eagleton argues, therefore, that in the ethical 
world created by Foucault, society is little more than ‘an assemblage of autonomous 





There are two aspects to Eagleton’s critique which are worth examining in more 
detail in order to tease out those relevant strands in Foucault to do with the issue of 
the self in relation to the collective. Firstly, on the one hand, Eagleton takes issue 
with Foucault’s ‘monadic’ self and secondly, on the other hand, he is critical of what 
he perceives as Foucault’s lack of recognition of the interconnection between self-
realisation, mutuality and collective action.  
 
The first element of Eagleton’s critique is sustainable only if one overlooks 
Foucault’s insistence on the impossibility of a subject position ever being located (or 
locateable) outside a given regime of power. If it is possible to overlook this central 
point, then this particular critique is not misplaced. But since one of Foucault’s main 
premises is indeed that regimes of power function as the very conditions of the 
possibility of subjectivity per se, then I think it fair to surmise that Eagleton is here 
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mistaken. Let us recall that, according to Foucault, it is regimes of power that always 
lead to the failure of achieving the goal of preventing intersubjective bonds to disrupt 
the regime of power. Therefore, contrary to Eagleton’s critique, the aim of Foucault’s 
‘aesthetics of existence’ is best understood as having to do with shaping oneself to 
the extent that is possible from within the regime of power. Foucault himself argues 
that this is a matter of: 
 
 …showing how social mechanisms…..have been able to work, how 
forms of repression and constraint have acted, and then, starting from 
here, it seems to me, one [leaves]….to the people themselves, knowing 
all the above, the frontier possibility of self-determination and the choice 




Positing the argument that there is no possibility of escaping the effects of power, is 
not the same as construing subjectivation as subjection. It is always possible that 
there are ‘practices of liberation, of freedom, as in Antiquity, starting of course from 




With regards to the latter element of Eagleton’s critique - the connection between 
self-care, mutuality and collective action – Eagleton is not incorrect to point out that 
although Foucault emphasises that practices of the self include the forming and 
developing of ‘symmetrical and reciprocal relationships,’ this does not automatically 
translate into the establishment of ‘bonds of mutuality.’
486
 Yet, as Bennett points out, 
this does not mean that Foucault’s aesthetic self cannot engage in collective practices 
of mobilisation for reasons other than self-realisation.
487
 Along similar lines, 
Connolly defends understanding Foucault’s aesthetics of existence as the means 
through which the individual goes about cultivating and improving the quality and 
openness of its connectedness to others.
488
 An aesthetics of existence, according to 
Connolly, makes it possible to cultivate a ‘generous sensibility’ and opens up ‘new 
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possibilities in social relations….that enable a larger variety of identities to coexist in 
relations of ‘studied’ indifference on some occasions, alliance on others, and 




Eagleton ends by surmising that what is at work in Foucault’s aesthetics of existence 
is a ‘massive repression’ by which he means that Foucault is merely substituting the 
body for the subject and the aesthetic for the ethical.
490
 Therefore, the ‘autonomous 
individual’ is ‘a matter, very scrupulously, of surface, art, technique, sensation.’
491
 
This is similar to Best and Kellner’s complaint that, by individualising ethics, 
Foucault has reduced the individual from a ‘multidimensional form of agency and 
praxis to a decentred desiring existence.’
492
 Eagleton argues that this decentred, 
desiring self cannot be capable of autonomously acting on the basis of any rational 
principle the self gives itself as Foucault implies. Yet, this is not something that 
Foucault ever argued the self practices. Foucault never intended that the self should 
practice an ethics that is based on morality as command. Foucault’s entire ethical 
project is based on the (Nietzschean) impossibility that some command morality 
could ever be established. Bennett rightly points out that for Foucault, ‘ethics is a 
matter of reflective heteronomy, of the recognition of one’s implication in and 
dependence upon a web of social relations within which there nevertheless remains 
room for the individual to carve out a space of distinction, self-direction, or 
‘liberty.’’
493
 I now turn to Wolin’s critique of Foucault.  
Aesthetics and the self-created narcissist 
Wolin, places his objections to Foucault’s aestheticisation of ethics in a frame similar 
to Eagleton’s. Wolin begins his critique within the context of the Habermasian 
division between science, morality and art.
494
 According to Wolin, Foucault is a 
‘pan-aestheticist’ in the sense that he transgresses the Habermasian boundaries of 
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experience by refusing to ‘rest content with aestheticism qua transcendent, 
supramundane spiritual activity.’
495
 Instead, he views Foucault as concerned only 
with generalising beauty and the artistic sphere throughout the whole of life. Wolin 
maintains that by following Nietzsche, Foucault’s aim is to cultivate ‘the aesthetic 
attitude toward the world’ and this ‘must transgress the boundaries of the aesthetic 
sphere per se, and pursue a course of conscious world-mastery.’
496
 Just as Nietzsche 





Wolin acknowledges that aestheticism may hold an important critical and utopian 
function. Aestheticism can be creative and is what allows for the imagining of 
alternative futures, which ‘by virtue of their anticipatory, utopian qualities, their 
sheer ‘being other,’ are able to present a powerful indictment of the existing world in 
its present indigent state.’
498
 However, in order to ensure that its insights are not 
merely abstract, according to Wolin, the aesthetic realm must mutually pervade the 
ethical and the cognitive realms. Foucault though prioritises aesthetics above all else.  
 
According to Wolin: ‘[t]he proponents of aestheticism emend decisionism by 
emphasising style or art – the final determinant of conduct.’
 499
 He views the major 
difference between decisionism and aesthetics being the aestheticist option of ‘an a-
social, narcissistic withdrawal-into-self’ which is ‘a posture, strictly speaking 
incompatible with decisionism.’
500
 Followed to its logical conclusion, Wolin argues 
that the aesthetic position opens the door to forms of life that are ‘manipulative and 
predatory vis-à-vis others.’
501
 He therefore concludes, as Eagleton did, that there is 
no ‘discernible trace of human solidarity, mutuality or fellow-feeling’
502
 to be found 
in Foucault’s self.  
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In Wolin’s analysis, Foucault prefers the beautiful and the tasteful to the more 
serious matters of collective action and social justice. Good taste cannot distinguish, 
except arbitrarily, between what is just and unjust. Wolin sees in Foucault’s self a 
dandy making trivial choices between fancies, firm in his conviction that ‘the 
Enlightenment project of rational reflection….is not worth saving.’
503
 Although 
Wolin does acquiesce that there are criteria of value internal to the aesthetic sphere, 
they are a matter of dramatic effect rather than content. Centring aesthetics leaves 
one with little more than ‘a dramaturgical model of conduct, in which action 




The essence of Wolin’s critique is that Foucault positions the aesthetic as the most 
important determinant of life. By singling out the aesthetic attitude to living, 
Foucault is insensitive to any other possible values. This results in an insensitivity to 
taking other individuals, or a community, as ends in themselves (rather than means). 
Therefore, other persons can only ever serve as aids to an individual’s own project of 
aesthetic self-formation. Wolin argues that others are no more than ‘material for my 
own personal aesthetic gratification; they are degraded to the status of bit players in 
the drama of my own private aesthetic spectacle.’
505
 Wolin does not stop here 
though, but goes on to argue that once the telos of Foucault’s ethics has been 
established as oriented to ‘this-worldly ends,’ which is a matter of ‘self-control for 
theatrical effect,’ an ‘aesthetics of existence’ is an ethics that: 
 
…favours either an attitude of narcissistic self-absorption or one of 
outwardly directed, aggressive self-aggrandizement. In neither case is 
there a discernible trace of human solidarity, mutuality or fellow-feeling. 
Instead the ethical universe of aesthetic decisionism is a Hobbesian state 




Like Eagleton though, I maintain that Wolin has based his critique of Foucault on 
only a selective reading. He has taken Foucault’s aesthetics out of context for the 
purpose of singling out this particular aspect. He fails to take into consideration that 
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Foucault does affirm the necessity of a code. Recall from Chapter Three that one of 
the main aspects of Foucault’s ethics is the ‘mode of subjectivation’ (mode 
d’assujettissement). Subjectivation is the way in which the individual establishes 
her/his relation to the moral code, which is different from subjection, whereby the 
individual is proclaimed a subject in a given discourse. The former requires the 
active participation of the individual whereas the latter does not. The mode of 
subjectivation is transformative in the sense that it is not passive, but rather demands 
the active participation of the subject. Foucault’s aim is to shift the emphasis to the 
manner in which the individual is meant to constitute herself as a moral subject of 
her own actions, but not through a denial of the moral code. Foucault is explicit in 
this when he states that ‘[c]odes of behaviour and forms of subjectivation…can 
never be entirely dissociated.’
507
 Ethics is made up of both together.  
 
Wolin’s critique therefore, suffers from a lack of consideration of the central place 
that ascesis occupies in Foucault’s aesthetic ethics. Recall from the first section of 
this chapter that Foucault elaborates self-care as governed by ascesis – self-
discipline and self-restraint - much more so than by style understood as performance. 
Style is only something that is cultivated through ascesis. Bennett importantly points 
out that Foucault is following Nietszche in his conception of the laborious task of 
stylisation: 
 
One thing is needful – To ‘give style’ to one’s character – a great and rare 
art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses 
of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of 
them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. 
Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of 
original nature has been removed – both times through long practice and 
daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; 
there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague and 
resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views; it is 




Instead of acknowledging that Foucault’s ethics is one that is only born through 
‘long practice and daily work,’ Wolin criticises Foucault for being preoccupied with 
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how it is that we do things rather than what we do. Eagleton similarly expresses this 
concern when he asks if rape, for the Foucaultian self, is morally deplorable only 
because it indicates ‘a certain imprudence or immoderacy on the part of the 
rapist?’
509
 Dews comes to a similar conclusion when he states that ‘Foucault wishes 
to avoid judging power-knowledge complexes from a normative standpoint.’
510
 And 
again, Best and Kellner chime in to object to Foucault’s lack of attention to 
structures of domination when they claim that the turn to aesthetics promotes a 
‘micropolitics of desire’ rather than collective forms of resistance that are guided by 




What all these critiques share in common is the accusation that Foucault is merely 
concentrating on how the subject does things rather than what is being done. Their 
criticisms are expressive of a discomfort with Foucault’s refusal to place a (‘the’) 
moral code at the heart of his ethical project. Foucault, instead focusses on: ‘the 
manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference 
to the prescriptive elements that make up the code’
512
 as well as on those processes 
by which the individual becomes a moral subject of her own actions. Thus, what 
critics like Wolin and Eagleton overlook is the emphasis that Foucault’s ethics puts 
on subjectivation and that he, in no way, is denying that moral codes are either valid 
or necessary. To the contrary, he argues that: 
 
…..the assumption of all this morality was that the one who cared for 
himself correctly found himself, by that very fact, in a measure to behave 
correctly in relationships to others and for others…..it is the power over 




In a manner that is similar to ‘code morality,’ subjectivation concerns governing 
one’s behaviour. The two (ethics and morality) differ though in the way that the 
process of subjectivation responds to subtle norms of behaviour and thought and in 
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so doing, raises the issue as to which sensibilities, attitudes and character are most 
appropriate. In short, ethics asks what sort of person I should be. Morality on the 
other hand, takes as its concern which actions are most praiseworthy.  Because codes 
and moral laws are only crude frameworks, behaviour that is enacted within a 
specific social context and its possible consequent potential to be injurious, falls 
outside of their scope. Bennett on this count argues that by placing emphasis on the 





This ‘careful and resilient approach to ethics’ to summarise, is one that is the 
interconnection between the moral code and subjectivation. The latter element is a 
complex, labourious praxis. As such it is composed of multiple tasks. Firstly, it 
works to specify which part of the self is to be worked on for ethics. Secondly, a 
determination is to be made as to which exercises and tests are to install the ethical 
code upon the self as sensibility. Thirdly, a rationale for adherence to ethical 
disciplines and principles must be generated. Lastly, a telos must be designated for 
the ethical subject.
515
 That is, a response is articulated to the question of what sort of 
person I should aspire to when I behave in a moral way.  
 
Foucault leaves this latter matter of a telos unsubstantiated. At this point I would like 
to tease out two issues here which I treat separately, but that are interrelated. Firstly, I 
will pursue the matter of Foucault’s ‘unsubstantiated’ telos, a point that many of his 
critics, and some supporters, remain dissatisfied with all of whom take the view that 
this is an insurmountable problem. Ultimately, I will argue that this is a strength in 
his approach and one I will seek to retain. Yet, it does raise the question as to 
whether or not, this ‘aesthetics of existence’ is now open to falling prey to the same 
dangers a code morality. Now that the individual is ‘free’ to choose, what is it that 
she will want? This is a question of motivation for the choosing, the wanting, comes 
from some place. This brings me to the second issue - what if an individual’s ‘desire’ 
emanates from a place of self-deception? What if she ‘desires’ from a place of injury, 
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from ressentiment?  This is something that Foucault does not offer consideration of 
yet is something that is necessary to deal with in the context of the present project. In 
the next section, I turn to the first matter of whether or not an unsubstantiated telos is 
undesireable.  
An unsubstantiated telos 
As discussed above, a common complaint about Foucault is that he lacks a 
normative standpoint and therefore, ends up offering nothing more than moral 
nihilism. As I also pointed out, Bennett suggests in rebuttal, that this sort of critique 
misses the point that by refusing to position a command morality at the centre of his 
ethics, Foucault does not reject out of hand the need for rules, prohibitions, etc.
516
 
Foucault did recognise that ethics refers to elements of the code and draws attention 
to his insistence that: 
 
I had to keep in mind the distinction between the code elements of a 
morality and the elements of ascesis, neglecting neither their 
coexistence, their interrelations, their relative autonomy, nor their 





Foucault’s point is that although ethics might take its bearing from prescribed codes 
of conduct, ethical conduct cannot be simply a matter of being read off of a moral 
code. What is actually most crucial is ‘the manner in which one ought to form 
oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that 
make up the code’ (my emphasis).
518
 In other words, a moral code is insufficient to 
capture the whole of the work that the individual needs to undertake. As regards the 
law and customs (‘the nomoi’), Foucault argues that although respecting these was 
emphasised for the Greco-Romans, what was more important was ‘the attitude that 
caused one to respect them’ (my emphasis).
519
 Once again, Foucault is emphasising 
the formation of sensibilities as the most important dynamic of ethical practice: 
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‘there is no….forming of the ethical subject without ‘modes of subjection’ and an 




While Bennett defends Foucault on this point, she nonetheless goes on to ask 
whether or not it would have been better if Foucault had filled out his concept of 
ethics with some specific content and surmises that indeed it would have been.
521
 I 
disagree with Bennett on pursuing this line of specification. I do not agree that it is 
productive, nor is it in keeping with Foucault’s conception of ethics, to pursue the 
specification of content that leads us back to ‘universalizing ideals that are class or 
race or gender specific.’
522
 I think that the more productive specificity lies in the area 
of elaborating how this ethical sensibility is to be cultivated. That is, what is it that 
will make the sensibility ethical? How do we go about cultivating ethical 
sensibilities? What theoretical and philosophical resources are available to us to go 
about working out such a project? 
 
Connolly suggests that Foucault creates a reflexive ‘little space between morality 
and ethics.’
523
 Again, Foucault does not tell us how this ‘little space’ should be filled 
out and this is the nub of dissatisfaction for his many critics, whom are not satisfied 
with his lack of specification of the normative content of his ethics. McNay suggests 
that it is in Foucault’s essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ that he gives consideration to 
the normative substance of his ethics.
524
 In this essay, Foucault considers Kant’s 
formulation of the Enlightenment as an attitude of critical self-awareness. Foucault 
gives special consideration to a definition of the Enlightenment through the term 
Aufgang, or exit, which he views as presenting the birth of the modern subject.  
 
According to Kant, the Aufgang that characterises the Enlightenment is a process 
that frees the individual from a state of immaturity. Kant argues that individuals are 
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kept in a state of immaturity as a result of their idleness and lack of courage: 
 
Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. 
Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his reason without direction 
from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in 
lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without 
direction from another. Sapere aude! ’Have courage to use your own 




Similarly to Kant, Foucault places the notion of critique at the centre of his ethics. 
Foucault also retains the notion of rational autonomy and this is central to his theory 
of aesthetics; it is what is central to an individual’s ability to exercise critical 
judgment and create the space between himtself and the imposition of dominant 
beliefs, norms and desires. Foucault further clarified this in a 1984 interview in 
which he made the essential link between freedom, ethics and critical reflection: 
 
It is obvious that by liberating our desire we will learn to conduct 
ourselves ethically……for what is ethics, if not the practice of 
freedom…..Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is 





In  his ‘Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual’ Foucault offers more detail, 
describing himself as a ‘moralist’ and listing the ‘three elements in [his]….morals’ as 
‘refusal, curiosity, innovation.’
527
 We should refuse to submit to the ‘government of 
individualization’ through a ceaseless questioning of what appears natural and 
inevitable in our own identity: an interrogation of the ‘contemporary limits of the 
necessary.’
528
 Refusal is fortified by the attributes of curiosity and innovation: ‘I 
dream of a new age of curiosity’ he writes.
529
 Curiosity functions as both a capacity 
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and a concern to seek out the strangeness in everything that is familiar, traditional, 
necessary and fundamental to life.  Innovation works to complement curiosity and is 
the capacity to continually search out new ways of thinking about things and new 
ways of imagining. Together, innovation and curiosity lead the individual to never 
rest content with the knowledge that one has acquired. This is Nietzsche: ‘We have 
to learn to think differently – in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even 




The three attitudes - refusal, curiosity, and innovation - are motivated by ‘the danger 
principle,’ which Foucault regards as informing our ethical choices: 
 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is 
dangerous….If everything is dangerous, then we always have something 
to do…..I think that the ethicopolitical choice we have to make every day 




This language is reminiscent of Reagon’s account of coalitional politics in which she 
emphasises that collective political action is ‘the most dangerous work that you can 
do.’
532
 Recall that Reagon describes the work that the individual undertakes in 
collective politics as ‘dangerous’ in a way that is life threatening, yet it is work that 
must be undertaken because it is the only choice that is possible if one wants to 
‘survive.’
533
 Foucault, on the other hand, is invoking ‘danger’ as something 
precariously positive and not necessarily ‘life threatening.’ So, although Foucault 
appears to recognise the suspicion that Reagon is expressing in her misgivings of the 
dangers inherent in coalitional politics, he links distrust with hope: ‘And if you are 
suspicious, it is because you have a certain hope….and we don’t have to renounce 
our hope because we are suspicious, or renounce suspicion because we have hope’ 
(my emphasis).
534
 Thus, Foucault’s attitude of a sceptical criticism does not amount 
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to an inert pessimism, or fatalism, but rather to a hopefulness about the future.  
 
In Foucault’s aesthetic ethics, the creation of the self is always as an act of freedom 
and the language he uses to describe self-transformation is in terms of ‘pleasures’ 
and intentional ‘choosing,’ rather than ‘desire’ in the sense that Brown uses the term. 
Freedom is a practice in the sense of praxis and this needs to be retained. But I want 
now to return to Brown’s complaint against Foucault that he has tacitly assumed the 
givenness and resilience of the ‘desire’ for freedom and that this arises through his 
implicit conflation of the will to power in the practice of resistance with a will to 
freedom. What is it that can motivate or thwart the ‘desire’ for freedom? In order to 
address this, I now turn to the second matter of concern to do with the presumption 
of the direction of telos.  
 
I wish to recall what I raised in Part One. Namely, that part of the problematic of 
identity politics is that such projects are premised on the shared experience of the 
injustice of oppression. As such, identity politics originate from within a negative 
experience – that of the injustice of oppression. If injustice is a felt and personal 
experience then in order for any account of transformation at the level of the self to 
be useful, it must offer a consideration of the effects of the felt experience of the 
injustice of oppression. Brown’s account of ressentiment warns of the dangers 
inherent in not attending to the dynamics at work in identity politics thereof. Recall 
from Chapter Three that, according to Brown, ‘desire’ appears to be constituted 
through wounding and therefore, I argued that there is no ‘desire’ available to be 
recovered prior to wounding. Rather, ‘desire’ will need to be rehabilitated from 
within the wounding. I suggested that ‘desire’ would need to be approached in a way 
that is reminiscent of Aristotle’s orexis (‘desire’), where ‘desire’ is conceived of as 
tied to the emotions and is a constituent cause of motion. Recall too that in Aristotle, 
orexis is guided by right reason and it is these together which motivate the agent to 
act. I now move in the following section to draw on some of Iris Murdoch’s  picture 
of the self in order to begin to develop an account of how the ‘memory’ of ‘desire’ 
can be rehabilitated from within identificatory processes and not prior to its 
wounding.   
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The ethical self and ressentiment 
Like Foucault, Murdoch does not support the metaphysical notion of a substantive 
self and in her exploration of the notion of subjectivity, she similarly turns to ancient 
Greece. She too, maintains that an aesthetic relation is of central ethical importance 
to any conception of the self. She shares also with Foucault a concern with the 
transformation of the self. Whereas in Foucault’s aesthetic ethics, the creation of the 
self is always as an act of freedom and the language he uses employs the terms 
‘pleasures’ and ‘chooses’ to describe self-creation and self-transformation, Murdoch 
however, focusses on our human frailties. She describes the frail and vulnerable 
individual as so: 
 
artists are human individuals, no work is perfect, though our hearts may claim 
perfection for some. The material of art is contingent limited historically 
stained stuff. Nevertheless art is a great source of revelation. Bad art displays 
the base aspects of human nature more clearly than anything else, though of 
course not so harmfully. One might even say that the exemplification of human 





Similar to Foucault for whom the self was to be created, or transformed, for 
Murdoch the self, or as she writes, our fantasy of who we are, and of how we move 
about in the world, obstructs clear vision, and it is for this reason that the self is to be 
transformed. Murdoch maintains that transformation of the self is necessary, not for 
the reason that some pre-existing ‘true’ self could be uncovered, or discovered. 
Rather, transformation is necessary in order to free the individual of the tendency to 
self-centredness. It is only once transformed that the individual might live more 
freely. For Murdoch, an ‘aesthetics of existence’ is being able to truly see reality, in 
order to be able to live in it, in all our activities, and with others: ‘[the] same virtues, 
in the end the same virtue (love), are required throughout, and fantasy (self) can 
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For Foucault, the defining aesthetic of an ethics of praxis is that it allows for an 
other life - different from the one to which we are subjected - and fortified by the 
attitudes of ‘refusal, curiosity, innovation’ that challenge the illusions built into 
social convention. Murdoch likewise holds that it is important to live consciously 
and this necessitates the cultivation of attention to the world in all its contingent 
dynamics, and to the self in that world, cultivating a relationship to the good and an 
attitude of love.  
‘Desire’ as motivating energy 
I now move to show how Murdoch can helpfully be drawn on to address the 
problematic of the wounding scene of identity politics. Recall that politicised 
identity moves within the constraints of liberalism. Therefore, if the transformative 
elements of identity politics are to be developed, it is necessary to understand the 
constitution of ‘desire.’ Brown identifies the primary question of identity politics as 
being about a ‘desire’ that is born both in and through pain. Brown argues that 
Foucault’s ethical project, because it posits ‘freedom as a practice,’ suffers from a 
neglect of the issue of the direction of ‘desire.’ How is it that the subject born in and 
through pain inevitably ‘desires’ freedom? Does this pain not carry the danger of 
thwarting the ‘will to freedom’? And if it does, how do we go about ameliorating the 
desire that thwarts freedom? What sort of dispositions should be cultivated here in 
order to heal thwarted ‘desire’?  
 
Murdoch equates ‘desire’ with eros, which is to be understood as a kind of basic 
motivating energy that can either direct the life of an individual positively or 
negatively. Understanding ‘desire’ as a primary, base motivator, is not unlike some 
feminist understandings of the term. Tomm, in her ‘Ethics and Self-knowing: The 
Satisfaction of Desire’ writes similarly of ‘desire’ as ‘the basic motivator or social 
action’ and that ‘individual agency is shaped by each person’s desire(s).’
537
 And 
furthermore, that ‘desire is the instigator of all ethical conduct.’
538
 Lourde similarly, 
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in her essay ‘Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,’ refers to eros as deeply felt 
love, desire and passion, as the ‘yes within ourselves, our deepest cravings’ and the 
‘capacity for joy.’
539
 According to Lourdes’ account, eros is what gives our lives 
meaning and establishes an evaluative standard. Eros serves as a guide to choice-
making; it is what yields knowledge of what gives our lives meaning and is 
empowering for how it inspires us.
540
   
 
But what Tomm and Lourdes both overlook is the more problematic side of ‘desire.’ 
They view eros as only the well of potentially positive motivation for ethical 
conduct. They do not consider the possibility that ‘desire’ might be formed and 
malformed through a primary ‘injury.’ For them ‘desire’ is a resource that exists 
outside of a situated subjectivity. By positing ‘desire’ as a resource, they preclude an 
exploration of the transformation, or in Murdoch’s words, the ‘purification’ of 





Murdoch views ‘desire’ as tied to Freud’s ‘fat relentless ego,’
542
 and therefore, 
argues that far from being an unproblematic resource, it holds the potential to either 
‘make or mar the life of the individual’: 
 
Plato uses this concept of energy [Eros] to explain the nature of moral 
change. (As in Freud, ‘cure’ lies in redeployment of energy.) He 
essentially accompanies the image of energy (magnetic attraction) by 
that of light and vision. The sun gives warmth and vital forces, and also 
the light by which we can see. We must transform base egoistic energy 




Moral change, the transformation of the ‘low Eros’ into ‘high Eros,’ happens 
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gradually and slowly. That is, a shift in focus is brought about slowly, away from the 
ego, which tends towards simplification, invention, and preconceived expectation 
and towards ‘high Eros,’ which seeks to understand. It is ‘low Eros’ I am suggesting 
that is Brown’s ‘who am I?,’ - that unproductive positioning of the self trapped in its 
quest to find the answer to ‘who am I?.’ ‘High Eros’, on the other hand, is the self 
involved with the world in a quest to answer ‘what do I want for us?’  
 
In the latter positioning of the ego, Murdoch argues that it is ‘vision’ that assists in 
the transformation of ‘low Eros’ into ‘high Eros.’ Where Kant argues, and much 
modern moral and political theory follows, that it is the will that simply springs into 
action (‘the sudden call of duty’) when  necessary, Murdoch, following Plato, uses a 
more realistic concept of ‘moral spiritual desire’ in which ‘a slow shift of 
attachments wherein looking (concentrating, attending, attentive discipline) is a 
source of divine (purified) energy.’
544
 ‘Desire’ is to be understood in Murdoch in the 
terms of motivation. But, having brought in the problem of egoism, rather than 
identifying the problem of the ego with the will, Murdoch instead locates it in ‘the 
image-making’ consciousness.
545
 Thus, the most basic moral problem becomes one 
of the development of clear vision and clear vision necessitates recognising and 
dealing with ressentiment since it acts as an obstruction to clear vision. 
Purified ‘Desire’: Vision 
‘Vision,’ according to Murdoch, is a form of knowledge (or ‘belief’), and contains 
within it the ‘desire’ that motivates the will in moral action, rather than the other way 
around, which is how feminists like Lourdes and Tomm appear to understand it. In 
Murdoch, the will does not, as in Kant, ‘spring’ into action, but rather is always 
conditioned by the limits of ‘vision’ or knowledge. Therefore, rather than being 
detached, the will is embedded in a complex consciousness and is always a direct 
function of ‘moral vision.’ Murdoch puts it this way: ‘I can only choose within a 
world that I can see.’
546
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‘Vision’ is the complex apprehension of ourselves in and of the world and is 
irreducible to a mere surveying of the facts.  In a manner similar to Foucault, 
Murdoch posits an individual’s choices as a function of, not only the will, but also 
knowledge and vision. Unlike Foucault though, Murdoch argues that both 
knowledge and vision include the quality of perception and states of mind, which 
begs the further, or primary, question of what the quality of our motivation is.  
 
In Murdoch, moral language does not amount to a practical indication of an 
individual’s choice, but has the function of an instrument of an individual’s unique 
perception of the world. This idea Murdoch develops in the well-known example of 
the mother ‘M’ and her daughter-in-law, ‘D.’ In the story of ‘M’ and ‘D,’ Murdoch 
provides an example of concrete moral deliberation that serves to critique 
behaviourism. In the example she describes a situation in which an individual’s 
feelings remain inward, privately hidden from any observer. I quote at length here: 
 
A mother, whom I shall call M feels hostility to her daughter-in-law, 
whom I shall call D. M finds D quite a good-hearted girl, but while not 
exactly common, yet certainly unpolished and lacking in dignity and 
refinement. D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently 
ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely 
juvenile. M does not like D’s accent or the way D dresses. M feels that 
her son has married beneath him. Let us assume for purposes of the 
example that the mother, who is a very ‘correct’ person, behaves 
beautifully to the girl throughout, not allowing her real opinion to appear 
in any way. We might underline this aspect of the example by supposing 
that the young couple have emigrated or that D is now dead: the point 
being to ensure that whatever is in question as happening happens 




This passage shows Murdoch introducing her notion of vision. What is described is 
something going on ‘entirely in M’s mind,’ and in the following passage Murdoch 
demonstrates how the mental image M holds of D has nothing to do with M’s actions 
towards D: 
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Time passes and it could be that M settles down with a hardened sense of 
grievance and a fixed picture of D, imprisoned (if I may use a question-
begging word) by the cliché: my poor son has married a silly vulgar girl. 
However, the M of the example is an intelligent and well-intentioned 
person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just 
attention to an object which confronts her. M tells herself: ‘I am old-
fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I 




The individual is associated with the language of vision: 
 
….is not the metaphor of vision almost irresistibly suggested to anyone 
who, without philosophical prejudice, wishes to describe the situation? Is 
it not the natural metaphor? M looks at D, she attends to D, she focuses 
her attention. M is engaged in an internal struggle. She may for instance 




In Murdoch’s example, M’s morality exists ‘not simply in her moving will but in her 
seeing and knowing mind.’
550
 Moral activity is not only outward  action, but actually 
precedes the outward action, having taken place in the mind and in fact, is 
continuous, never actually finalised. It is this contrast between the activity of moral 
vision and the activity of the will that is crucial in Murdoch. Murdoch decentres the 
emphasis on choice to the ‘complex of intellect, vision and imagination,’
551
 which is 
the background of the choices made by the moral agent.  
 
Murdoch argues that it will then require an ‘elaborate normative vocabulary’ that is 
sufficient to developing a moral vision; choice-guiding words will not suffice.
552
 In 
Murdoch’s example, it is moral language that becomes an instrument of knowledge – 
of the agent and her world – and this moral vocabulary is not determined by a public 
context on which all individuals can agree. Rather it is something that develops 
privately.  
 
How does Murdoch’s agent hold a right and truthful vision in which ‘desire’ has 
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been purified of ego (and the dangerous trap of ‘suffering’)? According to Murdoch’s 
account the agent’s attention must be focussed on the good. Murdoch writes that ‘I 
would suggest that the authority of the Good seems to us something necessary 
because the realism (ability to perceive the world and one’s place in it) required for 
goodness is a kind of intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is 
automatically at the same time a suppression of the self.’
553
  By centring the notion 
of ‘attention’ Murdoch construes the ‘good’ as ‘needful’ in the sense that the agent’s 
inner work is undertaken for the world outside of which the self is a part of. 




Just as for Foucault the self is to be created, for Murdoch the self-centred self and 
how we function in and on the world, is the obstacle to clear vision, and must be 
‘purified.’ The purification of ‘desire’ is a labour-intensive project, which is 
undertaken, not for the reason Foucault feared of ethical theories - for the purpose of 
some pre-existing ‘true’ self that would be recovered or discovered - but for the 
reason that, freed of the unhelpful baggage of self-centredness, one would now be 
able to live more freely, more able to see and connect with reality. That is, it is only 
possible to live a better life, without the identity-obsession of defining who one is. 
For Murdoch, the ‘aesthetics of existence’ means being able to truly see reality, in 
order to be able to live in it, in all our activities, and with others.  
 
To conclude, for Murdoch the ‘good’ serves to unify experience. The self does not 
move about in a world of ‘facts’ free to choose how to evaluate these. Rather, 
Murdoch points to the evaluative aspect that is inherent in all thinking. Valuing, as 
her ‘M’ and ‘D’ example illustrates, is not merely one possible kind of cognitive 
activity among many that the agent freely chooses from. Rather, valuing is what 
belies all cognitive activities. The agent does not choose what to value and when to 
value it, for she is always already valuing. Therefore, the question for the agent is – 
how can I make myself better? Murdoch poses this question not only as a matter of 
how can I treat you better, but also in the sense of Foucault’s ‘needful bodies.’ That 
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is, how can I heal myself? Murdoch’s answer is by focussing on the ‘good’: 
 
Good is unique, it is ‘above being,’ it fosters our sense of reality as the 
sun fosters life on earth. The virtues, the other moral forms, are aspects 





The ‘good’ is not a thing, moving out there in the world. It is not a resource and 
therefore, there is no clear way of exactly encountering it. It is for this reason that 
Murdoch argues that our vision is what we must improve. Cultivating our vision so 
that we can see others is the most important task and requires an inward turn.  
Conclusion 
This chapter explored in detail Foucault’s study of the Greek and Greco-Roman 
practices of the self as elaborated in his third volume of The History of Sexuality, 
paying careful attention to the elaboration of ethics as a praxis of ‘care of the self.’ I 
looked at the problematic of alterity in Foucault’s ethics through a critique of the 
most common criticisms of Foucault’s later work on ethics which accuse him of 
radical individualism. I argued that a careful reading of the Histories of Sexuality 
reveals that Foucault’s account of the ‘care of the self’ is in fact dependent on 
friendship and in such a way that a non-reductive relation to others is what is 
cultivated and maintained. The turn inwards is not a negation or a repudiation of 
others, but is dependent upon them. Furthermore, it is here in the project of care of 
the self that the issue of ‘perspectival knowledge’ is addressed.  
 
Whereas I argued that critiques of Foucault’s ethics as ‘care of the self’ that view it 
as radically individualistic are misplaced, the next section revisits Brown’s critique 
of ressentiment to argue that although Foucault does not neglect this problem, it 
could be more detailed. Therefore, I drew on some of Murdoch’s work to show how 
we might develop the necessary rehabilitative work in a way that approaches it from 
within the wounding. Murdoch’s picture of the inner life of the self is motivated by 
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‘desire’ and it is through developing clear ‘vision’ that ‘desire’ is purified.  
 
Both Foucault and Murdoch have been shown to counter those approaches to ethics 
which are most familiar. Rather than ethics as a matter of following a moral 
principle, their work guides us through the complexities of alterity and identity. 
Foucault delineates the hard work that is to be undertaken in the face of alterity. 
Murdoch does not turn away from how the fragility of the self may obstruct the 
clarity of vision that is necessary to see the other clearly. Murdoch insists that what is 
required is an ‘elaborate normative vocabulary’ sufficient to the task of developing a 
‘moral vision;’ choice-guiding words are not sufficient for the complex task. Her 
suggestion is that virtue ethics provides the ‘vocabulary’ that we are looking for. 
Foucault does not shy away from virtue ethics. Indeed for him, recall that virtue is 
counter to those moral systems of regulation and order. He seems to posit virtue 
itself as located in the resisting of the established order of things. He writes that 
‘there is something in critique that is akin to virtue’ and a ‘critical attitude [is] virtue 
in general.’ This sounds very much like Butler, who, recall from Chapter Three, 
situates herself in the same ethical tradition and indeed suggests that Foucault’s 
project of ‘self-transformation understood as a ‘practice of liberty,’ is to be 
understood as part of Foucault’s lexicon of virtue.’
556
 In Section Three I follow these 
converging threads and undertake the task of developing virtue ethics as an 
‘elaborate normative vocabulary’ to see how it is able to guide us through the 
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6 
Virtue ethics and feminism: Okin, Tessman and 
Nussbaum 
Introduction   
The main aim of the chapters of Part Three is to show how virtue ethics offers an 
elaborate normative vocabulary that allows for an original and productive way to 
think about the issues raised in feminist identity politics. Virtue ethics, is a type of 
ethics that works against the unrealistic and often unproductive search for universal 
rules. By undertaking the more challenging and dynamic task of asking how ‘I can 
be better,’ virtue ethics holds the aim of developing a contextualised understanding 
of the self in relation to the good.  This is a dynamic task that entails the 
development of practical judgment in order to formulate answers to the issues of 
what it means to live well as an individual or a group in a specific time or place.  
 
Despite the fact that many feminists share with virtue ethics the same dissatisfaction 
with the abstract, rule-bound, ambitious projects of deontological and 
consequentialist based ethical theory, there has been little interest in virtue ethics 
from feminists. Therefore, in this chapter I address some of the key concerns that 
feminists have expressed about an engagement with virtue ethics and I also look at 
feminist versions of virtue ethics. In particular, I look at Susan Moller Okin’s 
influential critique of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Alasdair MacIntyre’s neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics. I then look at two possible directions for feminism to take 
virtue ethics forward through the recent work of both Lisa Tessman and Martha 
Nussbaum.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section begins by addressing some of 
the key concerns that feminists have expressed about an engagement with virtue 
ethics. Okin’s critique is illustrative of some of the main objections that feminists 
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have raised about the possibility of a feminist engagement with virtue ethics. By 
offering a close reading of Okin’s main concerns, I seek to assess and address these. 
The following section then looks at one possible direction for feminism to take virtue 
ethics forward offered by the recent work of the moral philosopher, Tessman. The 
final section moves to look at Nussbaum’s well-known capabilities approach, which 
is a version of virtue ethics applied to political theory. Although both Tessman’s and 
Nussbaum’s approaches are compelling and have a number of strengths, I ultimately 
reject them as unsuitable for the purposes of a project that is concerned with the 
issue of forging and sustaining collective political projects across difference.   
A feminist critique of Aristotelian virtue ethics: Susan Moller 
Okin 
Feminists, like Okin, express extreme scepticism over the potential of virtue ethics to 
address key feminist concerns to do with ‘equal concern and respect for all human 
beings.’
557
 By way of a brief summary of the main points of Okin’s argument in 
‘Feminism, Moral Development, and the Virtues’: Okin sizes up virtue ethics from a 
‘feminist point of view,’ by which she means, from the ‘perspective that expects 
women and men to be treated as equally human and due equal concern and 
respect.’
558
 She focusses her critique on one of the earliest accounts of virtue ethics 
(i.e. Aristotle’s) and one of the most recent (i.e. MacIntyre’s).
559
 She firstly, looks at 
whether Aristotle and MacIntyre’s accounts of virtue ethics fail, or succeed, in 
meeting the feminist concern with ‘equal concern and respect.’ Finding that they 
both fail here, she sets about on an exploration to find out where they have gone 
wrong. Given their acceptance of the belief that women are not capable of achieving 
human ‘virtue,’ Okin locates their failure primarily in their accounts of early moral 
education. In the end, she turns to look at some feminist claims that there is in virtue 
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ethics something especially feminine and perhaps even feminist. I now turn to 
address her argument in detail.  
Okin’s critique of Aristotle’s virtue ethics 
In Aristotle, what Okin finds particularly problematic is that his account of the 
virtues is one that is specifically given for the free and educated males of Athenian 
society. From here, she argues that Aristotle’s political and ethical arguments depend 
upon the exclusion of women, slaves and manual labourers. Aristotle treats both 
women and slaves instrumentally in order to liberate men of the day to day running 
of the household, which serves to allow men to practice those virtues that lead to 
eudaimonia, or human flourishing.  
 
Okin supports this claim by pointing out that in Aristotle’s Politics, his two versions 
of Ethics, and the Rhetoric, when taken in light of his Generation of Animals, it is 
obvious that Aristotle ‘clearly assumes women’s inferiority’  and that he views 
women as a ‘deformity of nature.’
560
 Noting that other feminists, sharing the same 
concern (of the equality and flourishing of women) conclude that it is possible to 
make use of Aristotle by dismissing or ignoring his ‘misogynist and silly’ account of 
women’s biology, Okin remains unconvinced.
561
 She insists that in order to 
determine whether Aristotle’s work has the potential to be non-sexist, his account of 
the virtues must be closely examined.  
 
Although Okin correctly accuses Aristotle of treating women and slaves 
instrumentally, it seems to me that the more worrying question is whether or not in 
an Aristotelian-derived virtue ethics some people (like women) must be treated 
instrumentally in order for others to achieve/live a flourishing life. If the answer to 
this question is yes, then any form of virtue ethics cannot be of any further use to 
feminism or any other emancipatory political project. I will argue that the answer is 
not affirmative, but that Okin, in exploring her own answer to this question, makes 
this possible and viable. Okin’s main concerns lie not with virtue ethics per se, but 
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with a completely unrevised Aristotelian virtue ethics. That is, if virtue ethics is 
taken to be simply a list of virtues that is unchangeable. In Chapter Seven I will put 
forward the argument for a pluralistic conception of virtue ethics more fully, but for 
now, I simply would like to suggest that it is not necessary to take virtue ethics as a 
wholesale acceptance of the original list of virtues as presented by Aristotle. In fact, 
Okin’s own accusations, of Aristotle’s instrumental treatment of women and slaves, 
makes this impossible.  
 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics opens with defining the notion of virtue to be 
presented as ‘human virtue’ by which is meant ‘not that of the body but that of the 
soul.’
562
 The ‘vegetative’ element of the soul is that which ‘causes nutrition and 
growth’ since it exists in ‘all nurslings and embryos’,
563
 as well as appearing to 
function most in sleep; he concludes that it has no place in human excellence. Okin 
surmises that this leaves one with a picture of human ‘beings whose nutrition and 
growth is affected through the power of the most passive and least human part of 
their souls.’
564
 The individual seems to pass from embryo into adulthood alone, with 
no help from anyone else. Okin rightly points out that survival and well-being, from 
embryo to adulthood, is only possible with the care of women and/or slaves. She 
therefore concludes that there is a contradiction at work in Aristotle’s logic. Yet, I do 
not think at this point Aristotle is in any way contradicting himself or his definition 
of what qualifies as a ‘human virtue.’ What he is doing is making a distinction of 
what it is that distinguishes humans from animals. Animals would also not survive 
from embryo to adulthood without being looked after. It may offend our feminist and 
more modern sensibilities to see this, but it seems to me that the more important 
point that Okin could have made here would have been in relation to the ‘looking 
after’ of the human prior to adulthood and whether or not that task, which Aristotle 
categorises as a ‘function’ is not actually more akin to a skill. The problem is in not 
recognising the presence of virtue in the looking after.  
 
Having factored out all to do with the ‘nutritive’ and ‘growth,’ Aristotle then goes on 
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to discuss human virtue. This he divides into moral and intellectual virtue: 
‘intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for 
which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a 
result of habit.’
565
 The moral virtues do not arise by nature, but rather they are 
something habituated and made perfect through habit. They are learned by doing 
them. Moral virtues are neither passions nor faculties, but rather ‘states of character.’ 
Specific virtues are then listed and discussed by Aristotle at length. They include: 
courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, pride, good temper, friendliness, 
truthfulness, wit and justice. Here we can see that Okin is not wrong in pointing out 
that, even without reading the Politics and Biology, Aristotle’s list of virtues in NE 
are meant to apply to free male heads of household. I certainly do not disagree with 
Okin on these points. She is correct that Aristotle’s list of the virtues is androcentric 
and that a wholesale acceptance of Aristotle’s virtue ethics unrevised, virtue by 
virtue, is not conducive to the aims of feminism. This, she convincingly illustrates in 
her critique of MacIntyre’s appropriation of Aristotle, which I now turn to look at in 
order to clarify what it is about Aristotelian virtue ethics I do not take on board in the 
version of virtue ethics I will later work with. 
Okin’s critique of MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics 
Okin’s main concern with MacIntyre’s appeal to Aristotelian theory of the virtues is 
his failure to address adequately the social hierarchy and domination inherent in the 
Aristotelian tradition. In particular, she takes issue with MacIntyre’s lack of 
accommodation for the changed and changing status of women. She finds 
objectionable the ‘pervasive elitism of MacIntyre’s defence of the traditions, and its 
equally pervasive sexism.’
566
 Before I look at Okin’s critique of MacIntyre, I offer a 
summary of some of the salient points of After Virtue: a study in moral theory.
567
   
 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue is a critique of ethical life in contemporary liberal capitalist 
societies. According to MacIntyre, modern moral philosophy lacks credibility 
because it has jettisoned the ideas of a human telos or purpose and, founded upon 
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this, justice as a shared conception of social order. This has resulted in philosophers 
floundering in their attempts to come up with procedures with which to adjudicate 
between the competing claims of individuals who hold interests and values assumed 
to be unrelated to those of others. Adding to this lack of foundations, modern 
philosophers make claims to (varied, often incommensurable) universal values whilst 
neglecting context. The past is plundered in order to strengthen universalist claims, 
yet no homage is paid to the social and political context within which those theorists 
drawn on were acting:  
 
We all too often still treat the moral philosophers of the past as 
contributors to a single debate with a relatively unvarying subject-matter, 
treating Plato and Hume and Mill as contemporaries both of ourselves 
and of each other. This leads to an abstraction of these writers from the 
cultural and social milieus in which they lived and thought and so history 
of their thought acquires a false independence from the rest of the 





Devoid of a notion of telos, or attention to context, ethics is simply empty, and moral 
claims become incoherent. In order to correct this, MacIntyre surveys those 
conceptions of virtue at work through Western moral philosophy. This is a project he 
undertakes  in an effort to demonstrate how it is not possible to make sense of them 
until sense can be made of the ‘practices,’ contextualised in the particular place and 
time from which they originate. 
 
Turning to Aristotle, MacIntyre rejects his metaphysical biology, acknowledging that 
Aristotle’s social theory is ‘deformed by his beliefs about women and about the 
nature of slaves.’
569
 He replaces Aristotle’s metaphysical biology,
570
 which holds 
that the human telos originates out of the human faculty to reason, with an emphasis 
on traditions and their practices.
571
 MacIntyre defines a practice as ‘any coherent and 
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complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, 
that form of activity.’
572
 Practices are activities whose ends are internal to them. 
Human virtues, according to MacIntyre, are those ‘acquired’ qualities that are 
necessary in order for us to achieve ‘the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.’
573
 MacIntyre offers 
illustrative examples of what sorts of activities exactly qualify as ‘practices’ (as he 
has defined practice). Tic-tac-toe, for example, is not a practice, nor is throwing a 
football with skill. Chess and the game of football, on the other hand, both qualify as 





Okin’s main issue with MacIntyre is with his characterisation of family life as a 
practice. Okin views the characterisation of ‘making and sustaining of family’ as a 
practice as problematic on the basis that family life, unlike playing chess well or 
football well, is not an elective activity, but one that is essential to human flourishing 
per se. Without ‘family life’ there would just plainly not be anyone to live the ‘good 
life.’ Secondly, the configuration of ‘family life’ has always made it difficult, if not 
impossible for women to live the ‘good life,’ at least as defined by Aristotle’s list of 
virtues. Okin argues that family life, in particular, requires more ethical scrutiny than 
other practices, such as chess playing, or football games, which are less necessary to 
human flourishing and certainly less necessary to the lives of women.  
 
Rather than addressing this issue though, MacIntyre actually denies that family life 
has even been a ‘practice’ since the eighteenth century. Once production was moved 
out of the household and into the marketplace, MacIntyre argues that the home no 
longer can be viewed as belonging to the ‘realm of practices with goods internal to 
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Although MacIntyre does not explicitly discuss women in After Virtue,
576
 in 
discussing the issue of the transferal of production from the household to the 
marketplace, he remarks that women’s domestic labour as a ‘practice’ was 
destroyed.
577
 Women’s sphere, he notes, became reduced to that of childrearing and 
‘keeping house’: 
 
It is finally in the eighteenth century, when production has moved 
outside the household, that women no longer for the most part do work 
not very different in kind or work-relationship from that of men, but are 
instead divided into two classes: a small group of leisured women with 
no work to fill the day and for whom occupations have to be invented – 
fine needlework, the reading of bad novels and organised opportunities 
for gossip, which are then thought of by both men and women as 
‘essentially feminine’ – and a huge group of women condemned to the 





According to MacIntyre’s criteria for what qualifies as a ‘practice,’ once this shift 
occurs, women’s opportunities for realizing the various goods of self-development 
become greatly diminished. Thus, Okin concludes that MacIntyre, by other means, 
has effectively confined women to the same role as Aristotle confined them. 
MacIntyre, like Aristotle, fails to recognise the increasing responsibility women have 
taken up in being the sole carers of children – physically, emotionally and 
intellectually. Okin points out that it appears that MacIntyre regards the work of pre-
industrial women, such as cheese and soap making and raising cattle, as having 
given women more opportunity to exercise virtue than is available to women in the 
home today. To deal with the issues of the ‘nutritive’ and ‘growth’ has nothing to do 
with human virtue. So, although MacIntyre has bracketed out Aristotelian biology, 
he does not offer a version of virtue ethics that successfully addresses the key 
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Okin concludes her critique of virtue ethics in general with the suggestion that what 
is needed is a ‘specifically feminist account of the virtues’ and that any ‘list’ of 
human virtues needs to include ‘the qualities needed to nurture, to take care of those 
who cannot take care of themselves, and to raise children to an adulthood in which 
they can both flourish as virtuous citizens and enable others so to flourish.’
580
 
According to Okin, it is likely that this may not be an exercise of simply adding to a 





It is clear from Okin’s critique of MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical account 
that his is a virtue ethics little suited to feminism. I do not disagree with Okin on this 
point. Yet, I maintain that Okin is not rejecting virtue ethics per se, but rather 
pointing out the perils of an unrevised Aristotelian virtue ethics. I do not disagree 
that if we simply take a list of virtues and a specific way of life along with its 
specific history that all that we are likely to find is a reflection of very local 
traditions and values tied to specific forms of life that may not be conducive to our 
(contemporary) notions of equality and respect. Indeed, MacIntyre himself makes 
this very point. It seems very unlikely that there could ever be list of virtues that 
could serve as normative for all of us at all times. For someone like Okin, who thinks 
this way, and I add myself here, it is understandable to view Aristotle’s list of the 
virtues as restrictive and nothing more than a picture of one particular society’s view 
of ‘salience and ways of distinguishing.’
582
 But I want to ask if Okin has it quite 
right, or if she has missed something. Is this a correct reading of what Aristotle is 
really doing in the Nichomachean Ethics? Can it be read another way? I want to 
suggest that critiques like those of Okin’s have not fully appreciated what Aristotle is 
doing and that what Okin is suggesting needs to be done is actually what Aristotle is 
doing. I hope to show both where Okin goes wrong and where she is right, neither of 
                                                 
579
 Okin, ‘Feminism, Moral Development, and the Virtues,’ 211. 
580
 Okin, ‘Feminism, Moral Development, and the Virtues,’ 227-29. 
581
 Okin, ‘Feminism, Moral Development, and the Virtues,’ 229. 
582
 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,’ MidWest Studies in 
Philosophy, XIII (1988), 34.  
 
 186  Chapter Six
 
which necessitates a turn away from virtue ethics.  
The ‘non-relative virtues’ account 
Nussbaum suggests that if we look more closely at how Aristotle details and 
individuates the virtues, it becomes apparent that he is not simply listing all of those 
virtues that are most admirable in his society.
583
  Rather what we find is that a 
number of virtues and vices are simply not named. Of those that are named, a good 
many are unsatisfactorily named: ‘Most of these are nameless, but we must try…to 
give them names in order to make our account clear and easy to follow.’
584
 
Nussbaum argues that this is hardly indicative of someone undertaking merely a 
study of local traditions in order to extricate a list of the virtues reflective of those 
traditions. Nussbaum suggests that the key to understanding what Aristotle is doing 
lies in the way he introduces his list of virtues, and it is this that she suggests has 
escaped the notice of most writers on the topic, and I include here Okin.  
 
Nussbaum interprets Aristotle as in fact, in each case, to be isolating a specific 
sphere of human experience that is present in nearly every human life and 
furthermore, a sphere within which any human must make some choices over other 
choices, and act in some manner as opposed to some other manner.
585
 Indeed, 
Nussbaum points out that in ‘Book II: Moral Virtue,’
586
 in which Aristotle 
enumerates virtue and vice, he begins with an enumeration of the spheres in which 
choice takes place. From here Aristotle goes on to pose the following questions: 
What is it to choose and respond well within sphere X? What is it to choose and 
respond defectively in sphere X? This leads Aristotle to develop what Nussbaum 
terms a ‘thin account’ of the virtues.
587
 That is, Aristotle gives an account of each 
virtue and what it is to appropriately respond in that particular sphere. There are 
multiple and differing possibilities of what acting appropriately (and well) is in each 
case. Aristotle then goes on to develop a ‘thick account’ of the virtues by giving a 
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concrete defence in each case.  
 
Nussbaum extricates a number of spheres of experience that Aristotle enumerates. 
These spheres include: fear of death, or bodily injury; the appetites and their 
pleasures; the just distribution of limited resources; personal property; self-respect; 
community living; care for others; intellectual life; and the planning of one’s own 
life.
588
 Each sphere holds a corresponding set of virtues and vices. These spheres of 
universal experience and choice form the starting point for Aristotle’s ethics and are 
the basis of the enumeration of virtues and vices. The main point, according to 
Nussbaum, is that there are choices that everyone must make in these spheres. That 
is, we all have some attitude to our own death, towards ourselves, towards others, 
etc. As long as we are living a human life, we cannot escape these questions. The 
virtue or vice term in each case is determined by the sphere of experience to which it 
is attached.  
 
Enumeration of the virtues is fixed within the spheres of choice, which are 
necessarily both connected to and limited by our shared condition of human 
existence. The issue of virtue arises within the context of choice, which is both 
unavoidable and inescapably problematic. Thus, Nussbaum summarises that there 
are two stages in Aristotle’s approach. First, there is the delineation of the sphere of 
choice that serves to fix the virtue term. Second, there is the unfolding enquiry into 
what the appropriate choice in that particular sphere is. This latter enumeration is 
always revisable. But is the former revisable? This is what Okin wants to know and I 
take this to be her criticism of both MacIntyre and Aristotle. If the former, spheres of 
experience (choice) are revisable, then I think that Okin could accept the usefulness 
of virtue ethical approaches. Nussbaum does not address this question for the reason 




Although modern day virtue ethics is still in its infancy, since Okin’s 1996 critique, 
there has developed a broad base of work and approaches to virtue ethics. In the next 
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section, I look at Tessman’s revised virtue ethical account that appears to offer a 
picture of virtue ethics interpreted in a manner not dissimilar to Nussbaum’s 
interpretation.   
Lisa Tessman’s revised eudaimonistic virtue ethics account 
Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles is an attempt to 
rethink eudaimonistic virtue ethics in light of conditions of oppression.
590
 Tessman’s 
main premise is that ‘we’ live (in the West) in unjust societies. Those who live 
privileged lifestyles do so at the expense of various groups, including women, racial 
and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and people with disabilities. Tessman’s 
main aim is to examine the implications of this political and social landscape for 
eudaimonistic virtue ethics.  She raises questions to do with: How does a background 
of oppression and social injustice force us to rethink the virtues? What does it mean 
to be virtuous given a background condition of systemic injustice? What traits can be 
considered virtues? What is the relation between the virtues and flourishing? Is 
flourishing possible under conditions of oppression?  
 
Tessman’s approach is broadly Aristotelian in the sense that she adopts an 
Aristotelian approach and revises it from a feminist perspective. The conclusion that 
her revised virtue ethics comes to is one that is (self) avowedly pessimistic: 
 
Something very grim emerges when one tries to work with a 
eudaimonistic moral theory when examining oppression, for one centers 
(sic) the importance of flourishing and then confronts the terrible fact of 




Rethinking virtue ethics against the backdrop of actual political conditions, 
according to Tessman, reveals oppression to be even worse than has been previously 
acknowledged. Oppression, she argues, causes harm in more ways than is normally 
acknowledged in critiques of injustice and suffering.  
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Living under conditions of oppression leads to the experience of what she terms 
‘moral trouble.’
592
 ‘Moral trouble’ takes two forms: firstly, it is difficult to cultivate 
the virtues under adverse external conditions; and secondly, those traits that often 
have to be developed in order to undertake resistance in conditions of oppression are 
ones that can carry a heavy cost to the carrier. This latter set of virtues is what 
Tessman terms ‘burdened virtues.’
593
 They are virtues that are disjoined from the 
bearer’s own flourishing.  
 
It would seem that understanding ‘burdened virtues’ as virtues at all would be 
impossible, but in the final chapter Tessman considers and rejects this. She bases her 
rejection on the grounds that it is still necessary to have an account of what is 
possible vis-à-vis flourishing or moral goodness under actual conditions of 
oppression. In order to accomplish this maneuver, Tessman deviates from Aristotle, 
taking seriously a non-idealistic background picture (the condition of oppression), 
thereby reconfiguring the relationship between virtue and flourishing as contingent. 
That is, the ‘insufficiency of virtue for flourishing is often more salient than its 
necessity.’
594
 It is precisely here though that I identify the central problem of 
Tessman’s reworking of virtue ethics. Although she allows that the relationship 
between virtue and eudaimonia might sometimes be contingent, she still maintains 
an implicit definition of eudaimonia. 
 
In what follows, I concentrate my critique of Tessman’s virtue ethics account around 
the key issues raised in feminist identity politics. In so doing, I raise the following 
questions: What is the connection between virtue and flourishing (the good)? Can 
Tessman’s account deal with the issues raised by diversity feminists? Is the agent 
thought through as occupying multiple positions/identities?  
Coping with oppression: the ‘burdened virtues’ 
In order to take into account a background of oppression, within a eudaimonistic 
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virtue ethics, Tessman views it as necessary to emphasise the contingency between 
virtue and flourishing. Although Aristotle acknowledges that there can be cases 
when the relationship is contingent, he never considers the possibility that this 
relationship could be chronic. Yet, Tessman points out that under conditions of 
oppression, the relationship between virtue and flourishing is constantly disrupted.  
 
Adverse conditions, Tessman argues, can affect what qualifies as a virtue and, in the 
face of oppression, traits assessed as virtues are unlikely to be the same ones as those 
that are ‘good for the bearer.’
595
 Thus, many of the traits necessary for coping in 
adverse conditions under oppression are ‘burdened virtues,’ which are not virtues in 
the usual sense, for they are most often understood only counterfactually as 
virtues.
596
 That is, we can only understand ‘burdened virtues’ as virtues if we employ 
a ‘counterfactual’ situation in which conditions were better. If, in this way, it can be 
shown that the ‘burdened virtue’ could connect to the good life, then the burdened 
virtue plausibly maintains a connection to flourishing. Thus, Tessman maintains, 
instead of asking which traits succeed in connecting to a good life, traits that have 
the potential to be (partly) constitutive of the good life despite their ‘burden’ actually 




Two important issues arise here.  Firstly, we need to know how Tessman defines 
flourishing. And secondly, how does Tessman arrive at an account of the virtues? In 
regards to the issue of a definition of flourishing, Tessman offers what she calls an 
‘implicit’ account.
598
 She argues that it is not possible to flourish by accepting 
existing conditions (of oppression). Enduring and resisting are therefore, virtuous 
activities, but they are simultaneously harmful ones. Surprisingly she also claims that 
‘primarily people occupying dominant rather than subordinate positions of 
oppression should be understood as morally damaged.’
599
 Character traits that allow 
people in dominant positions to dominate are vices. The moral damage of oppression 
is so morally damaging that it extends across oppressors, oppressed and resisters. 
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That the extensiveness of oppression is often hidden, and the dominant are most 
often viewed as living the good life, Tessman argues, is only possible because the 
good life is conceived from a liberal picture of the individual as self-interested. 
Against this picture, Tessman takes Aristotle’s perspective on humans as inherently 
social and interdependent. She argues that ‘the pursuit of one’s own flourishing 
cannot qualify as morally praiseworthy (and what one attains cannot count as 
flourishing) unless one is engaged, as part of that pursuit, in promoting the 
flourishing of an inclusive social collectivity.’
600
 Tessman goes further than Aristotle 
to make the social collectivity inclusive.  
 
Tessman’s ‘implicit’ conception of flourishing and her refusal to delineate it more 
than this she views as differentiating her account from Nussbaum’s.
601
 Nussbaum’s 
account of flourishing, of which I will have more to say in the next section, 
delineates a comprehensive list of human functions and capabilities. Tessman objects 
to this approach on the basis that it is premised on a liberal conception of the 
individual as an autonomous chooser.
602
 Not only does Tessman object to this on the 
basis of an inclusive social collectivity, but also for the reason that it cannot account 
for the damage done to the ability of the agent to make choices about the good life 
under conditions of oppression. To this point, I agree with Tessman. 
 
Tessman’s critical revision of eudaimonistic virtue ethics and in particular, the 
category of ‘burdened virtues,’ raises the question as to how it is possible to identify 
the virtues under conditions that render the linkage between virtue and flourishing 
unreliable. That is, if the burdened virtues fail to enable the bearer to flourish, it 
seems unlikely that we could work backwards to delineate the virtues from a concept 
of flourishing. The burdened virtues thus imply that eudaimonia must be re-thought 
in some way that is contrary to one possible pattern of the connection between virtue 
and eudaimonia. Aristotle in fact does not derive the virtues from eudaimonia. To 
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the contrary, in Aristotle, eudaimonia is achieved in knowing (and exercising) the 
virtues: ‘human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence.’
603
 Thus, 
Aristotle does not argue from a prior notion of eudaimonia and work backwards to 
the virtues. Rather, the virtues fall into the definition of eudaimonia - not vice versa. 
From where does Aristotle derive the virtues then? Simply put, from common 
opinion (endoxa).  
 
Tessman points out that many contemporary virtue ethicists, unlike Aristotle, 
attempt to work from a conception of flourishing to an account of the virtues. This 
can only succeed though if virtue is both necessary and sufficient to flourishing. It 
can also work roughly even if virtue is not sufficient for flourishing, as long as, most 
of the time, conditions are conducive to flourishing. But since Tessman is assuming 
a background condition of oppression, she, of course, argues that ‘the necessary 
background conditions for flourishing tend not to obtain.’
604
 Nor can she begin with 
a conception of flourishing and move backwards to a list of virtues since she has 
already made it clear that the connection between virtue and eudaimonia is to be 
thought of as contingent. Thus, if there is not a consistent connection between 
flourishing and virtue, how does she propose that the virtues are to be determined?  
 
In answer to this question, Tessman distinguishes among four types of virtues, or 
‘hypothetical traits:’
605
 The first two sets (v1 and v2) are unburdended virtues that 
enjoy a non-contingent relation to eudaimonia. The latter is chosen when a better 
virtue is not available, but in its choosing, it is accompanied by the regret that some 
better virtue could not be exercised due to circumstances outside of the agent’s 
control. The latter two sets of virtues (v3 and v4) are burdened virtues of greater 
degrees, chosen under circumstances in which nothing else is possible. The burdened 
virtues are chosen because they are the ones that either allow the agent to endure or 
resist. Thus, they are chosen on the basis that they will (partially) lead to a good life. 
The v4 is only appropriately a virtue under conditions of oppression.  
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The virtues would then appear to be based on the social and political environment 
within which the agent is embedded. This in itself does not seem problematic, but 
given this framework it is still difficult to discern how we are to understand the 
account of eudaimonia (flourishing) that underlies Tessman’s view. She has already 
made it clear that, unlike Aristotle, she does not understand flourishing via an 
account of the virtues.
606
 Yet, she leaves open the possibility that we can in some 
sense understand the virtues via an account of flourishing. Certainly, she denies that 
we can identify the virtues associated with v3 and v4 by simply working backward 
from an account of flourishing. Nonetheless, it does appear as though a substantive 
concept of flourishing is being given a central role in her account of the virtues. In 
fact, it seems as if it is her account of flourishing that allows for the enumeration of 
which traits it is that ought to be considered virtues (as opposed to vices) and what 
kind of virtues these traits will be. If I am right, then it would seem that Tessman 
would articulate and defend a substantive account of flourishing.  
 
To the contrary though, she clarifies that she has no intention of arguing ‘for a 
conception of flourishing.’
607
 Rather, Tessman adopts what she describes as ‘a 
general conception of flourishing from what is implicit in the goals of liberatory 
movements (such as the feminist movements and movements for racial liberation) 
and use this conception of flourishing as a guide.’
608
 Tessman claims that her 
methodology does not require a particularised account of human flourishing. In 
explanation of this, she points out that ‘searching for the virtues suited for surviving 
and resisting oppression requires a specific account of human flourishing to a no-
greater extent than committing to any particular form of social or political change 
does.’
609
 She holds herself to be committed to the ideas implicit in human flourishing 
that are present in the goals of liberatory groups: ‘Those fighting oppression must 
already hold certain implicit beliefs about what a flourishing or good life is’ (my 
italics).
610
 Yet, if all those ‘fighting oppression’ rely on some notion of flourishing, 
why not articulate what that notion is? If this were even possible, it would seem to be 
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a very difficult task. If liberatory political groups do indeed have ‘implicit’ notions 
of flourishing at all, it would seem that such conceptions would often diverge from 
one another. For example, the notions of flourishing implicit in the political goals of 
feminists who identify either as liberal feminists, or radical feminists, or diversity 
feminists, or socialist feminists are all clearly very divergent. Given that distinct 
accounts of flourishing are present in varying liberatory movements, it is remarkable 
that Tessman has not articulated, at the very least, the main tenets of the conception 
of flourishing she is implicitly working with.  
 
It is perhaps this failure to articulate a specific account of human flourishing that 
explains why it then becomes difficult to determine which character traits ought to 
be considered virtues and which ones ought to be considered vices. At one point, 
Tessman lists as vices ‘cruelty, indifference, contempt, and arrogance.’
611
 Yet, 
according to her own classification of the virtues, it is not at all clear that these traits 
should be listed as vices. Instead it would appear under her system of classification 
that all of the ‘putative vices’ would rather be classified as burdened virtues. In fact, 
it would seem that almost any trait could be classified as a v3 or v4 trait.  
 
I do not think that Tessman is wrong to insist that resisters (activists) hold implicit 
beliefs about flourishing and the good life. But what she does not address is what 
happens to virtue and flourishing and the connection between the two when agents 
who hold different implicit accounts of flourishing come together to try to work out 
a shared project. This is after all, the dilemma of a good amount of work in feminist 
identity politics projects. What are the virtues in these circumstances? What is the 
connection between virtue and flourishing in these sorts of circumstances? And this 
brings me to a further and related problematic issue in Tessman’s account of 
‘burdened virtues.’  
 
In Tessman’s account, the social and political landscape is drawn around three 
groups of agents: the oppressed, whose lives are largely determined by the 
circumstances of oppression; the oppressors, who live lives of dominance made 
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possible through the oppressed; and resisters, or political activists, who work 
towards ending oppression. The way in which Tessman has delineated these three 
groupings of agents makes it seem as if individuals are members of only one group 
or another. This does not allow for an account of how individuals very often, indeed 
always, simultaneously occupy positions in which they are oppressed, they are 
dominating and they are resisting. Most movements are made up of individuals who 
simultaneously occupy many different positions in a given society.  
 
Tessman argues that those fighting oppression must already hold certain implicit 
beliefs about what a flourishing or a good life is. I want to raise the question of 
whether ‘holding’ is the same as aiming. That is, do I hold those ‘implicit beliefs’ 
with the intent to change them in relation to the group I intentionally place myself in 
or in which I am placed? Surely I may at times not so much ‘hold’ a worked out 
vision of a flourishing life, but rather have an aim that is being worked out along the 
way. What of the virtues needed to ‘aim’? Surely it will often be the case that I want 
a better life rather than the good life. In this case, it seems to me that we need to 
keep open the category of the good life, keep open the notion of flourishing. There 
are many times when we may need to retain flourishing as undefined, as in the 
process always of being defined and re-defined. It seems that a shift is needed here. 
My argument is that we need to develop a vocabulary through which we can 
articulate our differing implicit conceptions of flourishing and a vocabulary through 
which we can communicate these implicitly held conceptions of flourishing with 
others – others that we may share an oppressed position with, but that we may also 
not. How are we to understand the virtues that we need to cultivate and practice in 
order to do this?  
 
Therefore, I am not saying that I disagree with Tessman on the issue of the 
articulation of an exact or specific account of flourishing. I think that she is correct in 
dismissing the possibility, or viability, of specifying in advance a universal notion of 
flourishing and then working backwards from there to a list of virtues. Where I 
disagree with her is on the notion that ‘what conception of flourishing should guide 
one in the search for corresponding virtues’ is to be found in adopting a ‘general 
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conception of flourishing from what is implicit in the goals of liberatory movements’ 
and that we can ‘use this conception of flourishing as a guide.’
612
 The emphasis, I 
argue, must be on the former and not on the latter idea. I do not agree that we should 
assume an ‘implicit’ notion of flourishing and that this can best serve us by placing it 
at the centre of a virtue ethics. Instead, I think that in order for a virtue ethical 
framework to be able to do the work that is necessary in identity politics, ‘the good’ 
must be construed as plural, making it always contestable and something that is not 
possible to finally settle on, and that this is not possible if the good is given centre 
stage. Therefore, virtue should not be defined as an end-state of perfection, but rather 
as an ability to meet the practical demands of the world. In some ways this approach 
shares similarities with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, yet also differs. I turn to 
an assessment of this now.  
Martha Nussbaum’s Human Capabilities Approach 
Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’ project holds in common many 
similarities to Tessman’s. Like Tessman, Nussbaum believes that an Aristotelian 
virtue ethical framework can provide a deeply accurate critique of the multiple and 
complex real world situations in which individuals live lives of inequality and 
oppression. Where Tessman is interested in exploring the ‘burdened virtues’ though, 
Nussbaum is interested in developing a precise list of what she terms ‘Central 
Human Capabilities.’
613
 Nussbaum’s intention with these ‘Central Capabilities’ is 
that they should serve as a focus in development work for formulating basic political 
principles that can form the basis of fundamental constitutional guarantees.
614
 
Therefore, Nussbaum’s project has its basis in a universalist account of central 
human functions that is closely related to political liberalism, the latter of which she 
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Nussbaum’s capability approach is based on, and is a critical elaboration of, Amartya 
Sen’s work.
616
 In attempting to complete Sen’s capability approach (CA), Nussbaum 
draws on Aristotle’s understanding of appropriate human functioning to develop her 
list of ‘Central Human Capabilities.’ From Aristotle she takes the view that ‘we see 
the person as having activity, goals and projects – as somehow awe-inspiringly 
above the mechanical workings of nature, and yet in need of support for the 
fulfillment of many central projects.’
617
 The CA poses the question as to whether or 
not the human being holds the capability of achieving those specified ‘central 
projects.’ Nussbaum argues that the human who is not capable of fulfilling her 
‘central projects’ – as opposed to already fulfilling them, which is something very 
different – is not living a truly human life .
618
 From here, Nussbaum generates a list 
of capabilities that are universally central to all lives of dignity: (1) Life; (2) Bodily 
health; (3) Bodily integrity; (4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought; (5) Emotions; (6) 
Pratical Reason; (7) Affiliation; (8) Other species; (9) Play; and (10) Political and 




Nussbaum elaborates extensively on the meaning of the list, but I engage only with 
some limited aspects that relate to my specific interests. Firstly, according to 
Nussbaum, the list ‘isolates those human capabilities that can be convincingly argued 
to be of central importance in any human life, whatever else the person pursues or 
chooses.’
620
 Furthermore, the human life as the good life is ‘selected for political 
purposes only.’
621
 The list therefore, provides the basic legal principles for 
constitutional guarantees, human rights laws and development policy. In short, these 
ten capabilities are basic entitlements without which a society cannot lay claim to 
justice and thereby clearly delineate what action a state is obligated to take as well as 
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what action it is prohibited from taking.  
 
Another key point is that, according to Nussbaum, the list is morally pluralistic. That 
is to say, each component is discrete and independent of any other component 
worthy of pursuit. No one component should be viewed as subordinate to any other 
one, or to any generalisable single end. Yet, two capabilities do ‘organise and suffuse 





What all this means is that Nussbaum’s account places emphasis on ongoing activity 
as the basis for both moral and political choosing. The individual has a variety of 
distinct functions, habits and dispositions, all of which must be exercised. Not one 
can be reduced to any another one, nor to a single good that is external, nor to some 
end.  Instead, each should be understood as an end unto itself. The basis of morality 
is posited as functional and is related to Nussbaum’s recognition an individual’s 
desires must be taken seriously. Nussbaum insists that ‘the fact that human beings 
desire something does count; it counts because we think that politics, rightly 
understood, comes from people and what matters to them, not from heavenly 
norms.’
623
 Yet, Nussbaum is not satisfied to leave it at that for there are decisions 
that an individual must make. This is because not all desires are equally worth 
pursuing and fulfilling just as there are some habits or dispositions that are not 
worthy of being reinforced: 
 
[T]he basic intuition from which the capability approach begins, in the 
political arena, is that certain human abilities exert a moral claim that 
they should be developed…..Not all actual human abilities exert a moral 





Moral choice is a matter of deliberation. Part of making moral choices about which 
habits to reinforce and which ones to weaken is the task of deliberating about what 
sort of character one should aim to develop. That is, one needs to think carefully 
                                                 
622
 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 84.  
623
 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 146. 
624
 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 83. 
 
 199  Chapter Six
 
about what sort of person one should aim at becoming. It is for this reason that 
Nussbaum posits ‘practical reason,’ as universal. ‘Criticism too,’ she writes, ‘is 
profoundly indigenous to virtually all cultures.’
625
 Intelligence, according to 
Nussbaum is functional. That is, the function of intelligence is to aid the individual 
in coping with her situation. Nussbaum argues in this regard that ‘the idea of being 
able to plan and to execute a plan arises without any philosophical backing, out of 
the struggle of human beings to live in a hostile environment.’
626
 This ability to plan 
– intelligence – is what makes a human being human: 
 
To plan for one’s own life without being able to do so in complex forms 
of discourse, concern, and reciprocity with other human beings is, again, 
to behave in an incompletely human way. To take just one example, 
work, to be a truly human mode of functioning, must involve the 
availability of both practical reason and affiliation. It must involve being 




The goal of Nussbaum’s approach is to advance the capabilities rather than 
functioning. She argues that to take functioning as the goal of public policy 
would be to force the individual into some ‘single determinate manner’ and to 
take away the free choices that the individual would make in line with her own 
conception of the good and that this could in fact be a violation of their 
rights.
628
 Therefore, ‘where adult citizens are concerned, capability, not 
functioning, is the appropriate goal’ (emphasis in original).
629
 It would seem 
that Nussbaum’s intent here is to provide a worked out basis for political 
reform without thereby substantiating in advance what it means to live a fully 
human life. Yet, on what basis does the agent make choices once her minimum 
CA have been met? Nussbaum focusses on public choices only in order to 
assist individuals in reaching their own individualized goods. Once capabilities 
have been established, the individual is left to her own accords to evaluate her 
own specific ends, which can only be surmised to be on this account, arbitrary 
acts of the ‘will.’ Nussbaum’s list of capabilities are ‘thick accounts’ of virtues 
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and most importantly for her, they are matters of positive freedom in Berlin’s 
sense of the term. The list of capabilities are fundamental entitlements that are 
to guide Nussbaum’s project of thinking about social justice and are meant to 
contribute to defining what the responsibility of the state is.  
 
At this point, it is perhaps rather difficult to see how this is virtue ethics since it 
sounds very much like a matter of justice and therefore, morality. Nussbaum’s 
approach is most apparently virtue ethical in its centring of the situation and 
experience. That is, her approach is empirical rather than experimental: ‘like 
any universal approach, it is only valuable if developed in a relevant way: so 
we need to worry not just about the structure of the approach, but also about 
how to flesh out its content in a way that focuses appropriately on women’s 
lives.’
630
 This would appear to be a strength and certainly many have lauded 
Nussbaum on just this point. She looks at women’s real experiences with the 
aim of taking them seriously. The problem arises when on the basis of these 
real experiences, Nussbaum analytically abstracts universal principles. By 
doing this, Nussbaum is unable to either give an account of the dynamic nature 
of experience or of the possibility of reconstruction, or in Foucault’s language, 
transformation.  
 
In summary, Nussbaum’s virtue ethical approach (CA) is more appropriately 
categorised as a moral system rather than ethics as I have defined the terms in 
Chapter Four. That is, CA focuses on the external world of relations and 
actions and not in a meaningful way on the inner life of the self. In contrast, a 
virtue ethics that is non-eudaimonistic begins from personal reflection on life 
and the reflective capacities of the individual and views an agent’s activities as 
crucial factors in ethics. In the end, I take Nussbaum’s CA to be about morality 
as opposed to ethics.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted some general feminist concerns to do with an 
Aristotelian inspired virtue ethics by taking Okin’s critique of virtue ethics as 
paradigmatic. Okin rightly raises the issue of an unrevised list of Aristotle’s 
virtues, but I argue that her approach, is in some ways an incomplete 
understanding of Aristotle’s approach itself. I then turn to elaborate this 
argument. It is an error to read Aristotle as offering in some sense, a prior list 
of values and that from this list we should see how it is that self-reflection 
contributes to the virtues. Instead, there is scope for an enquiry into how a 
reflecting self would fill out the idea of choice-worthiness. This allows, not for 
an argument to be developed for a certain kind of life, but to look at how 
reflective activities that raise the question of value contribute to a good life 
along various dimensions of value.  
 
I then turned to Tessman’s work, which raises the question as to whether or not 
it is necessary to have eudaimonia take centre stage in a feminist virtue ethics. 
Her answer is yes, though with some considerable critical revision to 
eudaimonia. Though I do not take issue with her critical revisions to 
eudaimonia, I do not agree that eudaimonia must, or indeed should, take centre 
stage. In fact, granting the notion of eudaimonia centre stage, ushers in the 
danger of rendering the notion of ‘the good’ incontestable and finalisable. The 
usefulness of a virtue ethical approach to understanding the self can only be 
fully realised when eudaimonia is not posited as either explicit or implicit, but 
only as fully contestable. This loosens the connection more profoundly 
between the virtues and eudaimonia and also allows for developing the virtues 
for ends other than eudaimonia.  
 
My assessment of Nussbaum’s work is that she is formulating an argument of 
what the responsibilities of the government should be in ensuring that certain 
(human) capabilities can be enjoyed by all citizens of a given nation/state. This 
is, on the face of it, a project with an entirely different aim than mine. What 
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Nussbaum helps to clarify is that engaging with virtue ethics opens up a range 
of possibilities in regards to human flourishing which seem diametrically 
opposed. One the one hand, she seems to endorse a universal account of human 
flourishing while on the other hand she seems to endorse a relativist account 
that accepts any version of flourishing that the agent defines at some point in 
time for herself. I argue that it is necessary to avoid both of these positions. 
Nussbaum though, unequivocally endorses the former position and gives what 
she argues is a universal account of human flourishing. Her CA lists those 
human capabilities that all governments of states should provide support for 
and that governments should be pressured to guarantee to all citizens to be so 
enabled. Nussbaum’s project is simultaneously committed to Aristotelian 
virtue ethics and modern liberalism. It is liberal in the sense that she relies on 
an account of human nature that assumes that agents are autonomous decision 
makers, thus she privileges the agent’s capability to choose, develop and 
maintain the functions necessary for choice making. Nussbaum’s work is 
therefore, problematic for my project on the basis that she endorses a universal 
and spelled out account of human flourishing. Furthermore, her account is 
premised on a conception of the agent as an autonomous self-chooser.  
 
In the following chapter I turn to a pluralistic virtue ethical account and show 
how it elaborates a self (identity) that is inextricably related to the good, where 
the notion of the good is not finally definable. I address the central notion of 
‘desire’ as comprised of both ‘vision’ and ‘attention’ in order to illustrate a 
picture of the self with the full resources of an inner life that can be retrieved in 
a pluralistic version of virtue ethics. Beginning from an understanding of virtue 
not as an end state of perfection, but as a ‘dynamic process-notion,’
631
 a 
number of ethical concepts - love, respect, creativity and objectivity – make up 
the inner life and workings of the agent and have a pervasive influence on 
virtue as a whole.  
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7 
Pluralistic virtue ethics and the self 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I draw mainly on the recent work of Christine Swanton.
632
 This 
is emergent and underdeveloped work as yet, but I believe it can be developed 
in interesting and constructive ways that can, as Murdoch called for, offer an 
‘elaborate normative vocabulary’ sufficient for developing a moral vision. It 
has the potential to enriched our understanding and articulation of the 
problematics in identity politics debates. I do not attempt to engage fully with 
Swanton’s challenging and complex pluralistic theory of virtue ethics. The 
reading that I propose of her work is a charitable one. I choose not to 
emphasise shortcomings or inconsistencies. Although I could have offered a 
much more critical reading, my aim is to lay out the main structures of her 
pluralistic approach to virtue ethics so as to point out the possible intersections 
between the problematics of feminist identity politics and a pluralistic account 
of virtue ethics. A more detailed critical discussion awaits a future study. Since 
my goal is not to evaluate Swanton’s pluralistic virtue ethics (PVE) as a whole 
and its possible contribution, as a whole, to feminist theory, or certainly to 
virtue ethics, my reading of her is necessarily partial.  I intend to make the 
more limited argument that a PVE develops an agent who can forge and sustain 
the sort of alliances across difference that identity politics requires. In short, 
PVE offers a picture of an agent who is capable of articulating Brown’s ‘I want 
this for us.’ Because this thesis has argued that the picture of the self that will 
be capable of doing this necessitates a complex and rich inner life, therefore, 
this is what I concentrate on in Swanton’s work. I draw primarily from Part 2 
of her Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, which details the ‘basic modes of 
moral acknowledgment’ that feature in all of the virtues and includes love, 
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respect, and creativity for it is these – ‘the basic modes of moral 




Swanton’s PVE account is not a eudaimonistic virtue ethics in the standard 
sense since it loosens the standard connection between eudaimonia and virtue. 
This loosening allows for a focus on and development of a certain kind of an 
agent, and what capacities need to be present in an agent in order to articulate a 
vision (of the future) that is about the (common) good. I am most interested in 
what a pluralistic virtue ethical account can offer with regard to the dynamic 
relationship between agents and the good. How does a pluralistic virtue ethical 
project elaborate the inner life and capacities of the agent necessary for 
articulating a vision of the good when eudaimonia is not given centre stage in a 
way that is finalisable? 
 
Since Swanton’s pluralistic conception of virtue ethics that I am drawing on 
uses the term ‘pluralism’ in the sense in which it is understood in moral 
philosophy, rather than political philosophy, I use the first section of the 
chapter to clarify these different usages. While the term ‘pluralism’ is an 
important one in feminist theory, its usage in moral philosophy differs 
considerably.   
 
Section two offers an overview of Swanton’s PVE account. Although inspired 
by Aristotle’s notion of virtue as an end state of perfect responsiveness to the 
demands of the world, in taking a Nietzschean lead, Swanton recovers the 
complex dynamics of the dissatisfied attitude in Nietszche’s ‘will to power.’ 
This allows for a much more flexible virtue ethics that is better equipped to 
meet the complexities of an imperfect world. The following section highlights 
how this approach delineates virtue in a thoroughgoing pluralism.  
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Section four offers an overview of how it is that Swanton’s PVE is non-
eudaimonistic. The core notion of expressing a virtue, since it is not solely 
eudaimonia, is provided instead through three central modes of ‘moral 
acknowledgment,’ or responsiveness. It is these that form the framework 
through which all of the virtues are filtered and constitute the inner life of the 
self. Therefore in the final section I look at what I call ‘the responsive self.’ 
The central modes of responsiveness are ‘love, respect, and creativity.’ 
Combined, these modes constitute the ways in which the agent responds to 
someone (or something).  Love, respect and creativity have in common the 
core concerns of (feminist) identity politics raised earlier in Chapter Two, and 
this is the topic of the following section four. It turns out, unsurprisingly, that 
love and respect constitute the framework through which ‘care of the self’ 
operates and the section closes by looking at this. The chapter ends by 
reflecting on how a PVE appears to solve the issues of how the self can be 
related to and engaged with a vision of the (common) good that is able to 
contextualise the self while at the same time maintaining a strong notion of the 
self as an agent capable of self-reflection and action.  
Pluralism 
The term ‘pluralism’ in moral philosophy is most generally associated with 
‘moral pluralism’ and is distinguishable from ‘political pluralism’ in political 
liberalism. The latter refers to an incommensurability of value systems and 
what sorts of restrictions a government can impose on the freedoms of its 
citizens’ to act according to their own value systems. In moral philosophy, 
‘pluralism’ is a structural issue and takes as its concern the complexity of 
moral values and moral choices. Therefore, in moral philosophy, the debate on 
pluralism has to do with the shape of morality. That is, ‘pluralism in ethics is 
the view that there is an irreducible plurality of values or principles that are 
relevant.’
634
  The concern of moral pluralism is not with competing value 
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systems or points of view, but with differing values. In other words, pluralism 





In moral theory, pluralism is contrasted to monism. Whereas pluralism argues 
that there are multiple, irreducible values, monism claims that there is 
fundamentally one value. For the monist, the ‘good’ is fundamentally unitary. 
In monism, the single property that is constitutive of the good, or the right, is 
meant to be discoverable independently of the social situation or dialogic 
encounter. Consider how utilitarianism holds that all that is morally relevant 
can be reduced to a single principle to do with pleasure or pain and how 
Kantian derived philosophy holds that all moral judgments can be derived from 
a single principle to do with respect for rationality. By sidestepping what are 
complex, socially grounded and essentially contested standards defined by 
thick concepts, monism ends up reasoning in terms of thin concepts of the 




Unlike monism, pluralism insists that there are many and diverse responses 
appropriate to value: 
 
According to value centred monism, the rightness of moral 
responsiveness is determined entirely by degree or strength of value….. 
on the contrary, just how things are to be pursued, nurtured, respected, 
loved, preserved, protected, and so forth may often depend on further 
general features of those things, and their relations to other things, 




Pluralism, in contrast, is fundamentally more complex than either of utilitarian 
or Kantian accounts.
638
 In pluralism, there are multiple bases upon which the 
moral responses of an agent are formed and these are irreducibly plural. In 
contrast, it is possible that a monistic approach could hold that there are 
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different appropriate responses to value, but always to the same value (i.e. 
pleasure). According to the pluralist though, the monistic account cannot 
capture adequately what is really going on when agents appropriately pursue, 
nurture, respect, etc. a value rather than simply try to promote it. According to 
a pluralistic approach, the complexity of the agent’s responses to value can 
only accurately be explained pluralistically.   
 
This is not to overlook that many moral theories do allow pluralistic accounts 
of underlying moral (and nonmoral) values. But this does not mean that they 
are pluralistic as a whole or from the bottom up.
639
 For instance, although 
Rawls’ theory has two principles of justice, they follow a lexicographical 
ordering that points to which of the principles is the one to be followed in 
varied situations.
640
 Pluralism, on the other hand, insists that morality is 
fundamentally much more complex than this.
641
 Agents do not only respond to 
what is deemed of value with either, for example, desire or pleasure. Instead, 
agents are likely to respond with love, admiration, respect, affection, or awe.  
 
If values are plural then so too are choices that are made between values. The 
pluralist argues against the monist view that all values other than one basic one 
are instrumental. In pluralism, the complexities are much deeper than this – 
they are foundational. Thus, there are many values that are not valuable 
because of something else, but are valuable in and of themselves. It is because 
there are multiple foundational values that comparing values becomes difficult. 
It is this that makes choosing a complex task word. How are choices to be 
made between multiple, incomparable values? How are disagreements to be 
resolved in moral pluralism? 
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In pluralism disagreements are instances when a plurality of values does not 
yield a uniquely right answer. Incompatible positions can be grounded in sound 
reasoning when multiple perspectives, or principles, can be called upon to 
resolve an issue. This is incompatible with the monistic view that there is 
always a definite and right position to be taken. This indeterminacy in 
pluralism would seem to point towards it being nothing more than a form of 
relativism or subjectivism. Wolf points out that pluralism does not deny moral 
truth.
642
 The pluralist position is better understood as believing that if there is a 
moral truth, the truth is more complicated than the monist position, and it is 
complex in a way that renders the answers to certain questions indeterminate. 
Whereas the relativist holds the view that what is right for her is not the same 
as what is right for you, the pluralist position holds that for each of us, what is 
right in some instances will always be indeterminate. On this latter view, what 
is right is not relative to anything else, it is simply indeterminate. But if there is 
no right answer does this not mean that anything goes?  
 
Wolf points out that having no determinate answer does not imply that there is 
no wrong answer.
643
 Maintaining that two positions on a given issue are both 
reasonable is not the same as holding that any position is reasonable. Reaching 
resolution on hard moral questions is hard work. What may appear to be 
irresolvable today, may be resolved tomorrow. The main point of the pluralist 
position is that although one should not lose sight of the possibility of 
agreement, one should also not interpret agreement as simply a matter of 
‘luck,’ but rather the result of hard work.  
 
Pluralism is situated within a social context, or dialogic encounter, while 
monism is embedded in an arbitrarily narrow set of concerns. To adopt a theory 
of value, according to the pluralist account, amounts to taking on a particular 
way of understanding what a worthwhile life is. It is the way through which we 
explore new possibilities for living and life. By bracketing out an appreciation 
for a wider array of values, monism drastically reduces the possibilities of a 
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rich understanding of defining a good life and the good thus, diminishing the 
possibility of making meaningful evaluative distinctions. Monism erects 
barriers to the more fruitful avenues of exploration and criticism available to 
the pluralistic approach. Reaching moral agreements for the pluralist is not a 
matter of ‘brute, blind luck.’
 644
 Rather, it is a matter of hard work contra that 
‘human longing for simplicity’ and ‘completeness.’
645
   
 
I turn now to a brief summary of Christine Swanton’s pluralistic account of 
virtue ethics. Swanton follows on a first wave of writers, ranging from Alasdair 
MacIntyre to Phillippa Foot, who took up Anscombe’s 1958 challenge.
646
 
Swanton’s Virtue Ethics: A pluralistic view
647
 is distinctive in its attempt to 
articulate a pluralistic, as opposed to monistic, understanding of virtue ethics.  
Main features of a pluralistic virtue ethics  
Swanton develops a complex Nietzschean inspired virtue ethics in which the 
notion of a virtue is defined through the notion of ‘becoming.’ This is in 
opposition to Aristotelian conceptions of virtue which are defined as ‘end-
states of perfection.’
648
 Swanton presupposes no such state of perfection. 
Contrary to neo-Aristotelian formulations of virtue ethics, her virtue ethical 
account does not seek to present a worked out list of the virtues tied to 
eudaimonia. Rather, she argues against both eudaimonistic virtue ethics and 
virtue ethical conceptions of rightness.  Swanton’s approach locates the 
rationale for virtue in its ability to meet the practical demands of the world.  
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Although inspired in her work by the Aristotelian idea that ‘virtue is a state of 
appropriate responsiveness to, or acknowledgement of the demands of the 
world,’
649
 Swanton views Aristotle as not having provided a sufficient 
conception of the relation between the demands of the world and the 
flourishing of the possessor of the virtues. This shortcoming she attributes to 
Aristotle’s failure to develop a deep account of flourishing. She attributes this 
to Aristotle’s view that the work of normative ethical theory consists of 





Swanton argues that a richer account of human flourishing, independent of the 
endoxa, is what is needed to play the role of ‘background theory.’
651
 And this is 
only possible by taking more seriously the ‘richness and complexity of the 
moral domain.’
652
 Although she views modern-day accounts of virtue ethics as 
having made some progress in taking this domain more seriously, she insists 
that a more radical connection must be made between ethics and concrete 
phenomena. While most accounts of virtue ethics hold that the complexity of a 
situation lies in the complexity of the situation itself, Swanton argues against 
this. Instead, complexity lies in the area of the enumeration of the virtues and 
this complexity can only be made apparent when a ‘background theory’ is 
articulated clearly.
653
 Only when this is in place will it become apparent that it 
is the delineation of virtue itself which is what is most complex.  
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Swanton, like Okin, does not believe that the task of virtue ethics is to supply a 
list of the virtues. Rather, the task of virtue ethics is to articulate the complexity 
of the task of enumerating the virtues.   This is illustrated in Swanton’s 
discussion of the difficulties of distinguishing virtue from vice. Here Swanton 
draws on the work of Karen Horney who makes the observation that we are 
guilty of committing the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in any given situation, for the 
tendency we have to place too much emphasis on the actual situation. We are 
mistakenly led to believe that it is the situation that determines our reactions 
and not the other way around: ‘[w]e are inclined to put too great an emphasis 
on the actual situation, and to think that it determines our reactions.’
654
 Horney 
suggests that our ‘reactions’ in any given situation are determined not only by 
the situation itself, but also (‘even more’) by what she refers to as ‘our neurotic 
needs.’
655
 The important point Swanton is making in relation to Horney here is 
that ‘the task of delineating virtue inherits the complexities of the task of 
understanding psychic health.’
656
 In other words, it is the inner life of the self 
that is an integral component of any conception of the self.  
 
Aristotle viewed human beings as growing and maturing in a more or less 
healthy manner in spite of some interferences. In Aristotle we do not find a 
developed view of healthy human growth and the misfortunes which interfere 
(regularly) with this, points Tessman and Okin also make. Swanton argues that 
a ‘background theory’ (of human nature) that can account for interferences to 
healthy growing and maturing is necessary to broaden Aristotle’s equilibrium. 
In order to develop this, she draws on depth psychology and some of the 
insights of Nietzsche.  
 
While the linchpin of Aristotle’s conception of human nature is ergon – the 
idea of a distinctively human rationality – Nietzsche’s is the ‘will to power.’ 
Recall that Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ is the idea that ‘a living thing desires 
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above all to vent its strength – a life as such is will to power.’
657
 Swanton 
points out that at the centre of Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ are both self-love 
and creativity, something that is often unappreciated or forgotten. It is these 
elements that form the basis of Nietzsche’s account of the healthy agent. If the 
agent lacks either of these, the agent reverts into ressentiment. 
 
Swanton elaborates on the how the element of self-love in Nietzsche’s ‘will to 
power’ involves a dissatisfied attitude to the self as it is. That is, self-love 
should be understood dynamically in the sense that it requires the self to think 
of herself as worthy of further discovery and further improvement. Dynamic 
self-love affirms the self and opposes this dynamic affirmation to a complacent 
attitude towards who the self is. Therefore, self-love is distinct from self-
satisfaction. Love for the other incorporates self-love and distinguishes it from 
bad love. Self-love understood in this way can be seen as incorporating the 
principle of ‘care of the self’ that Foucault recovers.  
 
It is true that, as Brown has pointed out and raised concerns over, Nietzsche is 
located within the tradition of existentialism which emphasises individualism. 
Although this emphasis appears to be anathema to the collective projects of 
identity politics, which require identification with others, it is an individualism 
that is not to be equated with egoism. Rather, it is premised on, and this is the 
element that Swanton develops, self-love understood as healthy bonding with 
oneself where the self does not seek an escape from oneself, but instead a 
turning towards oneself to change and develop – to transform in a manner very 
similar to Foucault’s ‘care of the self.’ Therefore, we can see that in drawing 
on Nietzsche, Swanton’s account of virtue ethics is not a ‘species of ideal 
world theory,’ but is meant to be applicable to an imperfect world. It is for this 
reason that Swanton does not accept that virtue has to stand in ‘for whatever 
turns out to be the basis in human psychology, once that is developed to 
perfection, for leading the best life.’
 658
 Nor is there any single, unified 
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condition constituting the basis of virtue.
659
 It is for this reason that Swanton 
differs from most neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in her rationale for virtue. In 
Swanton, virtue is a ‘threshold concept,’
660
 by which she means that the 
rationale of virtue is to meet the demands of the world. Because virtue is tasked 
with dealing with an imperfect world, Swanton argues that the delineation of 




A pluralistic account of virtue  
Similar to other accounts of virtue ethics, Swanton defines virtue as a 
disposition to respond well to the demands of the world in a manner that is 
expressive of, rather than only compatible with, fine inner states. What is 
distinctive about Swanton’s approach is her argument that plurality 
characterises all aspects of virtue, which leads to a fully pluralistic account in 




(1) The ‘bases of responsiveness’ are plural.663 An item to be responded 
to by the agent is very likely to have more than one single morally 
relevant feature. For instance, we may respond to something on the 
basis of a bond, or due to the item’s status, because of its value.  
(2) The ‘modes of responsiveness’ are plural.664 The way in which an 
agent responds to someone or something is likely to be plural – her 
response may be through honouring, loving, respecting, etc.  
(3) Because (1) and (2) are plural, a monistic conception of what makes a 
trait a virtue is ruled out. Rather, what makes traits of character 
virtues is plural.  
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(4) Virtue is a threshold concept. The standard of what makes 
responsiveness to items in the field of a virtue excellent or good 
enough are plural. The standards are to a certain extent relative to the 
agent’s capacities (understood dynamically) and not necessarily only 
in relation to eudaimonia. 
(5)  The ‘rightness of action’ is also pluralistic with regards to a 
conception of the right.
665
 Since the above are all pluralistic, it follows 
that a conception of right action also is.   
 
In contrast to a monistic conception of virtue, where a mode of responsiveness to 
items in its field is singular,
666
 Swanton’s pluralistic account sees the requirements of 
virtues, as well as the virtues themselves, as plural. Thus, the standards for meeting a 
virtue are plural rather than set by one abstract standard. Virtues, in Swanton’s 
pluralistic account, are ‘dispositions of responsiveness to items in the world and 
these items have morally significant features (such as status, value, or a good) which 




‘The field of a virtue’ refers to those items which fall into the spheres of concern of 
the virtues, and to which the agent should respond in line with virtue’s demands.
668 
Swanton understands the ‘items that fall into the field of virtue’ broadly to include 
the following: ‘people, objects, situations, inner states, or actions,’ as well as, 




Swanton argues that there are significant differences in both the kinds of morally 
significant features that items have as well as the manner of appropriate response to 
those items. The former are the ‘bases of moral responsiveness,’ which include such 
things as value, status, good (or benefit), and bonds.  The latter are ‘the modes of 
moral responsiveness’ and these include: promoting, honouring, appreciating, 
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respecting, being open to, and loving items which have value, or status, are good, or 
to which one is bonded. It is the modes of love, respect and creativity, which thread 
through her entire argument and which, in the next sections I look at in more detail.  
 
The ‘modes of moral responsiveness’ are integrated in the virtues pluralistically. 
Swanton makes the claim that the virtues exhibit multiple ‘modes of moral 
acknowledgement’ such that, for example, the virtue of justice may require that 
items in its field be acknowledged through several different modes (promote, 
honour, appreciate, respect, etc.). This pluralistic account of the ‘modes of moral 
responsiveness’ acknowledges the ‘complexity of human responsiveness in the 
world, recognising that we are beings, not only agents of change in the attempt to 
promote the good, but also agents of change in the attempt to produce and create.’
670
 
That is, the agent is a person who has projects that are in the future.
671
 But what 
exactly constitutes virtuous moral acknowledgement (responsiveness)?  
 
The account Swanton’s PVE develops sets the standard of virtuous responsiveness as 
‘excellent or good enough.’
672
  That is, virtue is to be understood as a ‘threshold 
concept,’
673
 which means that the standards of any virtue are always relative to a 
particular context. An aspect of a standard of ‘good enough’ responsiveness to items 
in a virtue’s field is that it is this standard that sets limits to moral demands. This is 
what Swanton refers to as ‘the shape’ of the virtues - it is the specification of the 
demands that gives the shape of any given virtue.  
 
This thoroughgoing plurality and its concomitant complexity render the matter of the 
virtues a delicate matter. Virtues can easily be mistaken for, or can become, related 
vices. In an imperfect world, Swanton argues, virtue must be understood as a 
‘threshold concept,’ the central distinguishing feature of which is the expression of 
fine inner states.
674
 For Swanton, this is an aspect of the ‘profile of the virtues’ for 
each mode of moral acknowledgement comprising that profile (i.e. promoting, 
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honouring, appreciating, respecting, being open to, and loving items which have 
value, or status, are good, or to which one is bonded). This aspect appears to be the 
most complex and difficult to come to terms with. How after all, are we to know if 
virtue expresses fine inner states? But it is precisely on this point that a virtue-ethical 
account is to be distinguished from a consequentialist view.
675
 In contrast to a 
consequentialist conception of moral acknowledgment, which requires neither good 
motives nor good intentions, Swanton’s conception of virtue acknowledges the 
modes of moral acknowledgment as plural and as requiring the expression of fine 
inner states.  
 
Some versions of consequentialism and Kantianism also require of virtue that it is an 
expression of fine inner states. Yet Swanton argues that it is still possible to 
distinguish virtue ethics from both consequentialist and Kantian accounts on the 
basis of the nature of the fine inner states. Whereas the consequentialist has a 
‘standing commitment’
676
 to act from the objective of leading a consequentialist life 
and the Kantian has a ‘standing commitment’ to perform her duty, the virtue ethicist: 
 
….in short, claim[s] that moral responsiveness expressive of virtue must 
express fine inner states, and amongst those states will be a background 




Whereas Aristotle assumes that practical wisdom is necessary for all virtue, Swanton 
does not maintain that certain internal states are necessary for a certain trait to be 
considered a virtue. Instead, Swanton follows Nietzsche’s lead in downplaying the 
role of practical wisdom. This serves to disconnect the usual tight connection 
between virtue and eudaimonism in standard accounts of virtue ethics. I now want to 
turn to look at how Swanton formulates her argument against eudaimonism for it is 
here that Swanton’s pluralistic view of virtue ethics finds its basis and I think is most 
useful for thinking about the work of the agent in identity politics.  
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A non-eudaimonistic account  
Swanton grants the assumption to eudaimonism that in order to be (fully) good qua 
human being it is necessary to flourish.
678
 It does not follow then that, even if virtue 
is (partially) constitutive of goodness, it is a necessary condition of a trait being a 
virtue that it is characteristically (partially) constitutive of (or contributes to) the 
flourishing of the agent. Swanton argues that this is because there are cases when at 
least some of the virtues might contribute to certain aspects of a human’s goodness 
other than her flourishing. Here we can see that Swanton’s account does not differ 
significantly from Tessman’s account.
679
 In fact, Swanton seems to be in agreement 
with Tessman that some virtues might turn out to be detrimental to flourishing 
whilst, actually making that contribution. Swanton though is very clearly making a 
separation between ‘goodness’ and ‘flourishing’ that Tessman does not. Therefore, 
Swanton specifies her position that there are some virtues that are inimical to 
flourishing though they may be (partially) constitutive of goodness. That is, we can 
act virtuously for reasons other than eudaimonism. This other reason is not one that 
is possible in Tessman’s account where agents always exercise the virtues for 
reasons connected to eudaimonism (even if sometimes this is only implicit).  
 
Illustrating this argument, Swanton considers three kinds of lives. I find it instructive 
to look in detail at her account as it serves to clarify where Swanton’s account 
diverges from Tessman’s in a direction that I argue is most useful for developing an 
account of the self in ethics for identity politics. None of the lives Swanton discusses 
display traits that appear to be indicative of ‘flourishing,’
680
 yet all do appear to 
display virtues since ‘they are lives characterised by habits of appropriate response’ 




The first example is of a woman who has gone into the jungle to work ceaselessly to 
save lives and relieve suffering of those who would otherwise have perished. The 
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work and the tropical environment have made the woman herself ill and she is 
suffering from malaria and dysentery. Despite suffering from ill health and 
exhaustion though, the woman continues to work without rest. Furthermore, she is 
plagued with self-doubt about the work she does. Since the woman is not religious, 
she cannot mitigate her suffering by the sort of joy experienced by religiously 
inspired saints.  She is not the ‘moral saint’ Wolf describes for whom ‘happiness 
would truly lie in the happiness of others and so would devote [her]self to others 
gladly and with an open heart.’
682
 Having seriously compromised her health, the 
woman dies prematurely. 
 
Swanton’s second example is of an artist who suffers from a manic-depressive 
illness. The artist, though afflicted by on-going self-doubt, nonetheless feels strongly 
that she is talented and through her art has something important to say. Since the 
artist’s creative energy is at its strongest during the manic phases of her mental 
condition, she refuses to seek or receive treatment for her disorder. Never gaining 
recognition for her artistic endeavours, plagued with constant feelings of failure, she 
eventually commits suicide. Even after her death, her art does not achieve the hoped 
for recognition.  
 
Swanton’s third example is of an environmental activist who foresees an 
environmental disaster that will not occur in his lifetime. The activist has no 
immediate family and works tirelessly to persuade others of the impending disaster. 
He is never taken seriously in his lifetime. Under a tremendous amount of stress, he 
dies suddenly of a heart attack. After his death, the public takes notice of his work 
and the danger he had warned of is heeded and subsequently, his work is 
appreciated. 
 
None of the individuals in the Swanton’s three examples can be said to have lived 
lives in which they flourished. Yet, according to Swanton, the life of the aid worker 
is certainly admirable and successful - she saved many lives that would otherwise 
not have been saved. The life of the artist, although not successful, Swanton views as 
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having been admirable – it was ‘an admirable failure.’
683
 The life of the 
environmentalist was successful, in that his life’s work was appreciated after his 
death. All of the lives, Swanton argues, were certainly meaningful and exhibit a sort 
of excellence that is excluded from view by an Aristotelian approach.  
 
In order to bring into view the excellence that is excluded from an Aristotelian and 
eudaimonistic approach to the virtues, Swanton argues that a pluralistic 
understanding of virtue is necessary. That is, what makes a trait a virtue ‘is that it is a 
disposition to respond in an excellent (or good enough) way (through the modes of 
respecting, appreciating, creating, loving, promoting, and so on) to items in the fields 
of the virtue.’
684
 Swanton terms this ‘principle (T),’ which allows for not simply one 
ultimate point to virtue (flourishing), but rather for the possibility that there may be a 
plurality of ‘ultimate points.’
685
 That is, there are other grounds for a trait’s being a 
virtue, such as it being admirable, or contributing to a successful or meaningful life. 
These other grounds are not reducible to the eudaimonist claim, Swanton says, 
although they are easily mistaken for it:  
 
What is the ultimate point depends on how the virtue is targeted at the 





The rationale of virtue is the pluralistic demands of the world rather than the 
‘perfection of our nature’
687
 as in a neo-Aristotelian (eudaimonistic) virtue ethics. 
Swanton’s PVE, in contrast, provides an anti-foundationalist justification for virtue. 
The point of the virtues in PVE is not to offer a set of base-level values from which 
an explication of the demands of the world can be derived. Loosening the connection 
between eudaimonia and virtue, permits a problematisation of virtue itself. This has 
the result that there is not a list of the virtues that is immutable that one is working 
from. Rather, the list is always the problematic, to be worked out from situation to 
situation by the agent.  Recognising that there is complexity in the area of the 
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delineation of virtue itself posits virtue as a ‘dynamic process-notion,’ rather than an 




The main point that I wish to make is that in order for virtue to be problematised in 
the manner Swanton elaborates, the agent is one for whom an inner life is of 
paramount importance. That is, if virtue is what is problematised, and must be 
worked out from situation to situation, the agent needs to be able to take on this task 
since it is the agent who is being called upon to constantly read and re-evaluate each 
situation. Thus, the question to be asked is: what does the ‘inner’ life of the agent 
consist of?  
 
Recall that Brown’s ‘for us’ has the aim of instantiating ‘desire’ in the subject 
beyond the ‘I want’ in terms of liberal self-interest. This orients the subject instead 
towards the collective. I want to suggest that all three of Swanton’s examples of lives 
draw out the issue of the embeddedness of the individual in a larger society. Not one 
of the individuals is a completely independent self for whom recognition and care 
are not paramount. In the first example, the woman in the jungle is moved in her 
work by a deep concern for the well-being of others. In the second example, the 
artist, who believes that she has something to say, is pushed on in her commitment to 
her art to keep trying to get this appreciated by a wider audience. She does not do art 
only for herself, but because she believes that she has something to say that others 
need, or want, to hear. And in the final example, the environmentalist thinks that his 
environmental message is for the wider good of society (and perhaps for the 
environment itself?). He comes to be appreciated when his work is recognised 
(although only after his death). The primary concern and target of engagement in all 
three is not with the individual, the self, but rather with the ‘other’ and is about the 
good in the context of a common good and not eudaimonia.  
 
Thus, the two threads that come out of these examples are that the agent is not 
simply a self, but a ‘self’ that moves in the world enmeshed ‘within a matrix of 
concentric fields extending from the intra-psychic through the interpersonal to the 
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larger culture in which we are all immersed.’
689
  This is ‘desire’ in the subject that 
moves beyond the ‘I want’ in terms of liberal self-interest and instead is an 
orientation of the subject towards the collectively conceived ‘good’ as the aim of that 
‘desire.’ This is most clearly illustrated in Swanton’s first example of the aid-worker 
in the jungle. Her ‘desire’ is to save lives, and as many as possible. In order to do 
this, she sacrifices even her own life. Her ‘desire’ is for a good larger than herself. 
What is the limit though? She ends up losing her life. If eudaimonia is not connected 
to virtue are there now no limits?  
 
The aid worker’s ‘desire’ is one of a universal love that is not constrained and 
trained by ‘care of the self.’ Given that the agent is embedded in a social matrix, and 
that virtue is something that is a ‘dynamic process-notion,’ then the agent must 
possess certain inner resources, all of her own that enable her to articulate a good 
beyond herself. But a picture of the good that is oriented towards a collective good 
must also contain and retain within it some conception of ‘care of the self.’  
 
In Swanton, this ‘desire’ in the agent belongs to what she terms the ‘basic modes of 
moral acknowledgment’ and includes: ‘universal love and its necessary precursors, 
receptivity and appreciation; self-love; universal respect and self-respect; and 
creativity.’
690
 All of the basic modes of moral acknowledgment feature in all of the 
virtues. In the next section I look at these basic modes of moral acknowledgment and 
show how they elaborate the inner life of the self. I address the central notion in 
identity politics, i.e. ‘desire’ and via Swanton, argue that it is a notion that is 
comprised of both ‘vision’ and ‘attention.’ As the issue of self-reflection becomes 
raised, what begins to emerge is a complex picture of the person that provides the 
basis for a richer approach to the ethical concerns raised in identity politics.  
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The responsive self 
I have argued that identity politics movements are premised on an understanding of 
the self as inextricably related to ‘the good’ in a way that is potentially and 
aspirationally transformative and that Brown’s language of ‘I want this for us’
691
 is 
suggestive of moving the agent in this direction. If Brown’s ‘for us’ instantiates the 
‘desire’ of the subject as beyond the ‘I want,’ in terms of liberal self-interest, and 
orients the subject instead towards the collective or a politically conceived ‘good’ as 
the aim of that ‘desire,’ the ‘I’ must be capable of a certain kind of attention that is 
oriented towards the ‘us.’ I argue in what follows that this sort of self can be 
developed by drawing on Swanton’s ‘basic modes of moral acknowledgment,’ which 
include ‘universal love and its necessary precursors, receptivity and appreciation; 
self-love; universal respect and self-respect; and creativity.’
 692
 
Love and respect 
Swanton’s ‘basic modes of moral acknowledgement’ are plural and are present in all 
of the virtues, serving to integrate the virtues. She draws her account primarily from 
Kant’s ‘The Doctrine of Virtue,’
 693
 in which he claims that morality is essentially 
comprised of two opposing forces, love and respect. Kant claims that love and 
respect are opposite forces and therefore, pull in opposite directions not dissimilar to 
attraction and repulsion in physics.
694
 Clarifying that she does not mean, nor does 
she take Kant to mean, that love and respect are opposed to each other, Swanton 
argues rather that there is an ‘equilibrium’ that the two must meet in order for there 
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to be stability between them.
695
  That is, both forces must be integrated if the moral 
realm is not to completely fail. Swanton takes this to mean that love and respect 
must be brought into equilibrium in the agent ‘if they are to constitute aspects of the 




Love is comprised of universal love and self-love. Rather than thinking of these as 
separate virtues, possibly coming into conflict with each other and other virtues, 
Swanton sees Kant as pointing in the direction of seeing them as ‘part of the profile 
of all virtues.’
697
 Thus, all virtues, in order to be virtues, require both forms of love. 
Together they are what bring the virtues into their proper equilibrium. Love involves 
forms of coming close, but ‘wise forms of coming close.’
698
 The modes of 
receptivity and appreciation are essential to this ‘wise’ coming close.  
 
Swanton identifies ‘receptivity’ and ‘appreciation’ as part of the modes of moral 
acknowledgment and as essential for ‘excellence in the coming close of love.’
699
 
Drawing on Murdoch’s notion of ‘attention’ and Noddings’ notion of ‘engrossment,’ 
Swanton shows how Murdoch’s ‘attention’ relates to both wisdom and love and, in 
the end, how both depend on self-knowledge. Starting with Murdoch’s well-known 
passage of the mother, M, and daughter-in-law, D, Swanton draws out two important 
issues:
700
 firstly, what the relation between attention and love is and, secondly, 
whether (loving) ‘attention’ can be distorting and inaccurate to the facts. In other 
words, Swanton emphasises what the relation between attention and wisdom is. 
 
Recall from Chapter Five that the mother, M, makes a transition from being ill-
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disposed to her daughter-in-law, D, having initially viewed D with a hostile gaze, 
and now views her with a loving gaze. Murdoch claims that the mother-in-law is 
capable of giving ‘just and careful attention to an object, which confronts her.’
701
 
Swanton analyses this notion of ‘attention’ in terms of the idea of receptivity, or 
‘engrossment,’ as a form of heightened awareness elaborated by Noddings, which is 
a ‘pre-analytical’ openness that involves feeling rather than thinking. It also involves 
an ability to quieten and close out unimportant, background noise that could obscure 
one’s focus. According to Swanton, it is this awareness, openness, and quietness that 
are involved in receptivity or ‘engrossment’ that makes a loving attention possible. It 
is precisely this sort of emotional attitude that allows the positive features of the 
daughter-in-law to emerge to the mother over and above the negative features. It is 
also what allows the previously negative features that were in focus to be 





Turning to the latter issue, missed by Murdoch’s example, Swanton addresses the 
important point of whether (loving) attention can be distorting and inaccurate to the 
facts. Swanton asks why it is that the loving gaze’s account of ‘unpolished’ as 
‘refreshingly simple’ should be privileged over the hostile gaze’s account of 
‘unpolished’ as ‘vulgar.’
703
 Swanton’s reply is that a loving gaze entails ‘practical 
wisdom.’
704
 In Murdoch’s it appears that a further and more careful look at the 
daughter-in-law is what is necessary to decide what wise attention might amount to. 
Yet, as Swanton points out, we already have Murdoch’s description of the daughter-
in-law – she is ‘unpolished, unrefined, lacking in dignity.’
705
 What we require 
therefore, is not further knowledge (cognitive knowledge), but self-knowledge. 
Given that the world is ‘chancy and huge,’
706
 our perception of it is (necessarily) 
selective. Because our perception is (necessarily) selective, we should strive to make 
it at least free of psychological distortions and this task requires work from us and 
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work on ourselves.  
 
Since ‘attention’ can become obscured by the psyche, which is prone to ‘self-pity, 
resentment, fantasy and despair,’
707
although involving Noddings’ pre-analytic 
receptivity or engrossment, the analytic phase (practical wisdom) can only be entered 
into with ‘appreciation.’
708
 Swanton describes the analytic phase of appreciation 
through Hume’s standard of taste: ‘It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste, a 
rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled: at least, a decision, 
afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another.’
709
 It is here though 
that I think Swanton goes wrong on two counts when she employs Hume’s standard 
of taste. Firstly, this just does not seem to be what Murdoch is trying to get at in her 
example of M and D. Secondly, Swanton herself, does not seem to be trying to 
develop such a standard. I discuss both of these points here since pointing to where 
Swanton goes wrong, illuminates where she is right. 
 
Firstly, if Hume’s account of appreciation were a correct analysis of Murdoch’s 
mother’s reflective process, we would either see the mother prefer love over 
resentment on the basis of an independent standard, or, alternatively, the mother’s 
emotional transformation could be seen to be made on the basis of an independent 
standard. Yet, there is no evidence of such a standard anywhere in the example. 
Neither of these possibilities is apparent in Murdoch’s example. Murdoch does not 
portray M as comparing one sentiment to another on the basis of any standard. What 
we do see is that the shift made by M happens internally and on the basis of very 
careful self-reflection, without reference to an independent standard. The mother 
appraises herself in relation to D, and although this assessment involves M looking 
at her own feelings, the form of the appraisal does not proceed as implied by Hume’s 
remark.  
 
It seems to me that a more accurate understanding of what is happening is that a 
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progression is being made from one set of feelings to another. The progression is 
based upon a stringent internal scrutiny that is undertaken by M in relation to, not 
only herself (M), but to another (D). If we invoke the notion of a standard to try to 
make sense of what is happening, as Swanton does, what becomes suggested is that 
M’s changed evaluation of her daughter-in-law results in nothing more than an 
endorsement, or acceptance, of the daughter-in-law’s personal style. But this is 
clearly not what Murdoch’s point is. And I do not think that Swanton herself is 
trying to make this point either. An appreciation of the daughter-in-law is certainly 
part of what Swanton wants to draw out, but by invoking Hume, Swanton obscures 
the paramount role of self-reflection in the mother-in-law’s transition. Indeed, 
Murdoch’s mother arrives at her conclusions of D after a process of reflection, rather 
than beginning from a unitary account of value (Hume’s standard). And this is 
Swanton’s point here as well. Self-reflection is of paramount importance when, 
indeed because, value is plural.  
 
Self-knowledge requires self-reflection and both are necessary for bringing about 
ethical change in the self in relation to the other. As Murdoch’s example illustrates 
so clearly though, self-reflection is not mere introspection. Introspection might yield 
knowledge of what beliefs, desires, sensations and the like we have. Introspection is, 
as Kant remarked, merely ‘occupying ourselves with spying out the involuntary 
course of our thoughts and feelings and, so to speak, carefully recording its interior 
history.’
710
 Self-reflection aims at something more than mere knowledge. Self-
reflection has the more global aim of understanding the context and significance of 
particular mental states in terms of the self as a whole. Self-reflection, therefore, is 
practical and its aim is to yield knowledge that has an effect on how a life is lived 
and understood. It is because self-reflection is practical in this way that mere 
knowledge in the sense of an itemisation of mental states is not what is required. 
Self-reflection is, as Murdoch points out, an activity and one through which we come 
to know our own ethical quality, recognise value and integrate this knowledge into 
our lives. And I think this is what Swanton’s main point is, but that she obscures by 
invoking Hume’s ‘Standard of taste.’  
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Swanton would have done better to draw on her own evocation of Nietzsche here. It 
is after all, by drawing on Nietzsche that Swanton formulates the argument that 
virtue is a ‘dynamic process notion.’ How might Swanton have drawn on her own 
insights into Nietzsche to have delivered a more fruitful critique of M? Instead of 
invoking Hume’s standard of taste, Nietzsche points in the further direction of self-
love as a dynamic activity that enables the agent to distinguish between acceptance 
as a core of virtue and bad acceptance, which is complacency and self-satisfaction. 
Nietzschean self-love is activity that requires that the agent think of herself as being 
worthy of further improvement and discovery. And is this not more accurate as a 
description of what M is doing? Is she not taking a look at herself and her attitude 
towards D and seeking to improve herself (in relation to how she views D)? She is 
dissatisfied with herself in this regard, and so she looks again and seeks to improve 
herself. She asks herself, how can I be better? How can I do better? 
 
The notion of ‘attention,’ as Swanton has developed it here, allows for a different 
kind of moral thinking than that of other rule-bound ethics, like Kantianism or 
utilitarianism. Rather than working from a prior list of values and perhaps, if at all, 
seeing how self-reflection might contribute to them, what Swanton does, vis-à-vis 
Murdoch, is to look at how a reflecting self would fill out the idea of choice-
worthiness. This is not about arguing for one kind of life over another, but rather to 
show how it is that reflective activities that raise the question of value contribute to a 
life along various (plural) dimensions of value. 
 
Living virtuously requires that the agent’s ‘attention’ is directed inward in order to 
return outward. The self-reflective self is concerned with the state of her self, but in 
light of values beyond her. Reflection for the sake of reflection, or introspection, has 
nothing to do with the ethical project. It is one in which the inner life and reflective 
capacities of the agent play a paramount and critical role. To return to Horney’s 
‘neurosis,’ we must acknowledge that we cannot simply decide what to believe or to 
feel about a matter without permitting in the relevant ‘facts’ (cognitive knowledge) 
of a situation to guide us. Therefore, self-reflection is not completely independent of 
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self-knowledge. There are constraints encountered in, and by, the self-reflective self, 
and these need to be addressed. Murdoch herself writes: 
 
Our states of consciousness differ in quality, our fantasies and reveries 
are not trivial and unimportant, they are profoundly connected with our 
energies and our abilities to choose and act.
711
 
Swanton’s conclusion is that attention as receptivity and appreciation are necessary 
for virtuous love, but as aspects of wisdom, they do not entail detachment from the 
work of the self. Accepting receptivity and appreciation as necessary for (good) love 
does not preclude the coming close analysis of love. Attention, therefore, allows for 
a different kind of moral thinking from that of the more rule-bound ethics. The 
constraints encountered in, and by, the self-reflective self, need to be addressed.  
Murdoch’s example of M and D though is rather innocuous. M seems to be at a safe 
distance from D, who is living in Australia. The relationship between mother-in-law 
and daughter-in-law is not of the same ‘dangerousness’ as Reagan’s activists. 
Swanton’s aid worker’s dilemmas seem of a more pressing nature and raise 
questions to do with how it is that the self will be safeguarded from being swallowed 
up by self-sacrifice.
712
 How do we ensure that the other is not swallowed up in 
invasive compassion? How does the agent guard against a self-sacrificing 
compassion? In the next section I turn to a look at how Swanton’s account deals with 
the central problem of how to combine ‘love’ with respect for the self and others as 
individuals.  
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Swanton’s basic argument is that love is necessary for justice. Love is part of, 
though not the whole of, the profile of justice. In detailing this argument, Swanton 
makes the following distinctions between universal love and other ideals such as 
respect, partialistic love, and universal benevolence: 
1. It is a form of coming close; 
2. It is particular; 
3. It is universal; 
4. It is impartial; 
5. It is unconditional.713 
Universal love as particular is ‘constrained by the ‘fitnesses’ of time, place and 
circumstances, one is to come close to another as an individual, an individual who is 
fungible with others.’
714
 That is, universal love is pervasively context specific and 
therefore, plural. Universal love is not to be thought of as a love for all of humanity 
as such. Rather, it is a bond of a particular kind that exists between individual 
persons. Universal love has its basis in self-love since it is only when the agent 
refrains from externalising self-contempt in hostility, defensiveness, etc. that she will 
be able to develop the bond of universal love. Therefore, universal love is premised 
on, as well as based in, personal work that is transformative. The self-to-self 
relationship is central to the success of developing the bond of universal love.  
According to Swanton, there are three possible views on the impartiality and 
universality of universal love. Firstly, there is the view that human beings have equal 
and inherent worth as persons independent of others’ responses to them. The 
impartiality of others’ love for them is a response to this equality. Secondly, 
impartial love is creative in the sense that worth is something that does not exist 
independently, but is created. The worth that persons have is brought into existence 
and does not pre-exist its creation. Swanton though moves to defend a third view that 
claims that impartial love is neither of these foregoing views, but is instead a bond of 
a certain kind, which she terms an ‘expressivist view.’
715
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Swanton defines her alternative, expressivist view, as successfully avoiding the issue 
of searching for some grounding property: ‘Love is not resultant on beliefs about 
value or merit…it is groundless.’
716
 That is, it is not to be based on some 
characteristic, either created or discovered, or otherwise recognised in the beloved. 
Defining this sort of love as groundless does not mean that it is arbitrary, fortuitous, 
or incidental. Instead, love is similar in kind to a judgment about what an agent 
capable of such love is like, as opposed to a judgment of what the beloved is like. 
Universal love is groundless love and the capacity for this sort of love lies in the 
capacity of the agent to form bonds of this sort. 
If universal love is groundless, how can the agent make a determination of its scope 
and how can she love (the object) in a suitable way? Unsurprisingly, Swanton again 
takes a pervasively pluralistic approach to this question. It would be misguided to 
look for one highly generalizable criterion for moral considerability. A pluralistic 
approach offers a wide range of virtues within which universal love is contoured – 
that is, made more specific. Thus, though the agent does not love universally for 
reasons, the goodness of that universal love is grounded inter alia properties of the 
object of love, such as the nature of the good, value, status, relation to the agent. The 
goodness and reasonableness of such love lies in the character of the agent, as well 
as in the beloved.  
If goodness lies in the character of the agent are there certain features which are, in 
part, definitive of goodness in the love the agent expresses for someone (or 
something)? If so, does this not suggest that love is conditional on something? 
Swanton clarifies that such objections are merely based on a confusion of reasons for 
love and features which make for goodness in love. In virtuously expressed universal 
love, although the agent loves persons as ends in themselves (as opposed to means), 
this does not mean that the agent loves persons because they are ends. In order to see 
persons properly, in the sense that Swanton developed the notion of attention vis-à-
vis Murdoch and Noddings, we must make such a distinction in relation to others. 
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For if we love persons for the reason that they are persons, we end up carrying out an 
information gathering exercise that yields only cognitive knowledge of other 
persons: Are they persons? On what basis are they persons? Are they women? Are 
they white? Are they like me? Are they different? And so on. This leaves the agent 
in a place insufficient to take on the task of undertaking the personal work she needs 
to do in regards to herself in relation to others.  
Universal love, on the other hand, requires that the agent withhold judgment of the 
other. In this sense, universal love is impartial. That is, the agent refrains from 
defining the beloved, or object of love on the basis of some property. Instead the 
agent is open and receptive – she is not judgmental. In this way, universal love is 
non-judgmental, but it is also unconditional in the sense of coming close. 
Understanding universal love as entailing unconditionality should not be confused 
with self-sacrifice though. Rather, unconditionality points towards understanding 
universal love as not premised on some particular feature of the beloved. The love 
rather is based upon the bond between the agent and the beloved. Universal love as 
an aspect of the profile of the virtues (such as justice, benevolence, patience, etc.) 
allows that such love will not require the agent to be loving beyond her means. The 
strength of the love will always be dependent upon situation, the agent’s capacity 
and her strength.  
To summarise to this point, Swanton’s expressive view points towards answering a 
relatedly and troubling criticism of virtue ethics, which is that virtue ethics is 
standardly taken to hold that virtuous behaviour is in some manner easy, natural, or 
habitual. That is, virtuous behaviour appears to stem from inclination rather than 
reason. Yet, if we follow Swanton’s expressivist view, we can see that spontaneity is 
involved in virtuous behaviour and virtuousness does not arise out of conformation 
to what the virtuous agent would do. Rather, it arises out of on-going and committed 
personal work. Since a pluralistic conception of virtue ethics is open-ended rather 
than end-product oriented, it is important to look at the place of creativity in it. For, 
if virtue ethics is open-ended in the sense that the good is not finalisable, but 
constantly being re-formulated and re-understood, then the good, and the agent in 
relation to the good, is undergoing and undertaking revision consistently. This 
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means, in turn, that the agent, herself is constantly being called upon to change and 
to re-define. I want to suggest that if we understand this change as both Brown 
(thinking of the ‘I’ in relation to the good of the ‘we’) and Butler (the open-
endedness of performativity) do, then, it is a creative activity that it is simultaneously 
originative and productive. That is, creativity needs to be future-thinking rather than 
static.  
Creativity 
Recall that within identity politics identity, moving about in a context of alterity, 
must be preserved, but in a manner in which it is open to being transformed, or 
transformable. Therefore, it is necessary to know how the agent can change, and 
change not in the regressive direction that Brown, via Nietzsche’s ressentiment, has 
argued much identity politics is mired in. Now what needs to be clarified is what 
mode the ‘desire’ takes once ‘desire’ has been ‘purified.’ I think that the answer lies 
in the area of Swanton’s notion of creativity, which she classifies as another one of 
the modes of moral acknowledgment.  
Swanton takes her lead from Maslow who argued that creativity is something that is 
pervasive to all aspects of life.
717
 Thus, she views creativity not as a separate virtue, 
but rather as a mode of moral acknowledgment and thus, similarly placed with love 
and respect: ‘creativity is an aspect of the profile of all or virtually all of the 
virtues.’
718
 Swanton takes the middle ground in how she defines creativity, arguing 
that it has both an expressive and an achievement component. As an achievement 
word, Swanton agrees with Glickman
719
 that creativity involves, if not requires, 
evaluation of its product. This is what differentiates creativity from love and respect 
and is also what makes it a ‘task word.’
720
 Creativity leads to a product or an 
outcome.  
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If creativity is a ‘task word’ with outcomes, it then is necessary to understand what 
features the product needs to exhibit such that it is to be deemed properly creative or 
created rather than simply produced or promoted. To recall Butler’s notion of 
‘performativity’, the question here is about how creativity can be distinguished from 
‘performance.’ Swanton suggests that the features of a creative product fall into three 
main categories: ‘novelty’, ‘surprise,’ and ‘value.’
721
 Swanton dismisses ‘novelty’ on 
the basis that there are certain constraints that are present in creativity when it is 
understood within virtue to do with context and bonds. To illustrate this, Swanton 
takes the example of a work (W), and a conceptual space (C). If someone has 
produced W having worked within C, then W cannot satisfy the condition of novelty 
relative to C.
722
 That is, an act is not creative unless it transforms the conceptual 
space – there is a condition of novelty. But Swanton maintains that genuinely 
creative recombinations of available ideas can occur. This is the ‘surprise’ category 
in which a different relational property of the product of the creative act occurs. That 
is, ‘the innovation of the product and its unpredictability from the point of view of a 
given population whose members were acquainted with some of the ideas or objects 
prior to their recombination.’
723
 Creativity thus maintains the ‘I’ and attends to the 
context of the ‘I’. It would be the ‘lone oracle’ that is capable of ‘novel’ creativity. 
‘Surprising’ creativity reflects much closer the embeddedness of the self. Swanton 
points out that Novitz argues that creativity must have a value component and that in 
order for a ‘product’ to be creative it must have ‘real value to some people.’
724
 
Although Swanton views it as a mistake to think of creativity as a product word, she 
is right to retain this as a value component of creativity as an aspect of the profiles of 
the virtues. It is creativity that recognises the social embeddedness of the agent and 
her relation to the good.  
What is the point of creativity as a mode of moral acknowledgment? In Nietzsche it 
is the promotion of value. Its function is to serve that value and thereby, promote the 
value of the highest cultural ideals. Looking to psychology though, as Swanton does, 
there appears a different understanding of the point of creativity. Here creativity is 
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expressive of a bond, a bond with self. It is a foremost expression of self-love, and 
an indication of psychic health.
725
 Maslow sees creativity as necessary for healthy 
human growth and functioning. Unlike Nietzsche, he does not view creativity as a 
reserve of the few especially talented. Rather, creativity is ‘an aspect of practically 




Swanton does not view Maslow’s notion of creativity as being in complete 
opposition to Nietzsche’s since the latter saw two forms of psychic health as leading 
to mediocrity. Firstly, the ressentiment of the ‘slave type’ externalises self-hate, and 
secondly, there is the danger of the ‘will-lessness.’ Both sabotage creativity: the first, 
sabotages creativity in others as well as inhibiting it in one’s self; and the second, by 
leading a ‘life of adjustment.’
727
 Whereas Nietzsche is interested in creativity of the 
extraordinary individual, Maslow is interested in a more quotidian creativity. 
Maslow is interested in the health of the ordinary individual, and because of this he 
claims that ‘we must become more interested in the creative process, the creative 
attitude, the creative person, rather than in the creative product alone.’
728
 Swanton 
identifies a tension here between creativity as an expression of the flourishing 
individual and creativity as a societal and cultural goal. According to her, this 




Swanton importantly raises the issue of Nietzsche’s understanding, shared by so 
many, of the importance of creativity as a product notion. Nietzsche’s ‘philosopher 
of the future,’ who ‘lives a life of creativity and experimentation, is a free spirit who 
lives unphilosophically and unwisely, above all imprudently, and bears the burden 
and duty of a hundred attempts and temptations – he risks himself constantly.’
730
 
Nietzsche articulates the commonly held notion that there is a connection between 
imprudence and creativity. But Swanton suggests that despite this connection it is 
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possible to draw on, another, age-old distinction. She invokes to the defence of a 
‘standardly quotidian’ notion of creativity, the Aristotelian distinction between 
ordinary and heroic virtue – heroic virtue is not for everyone. I think this is a useful 
and legitimate point to make, but one that undermines, or at least does not serve to 
strengthen Swanton’s argument that creativity is a mode of moral acknowledgment. 
Within her own system of a pluralistic conception of virtue ethics, in which there has 
been a loosening of the connection between virtue and flourishing, the agent is called 
on, from context to context, to define and re-define her self, the good and her relation 
to the good. There cannot be a list of virtues that can get categorised under ‘heroic 
virtues.’  I believe that Swanton would have made a stronger case if she had invoked 
her ‘bonds and attention to context.’ After all, one of the main insights of virtue 
ethics is that the agent, and thus virtue, are both socially embedded. It seems to me 
that according to Swanton’s own project, there just are not different classes of 
virtues, there are only different contexts. Creativity as a mode of moral 
acknowledgment will feature appropriately in each context and in each virtue. 
Creativity contributes to the delineation of the virtues.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of a pluralistic account of virtue ethics.  
It presented an account of how a non-eudaimonistic virtue ethics elaborates a self 
that is ‘inextricably’ related to the good, where the notion of the good is not finally 
definable. It showed how only in non-eudaimonistic virtue ethics in which virtue is 
not an end state of perfection, allows for virtue, and thus, the practicing of virtues, to 
be construed as a ‘dynamic process-notion.’
731
 A number of ethical concepts - such 
as love, respect, and creativity– contribute to enriching the picture of the inner life of 
the self. I showed how PVE addresses the central notion of ‘desire’ as comprised of 
both ‘vision’ and ‘attention’ in order to elaborate a picture of the self with the full 
resources of an inner life. A complex picture of the person emerges that provides the 
basis for a richer approach to the ethical concerns raised in identity politics.  
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Questions remain regarding the possibility of applying this work to the problematic 
of the feminist identity politics debate. How does it contribute to the problem of 
combining collective politics and diversity? Does it help us to conceptualise feminist 
collectivity in a way that does not exclude diversity and yet, does not require unity? I 
do not have scope in the present project to answer all of these questions fully, but in 
the next chapter I try to offer a very rough and preliminary sketch of how the 
normative vocabulary provided by Swanton’s PVE might begin to. 
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8 
Practically speaking: applying pluralistic virtue ethics 
Introduction 
The previous chapter offered a picture of the agent that a pluralistic conception of 
virtue ethics offers and showed how this account is distinctive. The aim of this 
chapter is to consider how such an agent might be expected to function in an on-the-
ground case. That is, how can we expect the PVE agent to act when it comes to a 
real life situation in which problem-solving is involved? What does a PVE 
explanation add or take away from explaining how agents function in situations of 
difference and conflict? From where does the pluralistic virtue ethical agent derive 
her virtue knowledge? What can we expect her aims to be in problem-solving 
situations? What might be the virtues of practice she exercises? In order to address 
these questions, I begin to draw together the threads of my argument by offering a 
very preliminary suggestion of what the pluralistic virtue ethical self might look like 
in a particularised context.  
 
This chapter returns to the issues raised in Chapter Two concerning a conception of 
the individual in the context of collective political action. There I argued that 
collective political work requires individuals to constantly engage in ever-changing 
and intensely inclusive cooperative work across difference and that this entails 
ongoing self-transformation. The work of collective politics depends upon a notion 
of a self that can cultivate flexibility with respect to an individual’s own self-
understandings. It also requires that the self cultivate a receptivity to different others, 
who may be unappealing and sometimes threatening. Therefore, what is required of 
the self is tolerance for ambiguity and change. The dispositions necessary for this 
sort of work cannot be assumed as natural, for they are dispositions that require 
cultivation. This leads me back to the initial questions I raised, but now in light of 
PVE: What sort of participant is the PVE self? How does the PVE self take up a 
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non-reductive relation to the other? How is it that the PVE self allows, indeed, aims, 
at transformation of the self within the context of collective political action?  
 
My argument throughout this chapter is that a PVE account of the self is diagnostic 
as well as normative. That is, I propose that the self that is at the heart of a pluralistic 
virtue ethical account is one that we can indeed see at work when we look at cases of 
practical collective political work. At the same time, it illuminates the problem of 
combining collective politics and diversity and provides guidance.  
Throughout the thesis I have engaged with the issue of the self in identity politics 
from a mainly philosophical perspective. Theorizing about ethical agents requires 
bridging theory with practice, an issue critical for feminism and particularly to the 
re-thinking of collective political action. It is for this reason that in this chapter I 
move to sketch out how we might operationalize PVE. I move beyond a discussion 
of PVE’s philosophical concepts to show how some of its key concepts can be used 
to analyse political and social cooperation amidst diversity and conflict in the 
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC).  In particular, I return to look in much 
more detail at the case of Róisín McAliskey, which was briefly discussed in Chapter 
Two. Throughout this thesis I have built the argument that one of the most central 
issues for feminism is how to deal with difference/diversity. The NIWC provides a 
notable case to look at for how it did not seek to avoid differences/diversity, but to 
the contrary, centred difference and conflict. Indeed, central to its organising 
principles indeed was how to combine difference and conflict with collective 
politics. The McAliskey case is especially significant for how it tested whether or not 
a coalition of women from divisive national and political backgrounds could respond 
to an issue so important to both unionists and nationalists. My main interest here is 
not what the outcome of the response was, but how the Coalition went about the task 
of working out how to respond.  
The first section of this chapter provides a brief background of the Northern Ireland 
context and the place of the NIWC in it.
732
 The second section gives a more detailed 
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account of the Roisin McAliskey case than was presented in Chapter Two. Since the 
literature in feminist theory frames the case of the NIWC within the methodology of 
transversal politics,
733
 in the third section, I discuss how this approach understands 
this particular case. In the final section, I outline the framework that a pluralistic 
virtue ethical account offers. I argue here that a PVE framework fills in some of the 
gaps left by a ‘transversal’ approach. Importantly, a PVE can be drawn on to outline 
the attitudes and dispositions that diverse groups of women, working across 
difference, cultivate to establish non-repressive affirmative political connections.  
Background: identity, difference and political organising in 
Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland remains, despite movements towards a devolved government, a 
divided nation. Conflict is largely defined as a struggle between two rival groups – 
Protestant and Catholic. The divisiveness between the two is played out in physical 
violence, sectarian prejudices and contested notions of citizenship, belonging and the 
definition of the nation-state. The participation of women in formal politics is 
statistically and comparatively low.
734
 In community activism though, women have 
initiated cross-country alliances that transgress divisive religious and cultural 
boundaries. Most analyses of the women’s movement in Northern Ireland address 
women’s participation in formal politics and the impact community activism has had 
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on the participation of women in that arena.
735
 In what follows, I concentrate instead 
on the relationship between identity and difference and how this plays out in the 
internal workings of the women’s movement and in particular, the NIWC.  
In Northern Ireland, identity functions in such a way as to polarize differences. 
There, one can only ever occupy an identity position that is either Irish, Catholic, 
republican, nationalist; or British, Protestant, loyalist, unionist. The city of Belfast 
offers an illustrative example of this. Most of the city is ethnically segregated, 
embodying a quotidian apartheid. Of its 51 administrative wards, 27 have more than 
either 95 percent Protestants or 95 percent Catholics. Long high fences – ‘peace 
lines’ – have been erected between the conflict-prone areas.
736
 Identities are 
reinforced by a denial of difference as territorial and ethnic boundaries work to 
exclude outsiders and contain insiders. Belfast, in its division into two neat 
communities – one Protestant and the other Catholic – treats each one as a natural 
organic whole within whose boundaries individuals share a sense of belonging and a 
commitment to shared interests, positions and goals. This ‘cosy inclusiveness’ 
though also serves to generate ‘borders, dichotomies, and exclusions,’ which bar 




Segregation and suppression of difference fosters mutual ignorance. Consider the 
Catholic civil servant who, when asked whether his Protestant colleagues lacked 
insight into local life answered: ‘With some of them their ignorance is total, absolute 
and complete. You have people determining housing policy who have never been on 
the Shankill Road or the Falls Road.’
738
 Cockburn notes that in these roads the locals 
are not only strangers to each other, but to themselves as well. Cockburn recounts 
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how a social worker told her that she takes women in mixed (Catholic and 
Protestant) groups to a café for something to eat, first on one side of the line and then 
on the other, to teach ‘them that the food in the Falls is every bit as tasty as in the 
Shankill.’
739
 Their ignorance does not end at what the other eats. It extends to 
knowledge of themselves. Cockburn again recounts what a youth worker told her of 
the Protestant youngsters she works with: ‘They see themselves as British. Yet you 
ask them why they’re British, they’ve no idea. Ask them what they like about being 
British, they’ve no idea. Ask them what they’re frightened of, what would happen if 
we had a united Ireland. They don’t know.’
740
  
The ceasefires in Northern Ireland, although offering new opportunities for dialogue, 
have not eased ethnic, religious and political conflict. Because of this, ‘other 
cleavages, inequalities, and identities are accorded low priority.’
741
 Not only do 
constitutional concerns take precedence, but as Roulston notes, most women also 
share the same divisive community preoccupations. It is precisely because of this 
that feminism cannot disregard these other identity positions: ‘Northern Irish women 




In a context of ethnic and religious divisiveness, what are the possibilities for 
undertaking collective political action across differences and inequalities? Feminist 
diversity and postmodern accounts of identity like those discussed in Chapter Two, 
problematize the notion of a unified, essentialised female identity. They view the 
idea as not only impossible, but undesireable as a goal, or premise, for feminist 
collective politics. Instead, they identify the complex, overlapping, shifting and 
conflicting intersubjective relations as what might form and transform 
difference/identity. Feminists studying Northern Ireland have indeed documented 
this sort of multi-faceted identity.
743
 Porter, for example, argues that it is impossible 
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Attending to identity in ways that are, to recall Lloyd’s term, ‘constative’ in 
situations of radical alterity is not necessarily emancipative, but can serve to justify 
political closure in a manner similar to Brown’s ‘politicised identities.’ In Northern 
Ireland, loyalist women as ‘women’ have caused massive civil disruptions, violence 
and sometimes death as they have organised roadblocks in protest of the 
controversial right to march down nationalist roads. Republican women as women 
have been active in violent resistance to British rule. In Northern Ireland, as Porter 




When allegiances predominate, identity politics carries with it the risk of leading 
only to mutual ignorance and distrust. Any possibility of forming alliances across 
difference is foreclosed from the start. This is the observation that has been made by 
many studying the North Ireland women’s movement. The nationalist identities of 
Unionism and Irish republicanism have served as a barrier to the development of a 
unified women’s movement in Northern Ireland.
746
 The opportunities for taking the 
dangerous risks of coalition work, as Reagon has elaborated, are seldom available. 
Foreclosed also is the space necessary for the opportunity to cultivate Foucault’s 
attitudes of ‘refusal, curiosity and innovation.’
747
  
Yet, despite the divisive conflict engendered by divided and mutually distrustful 
identity positions, solidarity and alliances have emerged between women in Northern 
Ireland. These alliances did not emerge apolitically, but rather through practices 
aimed at recognising difference.
748
 The Belfast’s Women’s Support Network, for 
instance, came together, not out of friendship, but ‘because a common goal or 
common cause was stronger than the fear of personal risk involved in moving out of 
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safe familiar territory and across onto enemy terrain.’
749
 Forging alliances in zones 
of conflict, where political changes occur daily and participating in political projects 
with different others puts one at personal risk, is a risky and exhausting activity.  
 
If articulating identity politics through the language of ‘I am’ serves to fragment and 
obstruct the possibilities of solidarity, how successful are alliances that aim to shift 
that articulation to an ‘I want’? How successful are groups that have come together 
in order to achieve a particular goal? While alliances formed between some unionist 
and nationalist women’s groups have enjoyed varying degrees of success in 
achieving some socio-economic goals, the formation of the NIWC in 1996 provides 
a notable model of women organising across identity differences in a fractured 
polity.  
 
Monica McWilliams, a member of the Coalition, describes the politics practiced by 
the NIWC as intentionally transversalist and based principally on the notions of 
‘rooting’ and ‘shifting,’ which she defines as ‘being rooted in one’s own identity, but 
moving to appreciate another’s position.’
750
 According to McWilliams, the NIWC 
understood transversalism as ‘a process of dialogue across difference, a respect for 
differences,’ which leads to ‘a different kind of coalition politics’ in which 
participants ‘respect rather than bury their differences.’
751
 As discussed already in 
Chapter Two, transversalism rejects universalism and its assumption of unity and 
homogeneity. It rejects relativism and its assumption that there is no basis for a 
common understanding. Difference and conflict serve as starting points. 
 
The case of Róisín McAliskey and the deliberations that transpired within the NIWC 
in regards to this case, show how transversalist politics were operationlised. In 
assessing the case, I raise the following questions: how does transversalism explain 
this case? Are there limits to ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’? Is it missing something? Can 
transversalism explain the shift that the agent must make in order to heed the 
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‘message’ rather than the ‘messenger’? Do the terms of a transversal approach 
obscure anything crucial?  
The case of Róisín McAliskey 
Róisín McAliskey, daughter of the republican civil rights activist and former MP for 
Mid-Ulster, Bernadette Devlin (later McAliskey), was arrested in her home by the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary on 20 November 1996 on suspicion of her involvement in 
an IRA attack on a British army barracks in Germany. She was detained and 
interrogated for six days under emergency anti-terrorism laws. Following her arrest, 
McAliskey maintained that she was interrogated for five days without legal counsel 
and without being informed of the charges against her. On 27 November 1996 she 
was remanded to London pending extradition to Germany. Shortly after this she was 
transferred to the all-male Belmarsh prison. In response to Amnesty International, as 
well as growing international protest, McAliskey was eventually transferred back to 
London’s women’s prison, Holloway.  
 
Upon her arrest, McAliskey was classified as a Category A high risk prisoner.
752
 
This categorization meant that she was subject to solitary confinement, regular 
evening and morning strip searches as well as after ‘closed’ visits (i.e. visits with no 
physical contact). She was also subject to the added security measure of her cell light 
being turned on every hour throughout the night. Furthermore, her prisoner category 
also meant that she was excluded from prison communal exercise facilities.  
 
McAliskey was four months pregnant when she was originally arrested. She was 
asthmatic, prone to panic attacks and, due to an eating disorder, was severely 
underweight. She was fearful that she would be separated from her baby at birth and 
was told she may be manacled during the labour. Amnesty International protested 
that, not only had McAliskey been detained without charge, but the prison in which 
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she was detained did not provide adequate facilities for holding a Category A 
prisoner. Amnesty International denounced the conditions in which she was being 
imprisoned as ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.’
753
 Yet, despite McAliskey’s 
deteriorating physical and mental conditions, it took several months of mounting 
political pressure for the authorities to move to downgrade her status so that she 
could access the prison’s mother and baby unit.  
 
In May 1997, McAliskey was released on conditional bail just days before giving 
birth. She then spent the ensuing year in a psychiatric hospital, reportedly suffering 
from post-traumatic stress disorder and a severe form of post-natal depression. In the 
end McAliskey was never formally charged with any offence. In January 1998 she 
was cleared for extradition, but in March of the same year, the British Home 
Secretary announced that, on the basis of her medical condition, she would not be 
extradited.  
NIWC’s trasversalist approach to the McAliskey case 
When the McAliskey case became public, the challenge for the NIWC was to come 
to a position that would be acceptable to all of its members – unionist, nationalist, 
etc. – and one that could be publicly articulated within Coalition terms. Since the 
NIWC was not a homogeneous group, it could not assume unification and so, 
undertook discussions of the McAliskey case in an open forum.  
 
The NIWC began developing its position through an exchange of views at general 
meetings as well as in smaller teams, using as its framework the principles of 
transversalist politics. In these open meetings, participants intentionally confronted 
differing perspectives as women from diverse backgrounds all presented their 
perceptions. What was clear from the very beginning was that the identity that 
NIWC women shared by virtue of being ‘women’ would not be enough to come to a 
position on the case. Máire, a participant in some of the meetings, puts it so: 
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I am very conscious now when I’m looking to lobby on behalf of Róisín 
McAliskey’s rights as a woman, as a citizen, as a human being, that there 
are many sister organisations [in the women’s movement] that I know 
that I couldn’t approach…..When a situation comes up where a woman is 
in prison, she’s five months pregnant, and you feel that suddenly this has 
to be avoided, this is something that we can’t talk about: it really makes 




Any recourse to some sort of self-evident demands based on a universal sisterhood 
were unsettled for Máire by her observation that when the woman needing support 
was marked in advance by an identity – in this case, republicanism – she was outside 
the boundaries demarcated by ‘sisterhood.’ Therefore, the shared identity of 
‘woman’ could not serve as sufficient basis for forging and maintaining unity within 
the NIWC – something else would have to.  
 
What became clear from the beginning as the NIWC first worked out internally what 
their stance publicly would be on this case, was that hard work by individual women 
was required. In the open discussion forums, participants tried to persuade others and 
at times were called upon to adjust their views. Although arguments could be intense 
in these open forums, it was never about winning or losing. Rather, the aim was to 
find a position that could take into account deeply rooted loyalties and identities, 
whilst at the same time articulating the coalition’s founding principles of ‘equality, 
inclusion and respect.’
755
 These terms were far from self-evident. They hardly served 
to allow an internally diverse group to sidestep having to confront their differences 
as is evidenced by a report written up by two participants to the discussions: 
 
Aspects of her [McAliskey’s] case were discussed by the Women’s 
Coalition over several weeks. A range of issues were highlighted 
including the rights of the child, rights of prisoners, the treatment of 
women prisoners and the difficulties which arise when there is any 
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The ‘difficulties’ to which Wilde and McCabe refer are the manner in which in 
Northern Ireland, human rights ‘are traditionally seen as the domain of the 
nationalist or catholic community, especially when they relate to the issues of 
justice.’
757
 And, as might be expected from this historical legacy, Protestant and 
unionist members of the NIWC were wary that their support for McAliskey would 
be interpreted as support of a wider republican agenda. 
 
The ability of those members committed to principles of human rights, but still 
conflicted, benefitted from the contributions of other Protestant members. These 
members actively challenged the sectarian framework in which the McAliskey case 
was articulated as is captured in this quote of one such member: 
 
Some of the other Protestant members….immediately began talking 
about [Róisín’s] mother…and what she was likely to be involved in. I 
took the view that it was important to say what I had to say, specifically 
because I was Protestant, and that I was specifically talking to other 
Protestants in the Coalition…That was the way that I approached the 
discussions and debates….A lot of the reaction that people had was: the 
[McAliskey] name. So it was really about saying, ‘Well, forget the name. 
What about this situation for anybody?’ And then, you know, it was a 
very good example of going back to our basic principles and looking at 
the case through those and inevitably ending up at a particular position, 
because that was the only position you could have ended up - which was 




This member’s comments illustrate how hard it is to separate notions of justice from 
ethnic and political identity positions. This is both because some women did tend to 
come to the case having already pre-judged it based on McAliskey’s identity 
(‘Róisín’s story began before she was born’), and because the lives of the 
participants are framed by the sectarian landscape. The member quoted above, 
herself suggests that the discussions were ‘really about’ forgetting the ‘name.’ But 
can we really ‘forget the name’? Is it helpful to ‘forget’? Can forgetting lead to the 
transformative work that is necessary for individuals to work together across and 
because of diversity? Sagar, the Protestant activist who was nominated as one of 
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NIWC’s representatives to the peace talks, offers an account of her experience as a 
participant in the NIWC discussions about the McAliskey case which is particularly 
illuminating in this regard.  
 
Sagar recounts how she initially found it personally very difficult to think about 
Róisín McAliskey separate from her mother. McAliskey’s mother was the civil 
rights activist and MP, Bernadette Devlin McAliskey. For Sagar, herself a Protestant 
activist,  Devlin represented ‘painful’ and ‘bitter’ memories and conjured up feelings 
of ‘fear’ and ‘bigotry’ in herself.
759
 Sagar tells how she was able to recognise that in 
order to think about the Róisín case, she would have to face her own fears and 
bigotry. It was through the open discussions with other group members that Sager 
maintains she was able to come to view the case as being about equality and human 
rights, specifically prisoner’s rights. It was by focusing on commonly held values, 
according to Sagar, that she was able to agree that the McAliskey case represented 
an injustice. How is this journey explained within the terms of transversalism? 
The limits of transversal politics 
Transversalism places critical importance on dialogue and this is reflected in the 
process that the NIWC undertook in working out their stance on the McAliskey case. 
In transversalism, the dialogical process is elaborated through the notions of 
‘rooting’ and ‘shifting.’ Sagar approaches the McAliskey case from her ‘rooted’ 
position as a Protestant working class activist. According to transversalism, this 
position should not be given up. Sagar should stay true to her roots and her values. 
But staying ‘rooted’ should not involve a homogenisation of the ‘other.’ Instead, one 
should work to recognise differences. But this is not what Sagar appears to have 
done. She never both stays ‘rooted’ and ‘shifts.’ For Sagar, it is in trying to shift that 
she identifies the precise locus of her own injury. Why, when she looks at the issue 
of McAliskey does she feel fear, pain and hurt? The precise locus of injury for Sagar 
is the identity of McAliskey’s mother and what she this represents to Sagar in her 
‘rooted’ position.  
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At first, Sagar is unable to separate this information from McAliskey. Sagar appears 
unable to think of McAliskey as anything other than Bernadette’s daughter. She is 
unable to think of her as ‘a woman’ separate from her national identity. Indeed, 
Sagar was not alone in this view. Many republican feminists were critical of 
decoupling support for McAliskey ‘as a woman’ from her national identity. One 
such feminist questioned this tactic: 
 
Can you support somebody for part of themselves? I suppose Róisín 
herself, her body, became the locus of all those different debates about: 
is it because she’s a woman, because she’s a republican? – ‘I’ll support 
her because she’s a woman and because she’s pregnant but not because 





That Sagar, along with others, are unable to ‘forget’ McAliskey’s republican 
identity, serves as reminder of the limits of cognitive knowledge. In fact, her account 
suggests that it is not possible to ‘forget the name,’ but only to transform one’s 
relation to the ‘name.’ In order to do this, it is first necessary to grapple with how 
difficult it is to decouple notions of justice from the self-referential logic of our 
identity positions that may make ‘shifting’ difficult. Her account points to the 
possibility that the task is not to ‘forget,’ but to rather to ‘refuse’ who we are in 
relation to the name.  
 
Although Sagar focusses more on how she had to view the McAliskey case as being 
about equality and human rights in order to get to a point where she could support 
the NIWC supporting the case, she begins the account of her journey to this outcome 
from the very individual and personal stance of how she found it difficult to think 
about the case because of the fear and pain she felt in regards to McAliskey’s 
mother. Sagar does not suggest that for her it is a matter of forgetting ‘the name.’ 
Instead, Sagar maintains that it was only through a recognition of the painful 
memories conjured up by McAliskey’s identity (as the daughter of Bernadette) that 
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she begins to undertake the personal and inner work that is necessary to get to the 
point that she can view the case as being about equality and human rights. 
 
Transversalism accentuates communicative engagement and places an emphasis on 
the sharing of perspectives. It overemphasises the promise of cognitive knowledge. 
But where are we after we have undertaken the fact-finding mission and are left with 
‘fear’ and ‘hurt’? How is it that Sagar was able to shift from her ‘pain’ and ‘fear’ so 
that she could embrace a common project of equality and human rights?  
 
Exactly how Sagar makes the shift from being caught up in the hurt of who 
McAliskey is, to supporting her on the basis of the universal standards of equality 
and human rights is not clearly enunciated. How does Sagar move beyond her self-
needs/interests to articulate the communal and societal needs of social justice? I 
suggest that Sagar must first deal with the pain and hurt of what McAliskey’s mother 
represents, which can be placed in Brown’s logic of ressentiment and the question of 
‘who am I?’ In order to shift this logic of self-interest towards the communal issues 
of equality and human rights, which is ‘what do I want for us?,’ Sagar must 
undertake the work of self-reflection. According to a transversal approach, staying 
‘rooted’ means something akin to what McWilliams has to say: 
 
I don’t think I would have ever shed my nationalism. I have fairly strong 
beliefs, and I believe in my identity, and I am very proud of my identity. 
But I don’t need to superimpose it on someone else’s identity. I could 
never be supportive of someone who denies me that identity, or 





By remaining ‘rooted,’ Sagar experiences hurt and fear in her relationship to 
McAliskey. Transversalism holds that it is necessary to both ‘root’ and ‘shift,’ so, 
how does Sagar ‘shift’? Recall that ‘shifting’ in transversalism is a matter of putting 
oneself in the situation of those with whom one is in dialogue and from whom one is 
also different. This would seem to offer only an explanation for the dialogical 
process that Sagar engages with in relation to other members of the NIWC. But 
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recall that Sagar begins by indicating that for her the work began first as a matter of 
self-reflection. She begins by saying that she realised that she would have to confront 
her own fears and her own bigotry about Devlin in order to even think about 
McAliskey. I want to suggest that this sounds very similar to Swanton’s 
development of Murdoch’s example of M and D. In the next section I explore how 
we can read Sagar’s account through this framework and in so doing demonstrate 
how Swanton’s PVE might be operationlised.  
A pluralistic virtue ethics account of the McAliskey case 
How can we understand how Sagar progresses from one set of feelings – ‘hurt,’ 
‘pain’, ‘fear’ and ‘bigotry’ – to another? My assertion is that she does have to 
progress from these feelings in order to arrive at her final point, which was to 
exercise the ethical principles of equality and human rights. Sagar frames her 
feelings as ‘personal.’ They are something that are hers. The progression that 
happens is based on an internal scrutiny that is undertaken by Sagar in relation to, 
not only herself, but to Bernadette Devlin. When Sagar invokes the notion of a 
standard – ‘equality’ and ‘human rights’ – to try to understand what is happening, all 
that is suggested is that Sagar has been able to ‘forget the name’ Devlin. I do not 
want to suggest that such standards are not important, or not necessary. What I do 
want to suggest though is that something important does end up getting missed, or 
obscured, in our understanding of what is happening by invoking the standard as 
explanation.  
What is obscured by focussing on the standard is the central role of self-reflection 
that was necessary before Sagar could arrive at a point where she could make the 
shift to focus on the standard of ‘equality’ and ‘human rights.’ Indeed, is this not 
exactly what we see when Sagar recounts how she had to confront her own ‘fear’ 
and ‘bigotry’ before she come to the realisation that this case was about ‘human 
rights’ and specifically, ‘prisoner rights, and had anyone else been in Róisín’s place, 
who her mother was would not have mattered’
762
? Sagar appears to have arrived at 
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her conclusions about McAliskey, separate from her mother, only after a process of 
reflection. Sagar’s starting point is not that of a unitary account of value. Does Sagar 
not look at herself and her attitude towards Devlin and then McAliskey and seek to 
improve herself? Surely, the language she invokes – ‘my own bigotry’ – suggests 
just this. Do we not all feel shame when we look inside and find our own feelings of 
‘bigotry’, ‘hurt’ and ‘fear’? Dissatisfied with herself, does she look again? 
Dissatisfied that she cannot see McAliskey except as the daughter of Devlin, does 
she not indicate that this is not good enough? Does she not ask herself – how can I 
do better?  
These are not questions that are about one sort of life or another. These are questions 
that have to do with value. The profoundly personal aspect of self-reflection offers 
insight into the most acute needs of any particular situation. A pluralistic conception 
of virtue ethics draws on and relates such knowledge to cognitive human interests 
and communicative action. This relation results in the dismantling of the barrier 
between knowledge and value. In PVE all knowledge has an ethical component and 
thus, is related in some way to action (praxis) whether communicative or reflective. 
This suggests that all learning has a value component. That is, since knowledge is 
not value neutral, all learning entails an encounter with knowledge as value. Self-
reflection offers the means by which the value of any knowledge is made explicit to 
the agent. A transversal approach appears to give focus only to the act of 
communication. There is no explanation that is offered of what internal work was 
undertaken by Sagar in order to be able to shift from the starting point (that 
McAliskey’s mother was Bernadette and the hurt this caused for Sagar) to Sagar’s 
subsequent position of taking a stand on behalf of McAliskey on the basis of 
equality. Drawing on the PVE framework provides clues to these inner processes and 
clarifies the inner picture.  
Transversal politics does not assume that the agent has all the information she needs. 
Getting to the ‘truth’ demands open communication with others. Swanton argues via 
Nietzsche that because the agent is prone to ‘ignorance, cultural embeddedness and 
 




 it is necessary not only to see others (in the sense that Murdoch 
develops ‘unselfing’), but that it is also necessary to integrate the self’s own 
perspectives. Sagar brought to the open discussions within the NIWC both her own 
identity as a Protestant working class community activist and her commitment to the 
universal principles of equality and human rights. How did she integrate these 
perspectives? How does the individual go about integrating her own perspectives 
with those of others? The hard work in doing this is captured in the following quote 
from, Susan, another NIWC member from a Protestant background: 
There was a point when stuff came in and I looked and it was so clearly 
propaganda……[We had been] asking for improvement in] the 
conditions she was kept in, and we wanted to see their policies on 
women in the prison around health care….[But] I [thought], ‘This 
woman has now become Sinn Féin’s latest pinup, and I can’t listen to 
this stuff any more.’ And I said that at a meeting and the horns came out, 
and I felt isolated….
764
 
I offer this quote to reinforce the argument that I made in Chapter Two - that 
coalitions place the self in an ethical situation. That is, the agent is in a concrete 
relation to others with whom she is working towards a concrete goal. Susan, like 
Sagar, is in a relation to those other members in the NIWC working towards the goal 
of coming to a position on the McAliskey case. This practical ethics, remember, 
‘takes its start from a plight’ - the plight that each of us is epistemically limited. 
Transversal politics works to lessen this. Susan, in the open discussions of the 
NIWC shared her perspective, but to share our perspective carries a risk – Susan 
found that ‘the horns came out.’ She was hurt when she discovered that several 
women were behind attacks that were voiced. Therefore, to say that each of us is 
epistemically limited is not only what our plight is about. PVE highlights the need 
there is to integrate perspectives not just as an epistemological need, but as a social 
need. Problems in the world must be solved in ways we can live with.  
It is only through an integration of perspectives that a less limited response to the 
world is possible. It is in this sense – the task of integrating perspectives – that PVE 
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is profoundly practical. How to go about ‘integrating perspectives,’ remains 
unelaborated in ‘transversalism.’ We find ourselves perplexed when we try to 
understand what exactly has shifted for Sagar so that she now can access and be 
motivated by the universal notions of equality and human rights.  
Problem solving 
Swanton describes ‘virtues of practice’
765
 as ‘a dynamic process of feedback, 
learning and modification’ and groups them into three main categories. The first she 
specifies as the ‘virtues of focus’: 
 
An attempt to solve a problem requires that the participants have the 
disposition and ability to establish and maintain a shared focus. A shared 
focus suggests the nature of the information likely to be relevant, 
motivates the involvement of the parties, and provides a context for the 
operation of dialogical virtues involved in disclosure, testing and 
facilitation. While such a focus is frequently established (and  
maintained) implicitly, more explicit moves may be required when the 
topic is difficult….Where this is required, the virtues of focus require not 
just acumen, discipline, sensitivity, and wisdom, but also may require 
courage and persistence. There is a need, then, for virtues designed to 




The second group of the virtues of practice are ‘the imaginative and analytic virtues’ 
that are required to facilitate constraint integration.
767
 These include insight and 
depth of understanding, creativity and a commitment to so-called ‘valid 
information.’ Whereas, Yuval-Davis places emphasis on the ‘message’ as opposed 
to the ‘messenger,’ Swanton places emphasis on the agent’s ability to argue for 
herself, as well as, to attend openly to the validity claims of the other dialogue 
participants. A commitment to correct information consists in: 
 
….dispositions to disclose one’s own perspective, interests and beliefs, 
to gather data and acknowledge facts, to publicly test claims made during 
the process of problem resolution, to acknowledge expertise and to trust 
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that expertise, to recognise when trust is misplaces, and to change one’s 




The third group comprises the specifically ‘dialogical virtues,’ which are the virtues 
specific to group contexts. It is within this context that Swanton for the first time 
approaches and grapples with the issue of power. Swanton acknowledges that 
integral to most groups are power imbalances which will result in an exclusion of 
some participants from dialogue. Groups that appear to be free from power 
imbalances are only able to maintain solidarity through the acceptance of a shared 
belief system. Yet, even in these groups, there will still be those left out of the 
dialogue either because their views are not given serious consideration, or because 
they lack the confidence to defend their views. It is because of this that it is not 
enough to articulate one’s own views, but it is also necessary to articulate one’s 
views in such a way that others are encouraged to also articulate their views. This 
becomes paramount when there may be a disagreement of views.  
Solving disagreements, Swanton argues, requires ‘virtues of practice’ among which 
are dispositions to engage well in and to learn from dialogue with others. So, rather 
than ignoring opposing views, dialogue should be positively encouraged. The 
‘virtues of practice’ have the aim of facilitating problem solving vis-à-vis the 
‘constraint integration.’ Swanton writes: ‘The process of integration is not a process 
of choosing to ignore certain constraints while focussing on others, of choosing one 
horn of a supposed dilemma over another. Rather the process is one of 
transformation of a problem.’
769
 It is through a process of specification and re-
specification that the ‘constraint structure’ of a problem becomes tractable since ‘the 
transformed specifications open up a richer range of possibilities for their 
satisfaction.’
770
 It is for this reason that the ‘virtues of practice’ are to be understood 
as dynamic and processual, including as they do ‘feedback, learning, and 
modification,’
771
 all of which contribute to bringing about successful ‘constraint 
integration.’ 
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Swanton’s model of ‘constraint integration’ differs therefore from straightforward 
problem-solving in that it does not simply amount to a choice between alternative 
solutions, but is rather ‘an active, developmental process of transformation at an 
intellectual, emotional and behavioural level.’
772
 This dynamic, processual model 
does not develop by the agent making snap decisions monologically. Rather, it 
develops initially through the formulation of a mission and/or vision. This initial 
step is deepened through a narrowing of the ‘constraint structure.’ Constraints must 
be understood in their specific context while imaginative deliberation constructs 
solutions that incorporate various values. Therefore, behavioural changes must be 
adapted in order that further constraints do not block possible solutions to the 
problem-solving at hand. 
Where Yuval-Davis acknowledges that the transversal approach falters when 
conflict arises because there is no built in transversal ‘way of deciding what to 
choose,’ PVE rephrases the problematic as one to do with providing an ethical 
account of the affective preconditions necessary. PVE offers a picture of the self at 
work in problem-solving situations that approaches the task through the active 
cultivation of the virtues, where virtue is understood as a prototype that is, it is a 
framework of sorts that is broadly constrained and is further elaborated, or made 
more specific, through the integrating roles of love, respect and creativity (covered 
in the previous chapter). It is the ‘contourings’ of love, respect and creativity that 
make virtue (the prototype) applicable in concrete situations.  
 
Finally, I turn to the issue of how agents finally do formulate the ‘I want this for us’ 
that I have argued is the defining task of identity politics. This articulation calls upon 
the agent to formulate a judgment and this judgment relies on a certain type of self-
knowledge. Looking at the transversal approach, defining a shared vision, is done 
through ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting.’ Recall that ‘rooting’ has the aim of honouring 
diversity, of allowing the agent to maintain her identity and to be assured that she 
can walk away from any dialogic encounter just the same as she was when she 
walked in. ‘Shifting’ has the aim of being a way in which the agent can listen to what 
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another participant in the dialogue has to say. It has the more global aim of putting 
oneself in the ‘situation’ of those with whom one is in dialogue. ‘Transversal 
politics’ is based on a commitment that difference should encompass equality. 
Therefore all participants share a commitment to the importance of difference and 
must (in ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’) work to acknowledge power structures that 
function to disrupt equality. Yet, it still remains to me unclear here on what basis, 
once the agent has ‘put herself in the situation of the other’ she will formulate her 
judgments (on what projects to undertake). Does the ‘shifting’ run the risk of 
‘colonising’ the place of the other? What are the dispositions necessary to undertake 
the ‘shifting’ in such a way that it does not efface differences? Is this a self-
interested ‘shift’? Is it a ‘shift’ motivated by friendship? What is made clear is that 
the ‘shift’ is undertaken from a ‘rooted’ position, which is a position of self-
knowing. The self-knowing is an awareness of the agent’s social positionings vis-à-
vis the different other.  This self-knowledge remains in the position of a cognitive 
self-knowledge. Because the ‘transversal’ approach does not have the aim to 
transform the self, but rather to preserve it in its difference, this is not an ethical self-
knowledge.   
 
A PVE account, because it is motivated by virtue, depends upon a different sort of 
self-knowledge. The question needs to be raised though as to whether or not this 
self-knowledge is in any way linked to the agent’s positioning in regards to gender, 
race, sexuality, etc. Swanton does provide the necessary context for the agent – she 
is not the autonomous, lone, rational chooser, doing it all on her own. She is firmly 
rooted in the context of her social structure. Recall that it is through the contextual 
situation of the agent, Swanton develops the modes of moral acknowledgement as 
love, respect and creativity.  
 
A shift in focus away from identity issues per se and towards a vision of the 
common, towards the problem of collective action in a context of inequality and 
difference, relies on a particular conception of the person and a certain type of 
agency, which although not ever assured, must be conceived in the agent through the 
formation of critical self-reflection, and a willingness to engage in action. PVE 
 
 258  Chapter Eight
 
highlights the integrative function of virtue in the good life [and focuses] on virtue as 
a property of human beings in which their ‘inner’ lives are in order, and in harmony 
with and expressed by, their ‘outer’ actions. The agent of virtue ethics is deeply 
reflective. It is only the agent herself who knows whether or not her actions match 
her intentions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a very a preliminary sketch of what my suggestion for a 
feminist pluralistic virtue ethics might look when applied to a specific context/event. 
I have suggested that hints of the explanatory power of a PVE approach can be made 
use of to understand and evaluate some aspects of the recent case of the NIWC. I 
have also indicated how a PVE account can help to enrich some aspects of a 
‘transversal’ politics approach. Much of the literature frames this case within the 
methodology of ‘transversal politics,’ or coalition politics, and generally interprets it 
as an example of the possibility and success of practicing transversal politics as 
opposed to identity politics. I did not so much take issue with transversalism as an 
accurate and fruitful methodology for interpreting and understanding the NIWC. 
Instead, my aim was to show how a PVE account can be operationlised and in so 
doing, I noted the overlaps, as well as, the divergences between the transversal 
approach and the pluralistic virtue ethical approach. Although there are certain 
similarities between ‘transversalism’ and PVE, the latter offers a richer and broader 
framework through which to understand the self in feminist identity politics and 
thus, may serve as a resource to enrich the transversal politics framework.  
In PVE, identities can be crucially reconnected to the dialogic process; the inner 
work of the agent involved in creating new meaning (self in relation to other, and 
self in relation to context – in short, identity) is brought into focus; and the 
social/political and structural nature of the dialogic process between the self and the 
other is developed. A PVE framework, as I have developed it, in which we have in 
place a rich account of the self, allows for the filling in of important gaps in feminist 
theory. We can draw on pluralistic virtue ethics to outline the attitudes and 
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dispositions that diverse groups of women working across difference cultivate in 
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9 
Conclusion – Reformulating feminist identity politics 
and the problematic of ethics as praxis 
My articulation of ethics as praxis develops out of a dissatisfaction with the two 
apparently mutually exclusive prospects that contemporary feminism as a collective 
political movement faces – either a politics of difference disengaged from a 
contestable ethical grounding, or its opposite, the fruitless search for a normative 
framework that could transcend the conflicts of difference (of race, gender, class, 
sexuality relations). In order to avoid, without ignoring, either of these poles, I found 
it necessary to use as a starting point those postmodern accounts that take seriously, 
and as a starting point, the issues of difference/diversity and conflict. Although the 
postmodern accounts of Brown and Butler are most generally taken as paradigmatic 
of postmodernism’s indifference to the real, lived experience of identity – as felt 
suffering and real injustice - I find in both of these theorists’ accounts a productive 
alternative to the impasse. Both Brown and Butler take as their starting points the 
context of the complexity and multiplicity of the forms of antagonism that are 
inherent in gender, sex and race relations. Read together, Brown and Butler allow for 
a radical reformulation of identity politics as an ethical problematic. By taking a 
genealogical and historical approach to subject constitution, they allow for a centring 
of the suffering and antagonisms and irreducible embodiment at work in the 
constitution of subjects. They re-articulate the problematic as an issue of 
conceptualising freedom as a praxis which entails a ceaseless accountability. By 
bringing into dialogue traditions that do not normally engage with each other – 
postmodernism, feminism, moral philosophy, in particular, virtue ethics – I 
scrutinize the possibility of ethics as a problematic for feminist identity politics.  
 
Understanding ethics as praxis suggests that what is central in situations of collective 
political projects is the issue of alterity, which frames and forms the constitution and 
transformation of identities. Centring alterity suggests that there is hard work to be 
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undertaken if feminists are to forge and sustain collective political bonds. Indeed, 
according to difference feminists like Hartsock, women’s experiences are only 
recoverable within a framework of doing and not within a framework of being.
 
It is 
in recovering the collective dimension of difference feminism as collective political 
activity that Hartsock reminds feminism that women must struggle to undertake 
work as a group. Acknowledging the hard work that is involved in working as a 
group is not enough. On-the-ground examples, like those provided by the NIWRM, 
show that difference feminism meets its limits if in order to create a feminist 
solidarity based on sameness results in a denial of differences. Avoiding diversity 
ultimately leads to irresolvable splits and fragmentations.  
 
Ethics as a problematic for collective feminism cannot be separated from the 
antagonisms of multiple and diverse identities. Diversity feminists like Collins 
critique the racial bias of the identity of the subject in difference feminist theory. It is 
not possible, nor is it desirable, to expand the unified category of mainstream 
difference feminism. Rather, a separate category for ‘Black women’ is staked out 
and insists on attentiveness and responsiveness. Black feminist organisations like the 
Crunk Feminist Collective work from within Collins’ framework and press the issue 
to collective feminism that acknowledgement of, and responsibility for, the other 
must be what serves to motivate the desire for collective political struggles against 
oppression. Diversity feminists, like the Black Women’s Blueprint, insist that part of 
the difficult work of collective politics is about validating ‘the already historically 
entrenched’ identities we mutually constitute. Antagonism and conflict can never be 
‘left at the door.’  
 
Because difference and conflict cannot be transcended, there is no pre-given 
consensus or higher moral authority that individuals participating in collective 
political projects have access to. Postmodernist accounts like those of Brown and 
Butler work to accept the thesis of diversity feminists that gender difference cannot 
ever alone achieve anything close to an accurate description of gender, racial, class, 
or sexual identity. They begin from the premises that to try to pretend otherwise is to 
avoid confronting the inextricable link between contesting and refiguring mutually 
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constituting and mutually reinforcing identities. Brown articulates politicized 
identities as ‘injured states,’ thereby re-framing the debate of feminist identity 
politics in terms of psychic states. Recovering the affective dimension of identity 
politics pushes feminism to pay attention to the investments that are at work in the 
entrenchment of political positions that lead to a truncated and distorted desire in 
political aspirations. It is only through an ethical rephrasing of the problematic that 
‘desire’ can be transformed. 
 
Butler foregrounds the body (as gendered, as sexed, as raced) as the locus of an 
ethical and political struggle. The two cannot be separated. She renders ethics 
embodied. She offers a radical rethinking of the boundaries and content of ethics. 
Rather than transcending social and political conflict, she offers an understanding of 
ethics as transformative of difference and conflict. This ethics does not take as its 
task the working out of universal normative criteria that the subject follows in each 
and every instance. Rather, this ethics requires the cultivation of dispositions that 
would allow the subject to surmise in each instance what is the better way to respond 
in a situation in which she has to acknowledge and take responsibility for ‘the 
already historically entrenched’ collective identities at play. The accountability that 
Butler exhorts is one that requires not only active engagement of the individual, but 
also emphasises the necessity of formulating judgments without recourse to the 
assurance of normative criteria.  
 
These formulations of ethics, I maintain, hold in common a starting point 
comparable to a distinction made in moral philosophy exemplified by Sandel’s 
critique of liberalism. Sandel draws out the inner life of the agent as a matter of self-
knowledge and self-reflection. Self-reflection is what is necessary to carry out 
transformative work on the self. However, although Sandel centres the irreducible 
role of self-reflection in the project of embodying the subject, his subject reaches its 
limit since alone it is incapable of elaborating how it can take up a non-appropriative 
relation to the other. Foucault elaborates Sandel’s self-reflective self. What is found 
in Foucault is that when the self ‘turns its lights’ inwards, self-knowledge and self-
reflection are mediated through ‘care of the self,’ which deepens understandings of 
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the inner life of the self and its relation to the project of self-transformation. 
Foucault’s work is in the same timber as Sandel’s, but moves further and more 
radically to establish a new mode of relating to the self in which freeing oneself of 
identity is not what is stressed. Foucault insists that the relations we hold with our 
selves are not those of identity, but ones of ‘differentiation, of creation, of 
innovation.’ 
 
Ethics as praxis involves the self in relation to itself, in relation to others, to values 
and to projects and this sort of work necessitates a turn inwards. The turn is one that 
is enabled by the self’s relation to others and is undertaken for the purpose of being 
able to work better with others. Therefore, the self is not left unchanged, but is 
transformed by and through this inward turn. Foucault emphasises the element of 
‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heatou) involved in this work and draws out how this 
entails hard work – there are many tasks which the self must intentionally undertake 
here. Although Foucault’s ‘care of the self’ does not entirely neglect the issue raised 
by ressentiment of the presumption of the direction that the telos takes, I turn to 
Murdoch’s work which shows how within an ethics of transformation (praxis) this 
problem can be much more richly elaborated.  
 
Both Foucault and Murdoch counter those approaches to ethics which are most 
familiar. Rather than taking the task of ethics to be only that of working out 
normative criteria, they steer us through the complexities of alterity and identity. 
Foucault shows us how to ready ourselves for the task of alterity. Murdoch pushes us 
to elaborate a normative vocabulary that may be up to the task of such work. Choice-
guiding words will never suffice. Murdoch points us to look in the direction of virtue 
ethics. Foucault does not shy away from this ethical tradition. Indeed, for him, virtue 
is counter to those moral systems of regulation and order. He posits virtue as 
locatable in the resistance of the established order of things. This follows the thread 
beginning already with Butler, who situates herself in this same ethical tradition. So, 
it is here that I follow this thread and turn to virtue ethics. What is at stake is whether 
this helps us to constructively confront the question of responsibility and respect for 
the other in a manner that can motivate and sustain struggles against oppression.  
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In turning to an elaboration of a richer normative vocabulary through an engagement 
with virtue ethics, I acknowledge and interrogate the feminist hesitation in endorsing 
such undertakings. Taking Okin’s critique as paradigmatic of many feminist 
misgivings, I acknowledge and endorse the concern that feminism should be wary of 
working from a prior list of virtues, this is after all, counter to my own project. A 
careful reading of Aristotle reveals there is scope for an enquiry into how a reflecting 
self would fill out the idea of choice-worthiness.  
 
Some feminists have engaged with virtue ethics. Tessman posits a eudaimonistic 
virtue ethics as critical for feminism. I argue against this because it ushers in the 
danger of rendering the notion of ‘the good’ incontestable and finalisable. For a 
virtue ethical approach to allow for the radical contingency of social relations at 
work in collective political projects, I argue that eudaimonia, either explicit or 
implicit, must be approached as fully contestable. Only by loosening the connection 
between the virtues and eudaimonia can the virtues be developed for ends other than 
eudaimonia.  
 
Nussbaum is another notable feminist who draws on virtue ethics for emancipatory 
feminist aims. Her CA lists those human capabilities that all nations should provide 
support for and that governments should be pressured to guarantee to all citizens to 
be so enabled. She is both committed to a standard Aristotelian virtue ethics and 
modern liberalism. Her liberal account of human nature assumes that agents are 
autonomous decision makers, and therefore, privileges the agent’s capability to 
choose, develop and maintain the functions necessary for choice making. 
Nussbaum’s work is problematic for my project because she endorses a universal 
and spelled out account of human flourishing.  
 
Finally, I turn to a pluralistic account of virtue ethics, which as a non-eudaimonistic 
virtue ethics elaborates a self that although ‘inextricably’ related to the good, posits 
the notion of the good as not finally definable. Only a non-eudaimonistic virtue 
ethics in which virtue is not an end state of perfection, allows for virtue, and thus, the 
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practicing of virtues, to be construed as a ‘dynamic process-notion.’ A number of 
ethical concepts - such as love, respect, and creativity– contribute to enriching the 
picture of the inner life of the self. I show how PVE addresses the central notion of 
‘desire’ as comprised of both ‘vision’ and ‘attention’ in order to show the picture of 
the self with the full resources of an inner life. A complex normative vocabulary 
becomes available that paints a picture of the person that provides the basis for a 
richer approach to the ethical concerns raised in identity politics.  
 
The strengths of a PVE can be illustrated in examining what contribution it makes to 
on the ground situations of collective political organising across difference and 
conflict. It shows how identities can be crucially reconnected to the dialogic process. 
It brings into focus the inner work of the agent involved in creating the new. It 
highlights and develops the social/political and structural nature of the dialogic 
process between the self and the other. A PVE framework as I have developed, in 
which we have in place a rich account of the self, is able to fill in important gaps in 
feminist theory. We can draw on PVE to outline the attitudes and dispositions that 
diverse groups of women working across difference cultivate in order to establish 
non-repressive, affirmative political connections.  
 
The originality of this work lies in how it is situated between feminist theory, 
political theory, identity politics and moral philosophy. By taking an on-going debate 
in feminist theory/identity politics and suggesting a re-framing in language closer to 
moral philosophy, the research offers an exploration of the problematic in ways that 
have not yet been extensively explored. By probing, in particular, the new work in 
virtue ethics of philosophers like Swanton, this thesis uses it in ways that do not 
appear to have been explored yet for the contribution it could make to the feminist 
identity politics debate. It is in this way that this thesis makes a contribution to 
expanding the resources available to feminism to deal with difference and conflict, 
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Although the main focus of the research lies in the area of the problematics of 
feminist identity politics, it also critically engages with the newly developing field of 
modern day virtue ethics. As such this project makes a contribution to this field. 
There is scope in virtue ethics and PVE in particular, to be developed further in 
political theory and feminist theory. As of yet, aside from Tessman and Nussbaum, 
there has not been a lot of interest in political theory, in particular in feminism to 
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